Firefighter Brice Clayton Trossbach - Line of Duty Death (LODD)

AFTER ACTION REPORT AND IMPROVEMENT PLAN (AAR/IP)

Final Version

SECTION 1: LETTER FROM FIRE CHIEF CHRISTOPHER BELL

On June 27, 2023, units from the St. Mary's County Volunteer Fire Service, along with units from Naval Air Station Patuxent River Air Station Fire Department, were dispatched to a reported house fire at 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive in Leonardtown, Maryland. While entering the first floor for fire attack, and shortly after crossing the threshold of the front door, there was a series of catastrophic collapses that led to the first floor collapsing into the basement, leaving Firefighter Trossbach deeply entrapped in the debris. During the initial collapse, at least two individuals were able to quickly grab hold of Firefighter Trossbach for a few seconds before losing their grip on him. Tragically, after a long and exhausting effort, Firefighter Brice Clayton Trossbach died in the line of duty, resulting from his response to the structure fire.

The tragedy of Brice's loss alone is unthinkable, but it didn't stop there. Although Brice responded to this incident as a career firefighter with the Navy, Brice and a countless number of family members and lifelong friends are also members of the Leonardtown Volunteer Fire Department. The tragic loss of Brice will forever be felt by the Trossbach Family and the entire County of St. Mary's, who lost a caring and dedicated public servant that day.

In great humility and transparency, immediately following the tragic loss of Brice, the Leonardtown Volunteer Fire Department leadership established a Safety Review Committee, made up of subject matter experts from outside of St. Mary's County, to conduct a thorough, transparent, and honest review of the incident. The Committee was asked to gather relevant facts and information to evaluate all factors that contributed to the tragic outcome of the Deer Wood Park Dr. Incident. In addition, the Committee was tasked with making recommendations on systemic changes and measures needed to prevent or minimize the impact of future, similar events.

This report and the countless hours of work by the Committee are dedicated to Brice and the entire Trossbach family, in hopes that the lessons learned in this report will prevent future tragedies like this in the future. This is but one way that Brice's memory will live on forever in fire departments across the world.

Christopher Bell
Fire Chief
Leonardtown Volunteer Fire Department

SECTION 2: FIREFIGHTER BRICE TROSSBACH

Brice was a lifelong resident of St. Mary's County, proud of his heritage in the farming and first responder community. He attended Father Andrew White Catholic School and was a 2015 graduate of Leonardtown High School. Brice loved spending every minute with his fiancée, Cheyenne, and their St. Bernard, Molly. He grew up on the family farm helping raise animals, participating in 4H, and annually in the St. Mary's County Fair.

Growing up in the fire department alongside his father, brother, and cousins, it was apparent that Brice was selfless and thrived to serve his community. At 16 years old, he began his fire career as a probationary member and then worked his way to junior member, before becoming a full member at the age of 18 with the Leonardtown Volunteer Fire Department and later the Bay District Volunteer Fire Department.

In 2019, he began his career as a firefighter with the Naval District of Washington at the Naval Air Station Patuxent River Fire Department. Being a career firefighter was in his blood and was a lifelong dream and a distinctive honor, and a privilege.

Firefighter Brice Clayton Trossbach lost his life on Tuesday, June 27, 2023, after sustaining injuries in the line of duty while responding to a house fire in Leonardtown, Maryland.

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SECTION 3: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"For the past fifty years, the fire service has taken great strides to properly investigate tragic Line of Duty Deaths (LODD) to identify the contributing causes and factors that led to the outcome and to provide corrective actions that must be taken to prevent a recurrence. The methodology of conducting such an investigation has also evolved. Most commonly, an ad hoc group of people assigned to the organization impacted is appointed to identify, investigate, and hypothesize what strategical and tactical acts or omissions contributed to the tragic outcome.

Today, the fire service has benefited from a more advanced investigative process learned from law enforcement, the military, and other private sector industries like the aviation community. In this format, teams comprised of subject matter experts from outside of the organization or some combination thereof probe into both the events themselves and the managerial control systems that contributed to the LODD.

Fire Service personnel who have reviewed and immersed themselves in the study of LODD reports know that LODDs are rarely simple and rarely result from a single act or omission. Instead, there are many different critical factors linked together by a series of operational mistakes, violations, omissions, and chance. The unthinkable happens when this chain of tragedy comes together with outdated or unclear policies, resource deficiencies, qualification inequities, and a mission that has lost focus."

If the first three paragraphs of this summary look and sound familiar, it should. It was taken directly from the Frederick County, Maryland, Division of Fire and Rescue Services, External Safety Review Panel's Line of Duty Death Report, for Battalion Chief Josh Laird. I had the distinct honor and privilege of leading the exceptional members of that team as well.

I bring the Frederick County report up for one single, but widely overarching reason. Gordon Graham, a renowned expert in risk management, has reminded us for years that there are no new ways firefighters are getting hurt or killed. Over the past six years, the Baltimore/Washington region has experienced eight operational line-of-duty deaths, in six separate incidents, of which three internal reports have been completed. Although there are still three outstanding reports (two after the release of this report), in comparison, just as Gordon Graham avowed, the contributing factors, findings, and recommendations will be sadly redundant to these and other LODD reports. In addition to the commonality of the technical causes of this incident, the Committee heard testimony during interviews and observed administrative contributing factors that will also be addressed.

There was no reason to recreate many of the findings and recommendations from the Frederick County report. The similarities in technical acts, errors, and omissions are eerily similar, even though the incidents played out differently. Failures in communications, command and control, accountability, risk assessment, size-up, and a lack of standard operating guidelines all played a

major part in this tragedy. The Committee is confident that many of the findings and recommendations in the Frederick County report are completely applicable in this report.

St. Mary's County Maryland, was established in 1637 and was home to the first Maryland Colony. It is well-known regionally for its serene farming, fishing, and crabbing communities. It has also experienced a steady population growth based on an increase in Washington D.C. long-distance commuters, and the expanding Patuxent River Naval Air Station military base. The county has seen its population double since 1970. Despite the population growth, the volunteer fire system operates with all volunteers, with the exception being on the EMS side, where there is a certain number of paid career employees.

The Committee wants to publicly state that the residents of St. Mary's County are incredibly fortunate to have such dedicated and committed volunteers. They are largely focused on improving the quality of life in their communities and do so with great pride in their achievements.

Notwithstanding, the Committee also found a smaller number of volunteer corporations and members, who have largely failed to keep up with modern fire service best practices and standards, resisting any attempt to improve themselves and the fire system overall. Conversely, many of the departments have worked tirelessly over the last several years to bring desperately needed operational and administrative changes to a growing service, only to be met with strong resistance by those companies who have taken their eyes off the original mission of the fire service. It was positive to see that those who are taking the right steps to continue to do so despite those who oppose progress. As St Mary's continues to grow, and the call volume continues to increase, there will need to be greater emphasis placed on a single county-wide operational and administrative system within the fire and EMS service. This in no way suggests the formation of a single unified department. It does suggest that the taxpayers, residents, and business owners deserve the same level of high-quality service, regardless of which specific fire company serves their community. To do this, elected officials and fire department leaders will need to work towards compliance with national standards and best practices, professional qualifications, county-wide standard operating guidelines, and, perhaps most importantly, individual and organizational accountability.

Perhaps the most important point before moving into the incident itself is this. The Committee, and every single individual who ever reads this report, will have the benefit and luxury of knowing every detail of this incident, after the fact. We have a good understanding of when the fire started, how it traveled, the impact that it had on the structure, the risks that were lying in wait, the mistakes that would be made, and the recommendations that could have prevented this from happening. No single fire officer on the scene that morning had the same advantage.

I urge everyone who reads this report to do so with the purposeful intention of not trying to find fault with any one single person involved in this incident. While you will find numerous

individuals who either misunderstood what they were sizing up, failed to act appropriately, failed to communicate critical threats, or omitted critical processes, not a single one of those issues or individuals identified can be blamed for this tragedy. Understanding how this tragedy occurred can only be understood by recognizing how each individual factor, combined with the existing latent conditions, aligned perfectly, setting the stage for what occurred.

It is my personal and professional opinion that one of the most important yet least understood critical factors to consider when examining human tragedy is the human performance factor; more specifically, understanding how the human body responds under extreme conditions such as time compression, complexity, and friction. Knowing and understanding this, moving into the future will help us gain a better understanding of why some of these acts, errors, and omissions occur, even though they are considered highly trained, competent, and capable firefighters.

To learn more about the important topic of human performance, I strongly urge readers to review Section 6: Human Performance Under Stress, of the *Frederick County Department of Fire and Rescue Services, Captain Josh Laird LODD After Action Report and Improvement Plan*. The information on human performance was written by FDNY Captain Jason Brezler from "Leadership Under Fire."

The findings and observations documented in this report come from interviews, audio recordings, and a review of a plethora of on-scene videos and photographs taken from arrival and throughout the incident. This facilitated the Committee's ability to have a firsthand look at conditions faced on the morning of June 27, 2023, at 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive in Leonardtown, Maryland.

At 04:04, St Mary's County Emergency Communications Center received notification from the resident's home alarm monitoring company reporting a smoke detector alarm on the main hall and 2nd floor. Just one minute later, a second call was received by the neighbor advising that the neighbor's house was on fire and everyone was out of the residence. This was followed by a third caller reporting the house was on fire. Deer Wood Park Drive is in a non-hydrant area of the county.

Chief 1 arrived on-scene at 04:15, which was eleven minutes after the first 911 call. While the Committee was unable to ever obtain any reports or documentation from the Maryland State Fire Marshal's Office for some undisclosed reason, interviews with investigators on the day of the fatality revealed that the fire had a significant head start before the first 911 call.

Chief 1 provided his Incident On-scene Report and then conducted a 360. Chief 1 communicated visible fire from the 1st and 2nd floor, and on the 360, and advised heavy fire conditions in the rear. Chief 1 did not physically assess conditions inside of the walkout basement but assumed there were no conditions based on the fact that he didn't see any while conducting his 360. Because we were unable to obtain a cause and determination report from the Maryland State Fire Marshal's office, we do not have empirical evidence to know where the fire originated. Based

on video and experience, the Committee feels comfortable with suggesting the fire either started on the exterior of the structure and quickly spread to interior portions of the basement and upper floors, or the fire originated in the basement and communicated up and out of the structure. In either case, evidence indicates that there was a fire in the basement, as crews unknowingly operated above it.

Based on his size-up, Chief 1 understood that he had heavy fire conditions in the rear of the structure, as well as fire on the 1st and 2nd floors, extending into the attic. He also observed a lack of fire spread in the attached garage on the Alpha/Delta corner. Chief 1 also observed what he described as defendable space, in a 2nd floor bedroom on the Alpha/Bravo side of the structure. As Chief 1 processed his size-up, his strategy was to operate in offensive mode, with an assumption that crews would begin with a transitional attack based on fire conditions, and assess the ability to move interior after conditions improve. During his interview, Chief 1 stated that his incident action plan (IAP) was to control the fire on the 1st and 2nd floor, while conducting a search of the one bedroom on the 2nd floor. While Chief 1 had a clear plan in mind, he did not provide important elements of the plan to all incoming units to ensure everyone was operating on the same page. By the time Engine 11 deployed its line in the front yard and began operating, the 2nd floor bedroom had become fully involved.

Engine 132 was the second arriving engine, so Chief 1 directed the officer (Acting Captain and victim) to advance a backup line for Engine 11. Once the crew from Engine 11 darkened down exterior fire conditions on the front porch, both Engine 11 and Engine 132 advanced their lines up onto the front porch. Chief 1 also assigned Chief 3B to assume the role of Division 1 supervisor. Video at this point shows full involvement of the 1st and 2nd floor, with visible signs of a major breakdown of structural components due to direct flame impingement because the drywall had decomposed.

Engine 63 (First due Tanker) arrived next, and Chief 1 directed them to advance a hoseline to Side Charlie. It is assumed that Chief 1's intention was to have them flank the fire on Side Charlie, but he did not provide them with that specific tactical direction. Video shows that Engine 63 was flowing its line directly into Side Delta of the structure, opposing the hoselines operating on the front porch and inside once crews advanced.

The Acting Captain on Engine 132 directed both of his firefighters to advance their line through a window and into the 1st floor, while he left his crew to operate with Engine 11's crew. For a short period of time, the crew from Engine 132 operated inside the structure, unsupervised, while Engine 132 Acting Captain remained on the porch. At this point, both Engine 132 and Engine 11 had advanced their hoselines inside the structure, operating about 8-10 feet apart. Chief 3B then entered through the front door, moving 4-5 feet to his left just inside the front door. Both the officer of Engine 11 and the Acting Captain of Engine 132 remained exterior just outside the front door.

Helmet cam video shows that both lines flowing wide open in the living room made little to no progress whatsoever. Despite the obvious indications that both hoselines were ineffective at darkening down the fire, Engine 132's Acting Captain directed Engine 11 Firefighter 2 to move in or get out, which is what Engine 11 Firefighter 2 did. He exited the structure saying he was burning up and handed the line to Engine 132's Acting Captain. Chief 1 was unaware that crews had made it inside.

This left Engine 132, Firefighter 1, Engine 132's Acting Captain, and Chief 3B all operating in the living room/foyer area. Video shows that less than a minute after taking Engine 11 hoseline, fire from the basement below appears to break through the drywall and come up behind Engine 132's Acting Captain who is now kneeling on the 1st floor.

Video at the same time also shows the crew from Engine 63 directing the stream from their hoseline into the 2nd floor, quadrant C. The entire 2nd floor exterior wall on Side Delta had largely burned away. The same video shows the roof and 2nd floor listing towards Side Alpha.

Suddenly video shows a catastrophic collapse, where the roof and 2nd floor drop onto the first floor and into the basement simultaneously. The Committee could not determine if the collapse occurred from the top of the structure downward, or if the 1st floor collapsed into the basement, bringing the top of the structure down.

Engine 132's Acting Captain dropped down into the basement immediately following the collapse. Chief 3B was able to make it back to the front door, where Engine 11's Lieutenant and others on the front porch were able to grab him and pull him outside. Engine 132, Firefighter 1 was able to grab onto the window that he entered, where Engine 132, Firefighter 2 reached in and pulled him out of the window.

Over the next two (2) hours, crews would work tirelessly to reach Engine 132's Acting Captain, who was heavily trapped in the basement, underneath a very large collapse pile. Engine 132's Acting Captain was removed and transported to a local hospital, where he was pronounced dead. The State of Maryland Autopsy report listed his cause of death as Multiple Injuries sustained as a result of becoming trapped in a house fire with structural collapse.

In nearly all LODD reports, most of the report's findings could be directly attributed to a failure to follow some type of written policy or procedure. That is not the case in this instance because system-wide in the St. Mary's County Fire Service, there are very few written approved policies relating to any type of structural firefighting or incident management. In 2024, this is unthinkable.

Following many hours of interviews and discussions with those who responded to the Deer Wood Park Drive incident, it appears that a dangerous triad of overconfidence, inexperience, and a lack of basic competency aligned with a high-risk operation, where little to no universal policies and procedures existed. It should not be a surprise that the parts of the operation that did go well did so because of the experience, knowledge, and competency of a select few.

The Committee wants to be clear about the above statement. Sadly, at some level, a lack of experience and incompetence exist in every fire department just as it does in every vocation. St. Mary's County is largely a rural county, where fires are infrequent (not non-existent) and call volume is relatively low. This means it takes considerable time to gain invaluable experience, which is critical to becoming a competent firefighter.

Unfortunately, experience is not something you can dream-up, or gain by listening to stories being told around the coffee table. It's not something you get from simply being at a fire; it's achieved through thousands of hours of training and, more importantly, by actually working at a fire. Even in the busiest departments in the country, experience is gained over considerable time in active duty.

There is nothing wrong with being inexperienced, as long as you are self-aware enough to know that you don't know what you don't know about a very complicated and demanding job. There appears to be a growing observation in the National Fire Service, where those lacking in legitimate tactical experience often have an illusion of superiority on the many different topics of firefighting strategies and tactics. This is not limited to new firefighters; it largely includes firefighters with plenty of time in the fire service, but very little technical experience. A failure to recognize that you don't know what you don't know is a very dangerous mindset, especially when in a position of supervising firefighters.

The greatest strengths of the St. Mary's County Fire Service are also its greatest weaknesses. A decentralized, all-volunteer system is a very complicated model. The Committee believes there are highly capable leaders (some formal, some informal) within the system who have the capability and desire to implement most of these recommendations. The only thing standing in their way is their peers in some of the other fire companies. If the St. Mary's County Fire Service fails, it will have failed from the inside out. This tragic event provides an opportunity for the St. Mary's County Fire Service to take difficult actions to address these issues once and for all. The Committee wishes them the best of luck in this important endeavor.

Larry Schultz - Safety Review Committee Lead

SECTION 4: FIRE AND RESCUE SYSTEM OVERVIEW

Section 4 provides an in-depth look at how Fire and Rescue Services in St. Mary's County are organizationally structured.

The St. Mary's County Fire System is a volunteer-staffed system that consists of seven (7) volunteer fire corporations. In addition, there are EMS services provided through a combination system that consists of eight (8) companies as well as the Department of Emergency Services.

Currently, the volunteer fire and rescue corporations consist of one (1) corporation that provides both fire and ambulance service, six (6) corporations that provide fire/rescue and medical first responder services, and seven (7) corporations that provide ambulance/EMS services only.

Volunteer Services are divided into two sections, governed by the Fireboard Association and Rescue Association. The Fire Departments have a County Fire Chief and Assistant Chief. The EMS companies have a County Rescue Chief and Assistant Chief. All entities work together with the Emergency Service Board, which reports to the County Commissioners.

The Department of Emergency Services currently consists of uniformed and non-uniformed employees.

Leonardtown Volunteer Fire Department Company 1
22733 Lawrence Avenue P.O. Box 50 Leonardtown, Maryland 20650
(301) 475-8996

Mechanicsville Volunteer Fire Department (Company 2)
28165 Hills Club Road P.O. Box 37 Mechanicsville, Maryland 20659
(301) 884-4709

Bay District Volunteer Fire Department (Company 3)
46900 South Shangri-La Drive Lexington Park, Maryland 20650
(301) 863-8790

Ridge Volunteer Fire Department (Company 4)
13820 Point Lookout Road P.O. Box 520 Ridge, Maryland 20680
(301) 872-5571

Seventh District Volunteer Fire Department (Company 5)
21660 Colton's Point Road P.O. Box 206 Avenue, Maryland 20609
(301) 769-3600

Second District Volunteer Fire Dept. & Rescue Squad (Company 6)
45245 Drayden Road P. O. Box 1 Valley Lee, Maryland 20692
(301) 994-0751

Hollywood Volunteer Fire Department (Company 7)
P.O. Box 7 Hollywood, MD 20636
(301) 373-2900

Bay District Volunteer Fire Department (Company 9)
45774 Fire Department Lane P.O. Box 1440 California, Maryland 20619
(301) 737-0654

Leonardtown Volunteer Rescue Squad (Company 19)
22855 Lawrence Avenue P.O. Box 299 Leonardtown, Maryland 20650
(301) 475-8509

Mechanicsville Volunteer Rescue Squad (Company 29)
28120 Old Flora Corner Rd P.O. Box 15 Mechanicsville, Md. 20659
(301) 884-2900

Lexington Park Volunteer Rescue Squad (Company 39)
21633 Great Mills RD P.O. Box 339 Lexington Park, MD 20653-0339
(301) 862-3331

Lexington Park Volunteer Rescue Squad (Station 38)
45945 Buck Hewitt Rd. P.O. Box 339 Lexington Park, MD 20653-0339
(301) 863 9118 (301) 862-3331

Ridge Volunteer Rescue Squad (Company 49)
16515 Three Notch Road P.O. Box 456 Ridge, MD 20680
(301) 872-5970

Seventh District Volunteer Rescue Squad (Company 59)
21530 Colton's Point RD P.O. Box 7 Avenue, MD 20609
(301) 769-2287

Hollywood Volunteer Rescue Squad (Company 79)
43256 Rescue Lane P.O. Box 79 Hollywood, Maryland 20636-0079
(301) 373-3131

Advanced Life Support Unit
41550 Doctor's Crossing Way P. O. Box 653 Leonardtown, MD 20650-0709
(301) 690-2044


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Charles County
To Richmond
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To Baltimore
and Annapolis
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Golden Beach
New Market
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Country Lakes
Budds Creek
Oakville
Helen
Morganza
Chaptico
Loveville
Hollywood
Maddox
Clements
St. Mary's County
Government Campus
Wildewood
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Air Station
Compton
Avenue
Abell
Lexington
Park
Callaway
Great
Mills
Colltons Point
St Clements
Island
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Section 4.1 Current Volunteer Staffing

The volunteer segment of the fire and rescue system is comprised of approximately 420 Fire and 350 EMS volunteer members.

St. Mary's County participates in automatic reciprocal response with all jurisdictions that surround St. Mary's County, as well as federal fire rescue departments that operate both within and immediately outside of the county. This automatic mutual response relationship benefits St. Mary's County and all the partner agencies with which the County exchanges services. This relationship allows St. Mary's County to automatically dispatch the closest unit of the appropriate type, regardless of the jurisdiction from which it responds. The dispatch of the closest unit serves the best interest of the citizens in all participating jurisdictions. The dispatch of the closest unit serves the best interest of the citizens in all participating jurisdictions:

- Patuxent River Naval Air Station
- Calvert County, Maryland
- Charles County, Maryland
- Webster Field Annex, Maryland
- Prince George's County, Maryland

While mutual response relationships are important to providing effective service to citizens in border areas of the county, it is important to recognize that mutual response is only as effective as the assisting partners' ability to respond in a timely manner when dispatched. In several jurisdictions, St. Mary's County exchanges services with a predominantly volunteer-staffed service. In situations where an adequate number of operationally qualified volunteers are not available to respond when dispatched, the value of mutual response is diminished.

Like St. Mary's County, volunteer-staffed fire and rescue stations in neighboring jurisdictions are faced with the challenge of maintaining enough operational volunteers to meet the demand for services. This is particularly true during weekday hours. This issue can make reliance on mutual response problematic with some of the mutual response partner jurisdictions

Section 4.2 Administrative Structure



SECTION 5: PROJECT METHODOLOGY

5.1 Safety Review Committee

The following people comprise the Safety Review Committee, a multi-jurisdictional collection of Fire Department subject matter experts tasked with writing this After-Action Report.

- Lawrence Schultz, Assistant Fire Chief, Anne Arundel County Fire Department
- Richard Riley, Volunteer Duty Chief, Prince George's County Fire Department
- Carroll Spriggs, Assistant Chief, Prince George's County Fire Department
- Mark Trowbridge, Chief, Mechanicsville Volunteer Fire Department
- Daniel McMaster, Deputy Fire Chief, Alexandria VA Fire Department
- Timothy Kernan, Division Chief, Anne Arundel County Fire Department

5.2 Interview Process

On July 12, 2023, Leonardtown Volunteer Fire Chief Chris Bell, with the support of the St. Mary's County Volunteer Fire Department, and elected officials from St. Mary's County approved establishing a Safety Review Committee (SRC) to conduct a detailed, transparent, and honest review of the Line of Duty Death (LODD) of Firefighter Brice Trossbach at 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr.

The SRC initially collaborated with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) investigators to obtain information from interviews with personnel who operated at the Deer Wood Park Dr. incident. The SRC would like to thank NIOSH Investigators Murrey Loflin and Patrick Montague for their partnership during this process. The SRC worked together with the NIOSH team over the next several weeks, examining the events surrounding the incident, particularly those that contributed to the line-of-duty death of Firefighter Brice Trossbach.

Interviews with key individuals from the first alarm assignment were conducted to gather a more detailed accounting of fireground operations, communications, and observations during the incident. The goal of the interviews and review of all audio and visual evidence was to determine a precise sequence of actions prior to, during, and after the MAYDAY event. With prior permission, interviewees participated in recorded interviews, allowing the SRC to ensure accuracy and transparency in the interviewee's events and actions.

Throughout the investigation, the SRC conducted more than 75 interviews with those who had direct knowledge of the events at 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr. on Tuesday, June 27, 2023. In addition, the SRC was provided with several videos, including helmet cams, and a countless number of still photos.

Those interviewed provided their observations and accounts of the events of June 27, 2023. The SRC applauds the members of the St. Mary's County Volunteer Fire Department for their honesty and transparency during the interview process; this report could not have been successful without their contributions.

It is important to remember two things. Throughout the duration of the incident, there were more than 100 responders at the scene on Deer Wood Park Drive. Many came after the MAYDAY occurred, and several more were at the scene prior, but were not directly exposed to the actions that occurred leading up to the event. The SRC interviewed those most likely to be able to provide information beneficial for this report. In the over 75 interviews conducted, there were some areas of the incident where there was great concurrence on what occurred, but in most circumstances, there was a wide array of very different perspectives. This is not unusual in these types of investigations.

In addition to the personnel interviews, additional information and data reviewed included the following:

- Maryland State Fire Marshal's Office
- St. Mary's County Public Safety Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) Data for incident: F231780017
- Audio radio transmissions, provided by the St. Mary's County Department of Emergency Services.
- Examination of Selected PPE Worn by LODD Firefighter Brice Trossbach during June 27, 2023 Structure Fire at 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr. Leonardtown, MD.
- Autopsy Report [of Brice Trossbach], State of Maryland Office of the Chief Medical Examiner.
- National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.
- NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction, National Fire Protection Association (2021).
- NFPA 1001, Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, National Fire Protection Association (2019).
- NFPA 1021, Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, National Fire Protection Association (2020).
- NFPA 1026, Standard for Incident Management Personnel Professional Qualifications, National Fire Protection Association (2018).
- NFPA 1403, Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions, National Fire Protection Association (2018).
- NFPA 1407, Standard for Training Fire Service Rapid Intervention Crew, National Fire Protection Association (2020).
- NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety, National Fire Protection Association (2020).
- NFPA 1700, Guide for Structural Fire Fighting, National Fire Protection Association (2021).

- NFPA 1720, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire Departments, National Fire Protection Association (2020).
- NIOSH Alert, Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Firefighters due to Truss System Failures, Centers for Disease Control (May 2005).
- International Fire Service Training Association, Essentials of Firefighting, 7th Edition, pg. 454 (Feb. 2019).
- UL's Fire Safety Research Institute (FSRI), Fire Dynamics Boot Camp, (last visited Apr. 6, 2022).
- Maryland Fire Service Health and Safety Consensus Standard, Maryland Occupational Safety and Health (MOSH), Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (Jan. 1, 2002).

5.3 Riding Assignments and Interviews

Interviewees are identified by position and role on the scene.

Unit	POSITION	NAME	INTERVIEWED
Chief 1	IC		Yes
Engine 1	Officer		Yes
Engine 1	Driver		Yes
Engine 1	FF		Yes
Engine 1	FF		Yes
Engine 1	FF		Yes
Truck 1	Officer		Yes
Truck 1	Driver		Yes
Truck 1	FF		No
Truck 1	FF		Yes
Tanker 1	Officer		Yes
Tanker 1	Driver		Yes
Squad 1	Officer		
Squad 1	Driver		
Squad 1	FF		
Squad 1	FF		Yes
Chief 6	IC Aide		Yes
Engine 6	Officer		
Engine 6	Driver		
Engine 6	FF		
Tanker 6	Officer		
Tanker 6	Driver		
Tanker 6	FF		
Tanker 6	FF		
Tanker 6	FF		
Chief 3B	Division 1		Yes
UNIT	POSITION	NAME	INTERVIEWED

Squad 3	Officer		Yes
Squad 3	Driver		Yes
Squad 3	FF		Yes
Squad 3	FF		Yes
Squad 3	FF		Yes
Squad 3	FF		Yes
Tanker 3	Officer		Yes
Tanker 3	Driver		Yes
BC 13	BC		
Engine 13	Officer		
Engine 13	Driver		Yes
Engine 13	FF		Yes
Engine 13	FF		Yes
Truck 13	Officer		Yes
Truck 13	Driver		Yes
Truck 13	FF		Yes
Truck 13	FF		Yes
DC 9	Officer		Yes
Safety 9	Safety		Yes
Engine 9	Officer		Yes
Engine 9	Driver		Yes
Engine 9	FF		Yes
Engine 9	FF		Yes
Chief 7A	RIT Group		Yes
Command 7	Officer		Yes
UNIT	POSITION	NAME	INTERVIEWED

Tanker 7	Officer		Yes
Tanker 7	Driver		Yes
Tanker 7	FF		Yes
Tanker 7	FF		Yes
Tanker 7	FF		Yes
Engine 7	Officer		Yes
Engine 7	Driver		Yes
Engine 7	FF		
Engine 7	FF		Yes
Truck 7	Officer		Yes
Truck 7	Driver		
Truck 7	FF		
Truck 7	FF		Yes
Squad 7	Officer		Yes
Squad 7	Driver		Yes
Squad 7	FF		Yes
Squad 7	FF		
Squad 7	FF		
Car 7	FF		
Car 7	FF		Yes
Car 7	FF		Yes
Car 7	FF		
Engine 4	Officer		Yes
Engine 4	Driver		
Engine 4	FF		Yes
Engine 4	FF		
Engine 4	FF		Yes
Tanker 4	Officer		
Tanker 4	Driver		Yes
UNIT	POSITION	NAME	INTERVIEWED

Utility 4	FF		
Utility 4	FF		
Utility 4	FF		
Utility 4	FF		
Utility 4	FF		
Utility 4	FF		
Squad 2	Officer		
Squad 2	Driver		
Squad 2	FF		
Squad 2	FF		
Engine 2	Officer		
Engine 2	Driver		
Engine 2	FF		
Engine 2	FF		
Engine 5	Officer		Yes
Engine 5	Driver		
Engine 5	FF		
Engine 5	FF		Yes
WS 5			
WS 5	Officer		
WS 5	Driver		
WS 5	FF		
	FF		
Tanker 5			
Tanker 5	Officer		Yes
Tanker 5	Driver		
	FF		Yes
Chief 5			
	Chief		Yes
Utility 1			
	FF		Yes
Chief 13			
	NDW		Yes

SECTION 6: WEATHER & ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

The June 27, 2023 forecast as recorded by Weather Underground was light rain and reports of isolated thunderstorms with both cloud-to-cloud and cloud-to-ground lighting. The temperature was 66 degrees Fahrenheit with winds SE at 1 mph gusting to 1.4 mph. Humidity was 98% with 0.07 inches of precipitation recorded

The following graphics were provided by the National Weather Service.



STATION INFO
ID: KNUI
NAME: St. Inigoes, Webster Field, Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Activity
LATITUDE: 38.14889
LONGITUDE: -76.42
ELEVATION: 20 ft
MNET: NWS/FAA

10 miles SE of the incident

Time (EDT)	2.0m Temperature °F	2.0m Dew Point °F	2.0m Wet bulb temperature °F	2.0m Relative Humidity %	10.0m Wind Speed mph	10.0m Wind Gust mph	10.0m Wind Direction	Pressure in	Sea level pressure in	Altimeter in	Weather conditions	Visibility miles
9:53	75.0	69.1	70.9	82	10.4		SSW	29.68	29.70	29.70	Clear	10.00
8:53	73.0	68.0	69.6	84	8.1		SSW	29.68	29.70	29.70	Clear	10.00
7:53	71.1	68.0	69.0	90	6.9		SSW	29.67	29.68	29.69	Clear	10.00
6:53	69.1	66.0	67.1	90	4.6		SW	29.66	29.68	29.68	Overcast	10.00
5:53	66.9	66.0	66.4	97	0.0		N	29.66	29.67	29.68	Clear	10.00
4:53	68.0	64.9	66.0	90	9.2		SSW	29.66	29.67	29.68	Clear	10.00
3:53	66.9	64.9	65.7	93	0.0		N	29.62	29.63	29.64	Mostly Clear	10.00
3:02	68.0	66.0	66.7	93	10.4		S	29.64		29.66	Rain, Mist	6.00
2:53	69.1	66.0	67.1	90	11.5	20.7	S	29.67	29.68	29.69	Thunder, Light Rain	7.00
1:53	68.0	66.9	67.3	96	6.9		SE	29.63	29.65	29.65	Light Rain/Thunderstorm	8.00
1:02	70.0	66.0	67.3	87	9.2		SSW	29.68		29.70	Light Rain/Thunderstorm	8.00
0:53	70.0	66.0	67.3	87	13.8	29.9	SW	29.69	29.71	29.71	Heavy Rain/Thunderstorm, Mist	2.00
0:51	69.8	66.2	67.4	88	16.1	31.1	SW	29.69		29.71	Heavy Rain/Thunderstorm, Mist	1.75
0:35	70.0	66.0	67.3	87	9.2	24.2	W	29.66		29.68	Heavy Rain/Thunderstorm, Mist	3.00
0:27	70.0	64.0	66.0	81	11.5	23.0	W	29.67		29.69	Heavy Rain/Thunderstorm	1.75
23:53	71.1	60.1	63.9	68				29.64	29.66	29.66	Light Rain/Thunderstorm	10.00
22:53	75.9	57.0	63.8	52	9.2		WSW	29.66	29.68	29.68	Thunder	10.00
21:53	78.1	60.1	66.2	54	10.4	21.9	SSW	29.64	29.66	29.66	Light Rain/Thunderstorm	10.00

SECTION 7: BUILDING GEOMETRY AND CONSTRUCTION

20521 Deer Wood Park Drive was a two-story, wood frame constructed single-family dwelling, situated on a four-acre lot. The structure is listed as 2,500 square feet in total with the 1st floor listed as 1,285 sq.ft, the 2nd floor listed as 1,115 sq.ft, and the garage listed as 400 sq.ft. The basement covered the entire length and width of the structure with the exception of the attached garage.

The structure had 4 bedrooms, 3 bathrooms, central air conditioning, and was heated by forced air, heat pump that was originally run by propane, but had been converted to electric.

The home, which was built in 1997 was wrapped with vinyl siding exterior, with masonry basement exterior walls. The floor joists were 2x6 dimensional lumber, with 2x4 studded walls on both floors covered with drywall. The roof was constructed of wood rafters with plywood decking covered in asphalt shingles.

There is a “bump-out’ on Side Charlie at the Charlie/Delta corner and a two-level wood deck on Side Charlie. The top level of the deck is screened in and the bottom level is open.

SECTION 8: INCIDENT NARRATIVE

On Tuesday, June 27, 2023, at 04:04, St. Mary's County Emergency Communications Center received notification from the resident's alarm monitoring company reporting a smoke detector alarm on the main hall and 2nd floor at 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive in Leonardtown Maryland.

43	06/28/2023 04:11:44 AM	NO	FR	ZONE NOT RESTORED	25 main hall	H036421792
44	06/27/2023 04:11:43 AM	NO	OA	** Full Clear **		H036421792
45	06/27/2023 04:11:43 AM	NO	IN	SIGNAL CHAT INCIDENT CLOSED	CSO999	H036421792
46	06/27/2023 04:11:43 AM	NO	IN	ZONE RESTORE DLY		H036421792
47	06/27/2023 04:09:39 AM	NO		OA-Answr Mach-Msg		H036421792
48	06/27/2023 04:08:14 AM	NO	OA	Dialed Contact		H036421792
49	06/27/2023 04:08:13 AM	NO		OA-Answr Mach-Msg		H036421792
50	06/27/2023 04:07:20 AM	NO	OA	Dialed Contact		H036421792
51	06/27/2023 04:07:19 AM	NO	OA	ACTUAL FA		H036421792
52	06/27/2023 04:04:36 AM	NO	OA	Notify FD		H036421792
53	06/27/2023 04:04:35 AM	NO	OA	Dialing AHJ		H036421792
54	06/27/2023 04:04:33 AM	NO		OA-Answr Mach-Msg		H036421792
55	06/27/2023 04:03:26 AM	NO	OA	Dialed Premises		H036421792
56	06/27/2023 04:03:24 AM	NO		OA-Answr Mach-No Msg		H036421792
57	06/27/2023 04:02:35 AM	NO	OA	Dialed Premises		H036421792
58	06/27/2023 04:02:30 AM	NO	OA	Acct Access RE:Si		H036421792
59	06/27/2023 04:02:30 AM	NO	IN	CS OP ACCESSED INCIDENT	CSO001	H036421792
60	06/27/2023 04:02:25 AM	NO		FA-FIRE-SMOKE DET	24 2nd floor	H036421792
61	06/27/2023 04:02:14 AM	NO	IN	SMS SENT	SMS003	H036421792
62	06/27/2023 04:02:12 AM	NO	IN	SMS SENT	SMS003	H036421792
63	06/27/2023 04:02:12 AM	NO	IN	SMS SENT	SMS003	H036421792
64	06/27/2023 04:02:06 AM	NO	IN	SIGNAL PROCESSED BY IVN	EV004	H036421792
65	06/27/2023 04:02:06 AM	NO		IN-I-VIEW NOW EXTENDED CMMT		H036421792
66	06/27/2023 04:01:58 AM	NO		FA-FIRE-SMOKE DET	25 main hall	H036421792
67	06/27/2023 04:01:58 AM	NO	IN	HIGHER PRIORITY ALARM RCVD	CS002	H036421792
68	06/27/2023 04:01:58 AM	NO	IN	SIGNAL CHAT ABORTED	CS001	H036421792
69	06/27/2023 04:01:56 AM	NO	IN	ALARM DATA SENT TO IVN	SENIN1	H036421792
70	06/27/2023 04:01:56 AM	NO	BA	WINDOW(S)	18 FAMILY	H036421792
71	06/17/2023 02:13:27 PM	NO	IN	TIMER TEST	E602	H036421792

Log from monitoring alarm company



Photo taken prior to FD arrival

At 04:05, a second call was received by a neighbor advising that her neighbor's house was on fire and everyone was out of the residence. Following the upgrade and dispatch of the Box Alarm, a third call was received reporting the house was on fire. 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr is in a non-hydrant area of the county.

At 04:06, St. Mary's County Emergency Communications Center dispatched Box Alarm 1-19 for a reported "house on fire" at 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr. Units were directed to respond on Channel Alpha 3. The Box assignment in dispatch order was as follows: (*The specific resource that was dispatched may be different than the resource that actually responded based on how the system operates. The system requests a specific resource from a station, and the station determines which specific unit to take as long as it meets the resource type. The actual unit that responded is reflected in the parentheses.*

- Engine 1 (Engine 11)
- Truck 1
- Tanker 6 (Engine 63) (Pumper-Tanker)
- Engine 6 (Engine 61)
- Tanker 3
- Rescue Squad 3
- Engine 13 (Engine 132)
- Truck 13
- Engine 9 (Engine 93)
- Tanker 7
- Water Supply 5
- Ambulance Company 19
- Ambulance Company 6

QR Code for Dispatch Audio

While enroute, the dispatcher notified Chief 1 that they were taking several calls, and this was going to be a working fire. Chief 1 acknowledged the message and provided the dispatcher with the water supply location for the third due engine company (Engine 132) which was a hydrant located at Heritage Dr and Route 5.

At 04:15, Chief 1 arrived on location, positioned his vehicle on Side Alpha, and provided the following Incident On-Scene Report (IOSR): "Alpha side, two-story single-family dwelling, type 5 construction, fire showing on the Division 2 and Division 1, I'll establish the command, you can stand by for the 360." Once the 360 was completed Chief I reported "got three in the rear, Side Charlie access ah correction, basement access to the walkout, heavy fire in the rear."

Chief 1 arrival audio

St. Mary's Emergency Communications notified Chief 1 that he had 52 personnel responding and an extra engine and tanker on Box 1-19.

Chief 1 directed Engine 11 to layout from the driveway, and take a position behind the Chief 1 vehicle, leaving the driveway open for Truck 1.

Engine 11 arrived on location and dropped a 4” supply line with a humat valve attached, at the end of the driveway on Deer Wood Park Drive. Engine 11 officer directed his crew to stretch a 1.75” hoseline. Engine 11, Firefighter 1 asked his officer if they should stretch to the basement on Side Charlie or the front door on Side Alpha. Engine 11 officer directed Firefighter 1 to advance the line to Side Alpha.

Engine 11 Layout

Engine 11’s Initial line stretched and knocking down fire from the front steps

At 04:19, Engine 132 Acting Captain notified Chief 1 that he believed he would be the second arriving engine and asked Chief I if he wanted him to continue in (as third due). Chief 1 directed Engine 132 to assume the second due position (water supply dump site). St. Mary’s dispatcher then directed Engine 93 to operate at the fill site on Heritage Dr. and Route 5.

With Engine 11’s line stretched and charged, the crew from Engine 11 began knocking the fire down from the exterior due to the volume of fire on both floors and the front porch. Video shows that during the initial application of water from the first line, there were several visual indicators that the structural integrity of the building had already been compromised.

Truck 1 arrived shortly after Engine 11, and took a position in the driveway nose first towards the Alpha/Delta side of the house. The Truck 1 officer grabbed a 6' hook and met up with the crew from Engine 11 in the front yard. Truck 1 Firefighter 1 and Firefighter 2 each deployed a ground ladder to Side Alpha of the structure, and then each grabbed a tool and met up with the Truck 1 officer in the front yard.

Engine 11 initial push

At 04:20, Tanker 63 arrived on location. Tanker 63 Driver disconnected the humat valve from Engine 11's supply line to connect it to the discharge on Tanker 63. Engine 11 D/O immediately intervened and directed Tanker 63 Driver to reattach the humat valve to the supply line and pump off his water through the humat valve. The remaining crew from Tanker 63 stretched a 400' 1.75" hoseline to Side Charlie via Side Delta as directed by Command.

Chief 3B arrived on location and was directed by Command to assume the role of Division 1 Supervisor. Division 1 was assigned Engine 11 and Truck 1.

At 04:22, Engine 132 was directed by Command to stretch a second hoseline and back-up Engine 11 on Side Alpha. Command then directed Squad 3 to work with the Division 1 Supervisor and conduct searches.

At this point, the crew from Engine 11 had darkened down the fire on the front porch enough to advance their line up to the front door. With the crew of Engine 11 and Truck 1 all operating on the front porch, they continued to flow water into the 1st floor through the front door, making little to no impact on fire conditions. In fact, interior fire conditions continued to worsen. Despite the deteriorating conditions, there was yelling coming from the crews standing in the front yard for the crew of Engine 11 to "make the push." and "get in the door."

By now, the crew from Engine 132 had stretched a second hoseline to back-up Engine 11. The Acting Captain from Engine 132 directed Engine 132 Firefighter 1 and Firefighter 2 to advance

their line onto the front porch, and to enter the structure through the porch window, to the left of the front door, where Engine 11's line was operating. The Acting Captain left his crew and joined the crew from Engine 11 on that hoseline.

Engine 132 Firefighter 1 entered the structure through the front porch window, and Engine 132 Firefighter 2 fed him the hose from just outside the window. Engine 132 Acting Captain continued to yell from the front porch for the Engine 11 crew to move into the structure or move out of the way (paraphrased). Engine 11, Firefighter 1, who was still operating the hoseline largely by himself, became fatigued and handed the hoseline to Engine 11, Firefighter 2.

Rescue Squad 3 arrived on-scene, and while the officer went to the Command Post to check in, the remaining crew from Rescue Squad 3 traversed Side Delta to obtain a view of Side Charlie. Video obtained from the crew showed significant fire conditions on Side Delta and Charlie with obvious signs of substantial structural degradation.

Squad 3 360 Video

Engine 11, Firefighter 2 who was now operating Engine 11's line, continued flowing the line through the front door. Video shows Engine 132 Acting Captain yelling at Engine 11 Firefighter 2 to "get in the door." Engine 11, Firefighter 2 advanced about 4-5 feet into the structure. Throughout the time of interior operations, Engine 11's officer remained outside the front door on the porch. This left the line from Engine 11 operating just inside the front door, and the line from Engine 132 operating inside the structure, just to the left of Engine 11, Firefighter 2 in the Alpha quadrant.

The crew from Tanker 63 was operating a hoseline on the Charlie/Delta side of the building, attempting to knock down the fire as directed by Command. Engine 61 arrived on scene, and without direction from Command, self-deployed to Side Delta to work with the crew from Tanker 63

After operating the line for just over a minute, Engine 11, Firefighter 2 yelled out that he was burning up, and handed the line to Engine 132 Acting Captain, who was standing at the threshold of the front door. Engine 11, Firefighter 2 left the structure and exited to the front yard to get out of his PPE, which showed obvious signs of thermal overload.

At 04:26, Command called Engine 61, who had self-deployed to assist the crew from Tanker 63, and directed them to assume the role of RIT. Since Engine 61's officer had already self-assigned his crew to operate on the other side of the structure, they needed to reposition to Side Alpha to assume the role of RIT, and then go locate and retrieve RIT equipment.

Engine 132 Acting Captain was now operating Engine 11's hoseline just inside the front door. Engine 132, Firefighter 1 continued to operate the hoseline still to the left of Engine 11. Chief 3B, the Division 1 Supervisor eventually entered the structure and moved to his immediate left as he entered the front door essentially standing between Engine 11's hoseline, and Engine 132's hoseline. Video clearly shows an extraordinary amount of fire coming from every direction on the 1st floor despite two operating 1.75" handlines.

Chief 3B Interior Video

Helmet cam video shows, that about thirty-three (33) seconds after Engine 132 Acting Captain begins operating the hoseline, on his knees and positioned just inside the front door, a flash of fire breaks through to the right of where he is kneeling. Based on the video footage, the SRC suspects that there were significant fire conditions in the basement below them, that had extended underneath the basement steps and through the drywall on the 1st floor just to the right of Engine 132 Acting Captain.

Upon his arrival, Chief 6 reported to the command post, entered the command vehicle and assumed the role of command aide. Chief 9B arrived on location and was designated as the Incident Safety Officer (ISO). He immediately began a size-up, moving from Side A to Side D of the structure. As he reached the C/D corner of the structure, he noticed a partial collapse from the roof into the 2nd floor on Side Charlie. After several attempts to transmit that information, Chief 9B communicated priority radio traffic that there was a collapse of the 2nd floor on Side Charlie.

Collapse

Video

As Engine 132's Acting Captain continued to attack the blast of fire coming from below, video shows a catastrophic collapse of the 1st and 2nd floors as well as the roof.

Based on the significant amount of structural degradation prior to the collapse, the Committee is unable to determine where the collapse started or the order in which the collapse occurred. With the volume of fire present in the basement, the roof, and everywhere in between, it would be nearly impossible to pinpoint what occurred first. Video confirms that the structural integrity of the 1st and 2nd floors was largely non-existent. The drywall throughout the 1st floor had all but disintegrated, and the major components of the walls and flooring systems had already significantly decomposed. Video also confirms that the 2nd floor of the structure on the C/D corner was listing inward immediately before the collapse. There is also video evidence to suggest that there were significant fire conditions in the basement area below the 1st floor. To add to the uncertainty, Engine 132 Firefighter 1 reported that just before the collapse of the

2nd floor, he felt the 1st floor "drop and settle' for one to two seconds before the major collapse occurred.

As Engine 132 Firefighter 1 felt the 1st floor drop, he lunged towards the window that he had entered through, and Engine 132 Firefighter 2 was able to grab him and pull him out of the window. Chief 3B, the Division 1 Supervisor, was able to "hug" the exterior wall and escape back through the front door where he entered. Engine 132 Acting Captain dropped through the 1st floor and into the basement.

At 04:27, Command ordered an evacuation of the structure. A view of the structure following the collapse shows that aside from the exterior walls on Side Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie, all interior components from the 1st and 2nd floor had collapsed into the basement.

In the moments following the collapse, there was a significant amount of shouting and face to face communication involving those in the area of the collapse; however, no MAYDAY was transmitted. Chief 7A, who had arrived on location shortly before the collapse, was standing at the Command Post awaiting an assignment from Chief 1. When the collapse occurred, Chief 7A immediately made his way to the front of the structure, where he first encountered Chief 3B in the front yard. After assessing that Chief 3B was alert and talking, he proceeded onto the front porch to make sure everyone else was ok when he heard people screaming about "someone

MAYDAY call front porch

Chief 7A quickly interviewed members in the area to find out the nature of the emergency and who was affected. Chief 7A then gave the first MAYDAY, stating that it was believed that a firefighter from Engine 1 was missing on the first floor. After giving the initial MAYDAY message, Chief 7A began a face-to-face accounting of all members who were operating in the structure when the collapse occurred. Chief 7A then gave a second message to Command, announcing the name and presumed location of the missing member.

Following the MAYDAY transmission, Chief 1 notified St. Mary's dispatch to move the incident operations over to Alpha 4, leaving Alpha 3 for MAYDAY operations. Chief 6, who was functioning as the command aide, took over coordination of incoming resources on Alpha 4. A RIT Task Force was auto-dispatched following the MAYDAY.

Command directed Chief 7A to get everyone off the porch and reinforced that they were now operating in the defensive mode. Command then directed Engine 61, which he had designated as RIT, to deploy to the front door. Engine 61 was not in a geographical position to immediately deploy, nor did they have any RIT equipment.

Crews from Engine 132 and Rescue Squad 3 immediately began flowing water from the two hoselines into the collapsed area where they believed Engine 132's Acting Captain had dropped through.

Chief 7A, who was now leading the rescue efforts, began his size-up to determine the best course of action to effect the rescue of Engine 132's Acting Captain. After ruling out a rescue attempt from Side Alpha due to the amount of debris that had dropped into the basement, Chief 7A directed crews from Station 7 who had just arrived on location, to attempt entry into the basement through the masonry wall on Side Bravo, through a single window on the Bravo/Charlie corner. Based on the size and damage associated with the collapse into the basement, the crew from Station 7 was unable to progress more than six to eight feet in the basement, so they turned around and exited back through the window.

Side Bravo window attempted entrance

Concerned by the size of the collapse and the time that had already elapsed, Chief 7A requested heavy equipment to be brought to the scene with the hopes of a rapid descaling operation to reach Engine 132's Acting Captain.

At 04:35 Chief 7A advised Chief 1 "Update. No access to Side Delta, Bravo, or Charlie. I need you to assign a company to find another way into that basement. We are going to have to breach a wall. We are sending the crews from 7, Doug Insley, and myself to Side Alpha. We have two hoselines operating."

Chief 7A and the two crews from Station 7 returned to Side Alpha to reattempt to gain access to the basement. Chief 7A called for RIT packs and rope to be staged on Side Alpha. Chief 7A and the crews from Station 7 and Engine 5 begin parallel operations in an attempt to reach Engine 132's Acting Captain. One team worked the area just to the right of the front door, while the other crew took an approach from inside the garage through the interior wall leading into the structure.

While the two crews were working their way into the basement from Side Alpha, Chief 7A passed off leadership of the Rescue Group to Chief 5, so that he could work with the excavator which had arrived on location to try and find another means of gaining access to the basement.

At 04:46, Engine 73 officer notified Chief 7A that they had put eyes on Engine 132 Acting Captain and confirmed that he was “buried,” and “not moving.” Over the next twenty (20) minutes, several teams of two would enter and exit the basement via portable ladder in an attempt to remove debris and place a RIT pack on Engine 132 Acting Captain.

At 05:09, Engine 73 officer confirmed that the RIT pack had been deployed and was connected to Engine 132’s Acting Captain. With this in mind, Chief 7A and Chief 5 began a separate operation on Side Charlie focused on removing debris from the basement in an attempt to create a path of ingress and egress to reach and remove Engine 132’s Acting Captain.

At 05:27, Chief 7A (Rector) assumed command of the incident from Chief Bell.

Following an extended, manpower-intensive debris removal operation in the basement, Engine 132’s Acting Captain was packaged and removed from the basement at 06:16 and transferred to a waiting Medic Unit.



Diagram courtesy of NIOSH



Diagram courtesy of NIOSH

SECTION 9: INDIVIDUAL UNIT ACTIONS

This section describes the unit actions of several of the companies on the initial Box Alarm. Not all companies are included; only the companies that were given a specific fireground assignment. Numerous companies that responded after the initial Box Alarm assisted in common tasks and assignments, primarily focused on logistical functions.

As a point of reference, Chief 7A, Tanker 7, Engine 73, Rescue Squad 7, Car 7, and the officer from Engine 52 worked as a collective team primarily dedicated to RIT operations. While there are individual unit actions listed for them, they functioned similarly to a RIT Group, where members from each company functioned together to accomplish their area of operations.

Engine 11
Leonardtown VFD

At 4:06 AM Engine 11 was alerted as the first-due Engine for an Automatic Fire Alarm at 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive. The initial call which came in from the alarm monitoring service, was quickly upgraded to a full structure assignment following two additional calls from neighbors reporting a “house on fire.”

At the time of alerting, Station 1 had seven (7) members sleeping at the station, none of which were drivers. While waiting on drivers, they informally broke into crews for both Engine and Truck 1. Once a driver arrived at the Station, Engine 11 responded with a crew of five (5).

While enroute, Engine 1’s officer provided running route instructions for the driver and crew assignments for the three firefighters. As Engine 11 approached the scene, they were directed by Chief 1 to park off the driveway at 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive and to leave room for Truck 1. An LDH supply line was laid from the driveway entrance with an attached humat valve to facilitate water supply operations. Engine 11’s officer directed the crew to pull a 200’ 1.75” hoseline. Engine 11, Firefighter I asked Engine 11’s officer if he wanted the line deployed to the basement or the front door. Based on the 360-radio report from Chief 1, and no mention of fire in the basement, Engine 11’s officer directed Firefighter 1 to stretch the line to the front of the house.

Due to the volume of fire involving the front porch and both floors of the structure, Engine 11’s officer directed Firefighter 1 to begin knocking the fire down from the front yard. Firefighter 1 continued to try and darken down the fire on Side Alpha but didn’t make any substantial difference. As Firefighter 1 was darkening down the fire on the front porch, other members from Engine 11 reported hearing someone behind them yelling aggressively for them to move up onto the front porch. Once enough of the fire on the front porch was darkened down, Engine 11’s officer, and Engine 11, Firefighter 1, and Firefighter 2 advanced up the steps onto the front porch just outside of the front door.

For the next sixty to ninety seconds, Engine 11, Firefighter 1 continued to flow inside the 1st floor of the structure, through the front door, but made little to no impact on fire conditions. Despite the lack of knockdown, there continued to be someone yelling from behind them for Engine 11 to advance into the structure. At this point, Engine 11, Firefighter 1, who had been managing the hoseline largely without any support, became fatigued and handed the hoseline to Engine 11, Firefighter 2. With Firefighter 2 now on the nozzle of the hoseline, he moved into the 1st floor and made it about three to four feet into the structure, and began flowing water into free-flowing fire conditions. At this point, Engine 11's officer, Firefighter 3, as well as the crew from Truck 1 and Engine 132, remained behind Engine 11, Firefighter 2 out on the front porch and the steps leading up to the porch.

Engine 11, Firefighter 2 continued to operate the hoseline for 60 to 90 seconds, continuously flowing water on the 1st floor, but making no progress at all. Both Engine 11's officer and Firefighter 3 observed Engine 11, Firefighter 2's PPE beginning to off-gas. Simultaneously, video confirmed that someone behind Engine 11, Firefighter 2 yelled, "Get in and put the fire out, or I will do it for you."

Engine 11, Firefighter 2 began to feel like he was getting burned and exited the structure, handing off the hoseline to Engine 132's Acting Captain. With Engine 11, Firefighters 1 and 2, now out in the front yard, Engine 11 officer and Firefighter 3 assisted in backing up Engine 132, Acting Captain, who reentered the structure with the hoseline.

Within a minute of the exchange, Engine 11's officer witnessed a collapse of the upper floor, followed by a collapse of the 1st floor, sending Engine 132's Acting Captain into the basement. Due to falling debris and continuing collapse of sections of the 1st floor. Engine 11 officer and Firefighter 3 were unable to pull Engine 132's Acting Captain out of the structure.

As MAYDAY operations commenced, the entire crew from Engine 11 was removed from operations and directed to remain in the rehab area until eventually being relieved from the fireground.

Truck 1
Leonardtown VFD

At 4:06 AM, Truck 1 was alerted as the first-due Truck for an Automatic Fire Alarm at 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive. The initial call, which came in from the alarm monitoring service, was quickly upgraded to a full structure assignment following two additional calls from neighbors reporting a "house on fire."

At the time of alerting, Station 1 had seven (7) members sleeping at the station, none of whom were qualified drivers. While waiting for a driver, they informally broke into crews for both Engine 11 and Truck 1. Once a driver arrived at the Station, Truck 1 responded with a crew of four (4).

Truck 1 arrived on location at the end of the driveway and stopped just short of the driveway to move Engine 11's supply out of the way, providing access for Truck 1 in the front yard. Truck 1 driver positioned the apparatus nose into the driveway, in front of the two-car garage that was on the Alpha/Delta corner of the house.

Truck 1's officer grabbed a 6-foot hook and joined the crew from Engine 11, who were completing their stretch. Truck 1's officer observed the house as a 2-story dwelling with a basement and observed heavy fire conditions on the 1st and 2nd floors of the structure.

Truck 1, Firefighter 1, and Firefighter 2 immediately deployed two ground ladders to the 2nd floor on Side Alpha. Once this task was completed, they met up with Truck 1's officer, who was with the crew from Engine 11 on the front porch.

While on the front porch, Truck 1 officer positioned himself on the right-hand side of the front door, just behind Engine 11, Firefighter 2. He observed what he described as an extreme amount of fire on the 1st floor as Engine 11, Firefighter 2, began to push into the structure. Truck 1 officer had intended to get inside and perform a search once he could make it inside the structure.

While standing by the front door, Truck 1's officer recognized that Engine 11, Firefighter 2, was not making any progress at all and reported seeing his PPE begin to off-gas. Truck 1's officer reported that Engine 132's Acting Captain was standing behind him, yelling, "Get in the front door." Shortly thereafter, Truck 1's officer reported that Engine 11, Firefighter 2 had exited the structure, screaming that he was burning up.

Truck 1's officer saw Engine 11, Firefighter 2 handed the line to Engine 132's Acting Captain. Truck 1's officer observed Chief 3B (Division 1 Supervisor) enter the structure and move to the left of where Engine 132's Acting Captain was operating just inside the front door. Truck 1's officer also attempted to enter the 1st floor but immediately returned to the front porch.

Truck 1's officer estimated that Engine 132's Acting Captain and Chief 3B were in the structure for about thirty seconds when there was a collapse inside the structure. Truck 1's officer looked down and saw Engine 132's Acting Captain attempting to hold himself up between the floor joists for a moment before falling through the floor and into the basement.

Truck 1's officer saw Chief 3B scrambling to exit the structure. Both Truck 1's officer and Engine 11's officer were able to grab Chief 3B and get him out onto the front porch. Truck 1's officer then focused on getting water into the hole where Engine 132's Acting Captain was last seen.

Truck 1's officer exited the porch by himself in an attempt to try and enter the basement through the rear slider. After seeing no chance of entering the now collapsed basement, Truck 1's officer returned to the front porch area, where he observed Chief 7A working on organizing the rescue efforts. Truck 1's officer was directed by Chief 7A to find his crew and stage in the front yard away from the structure.

Throughout the remainder of the incident, the crew from Truck 1 assisted with a number of support-level tasks until the time they were relieved from the fireground

Tanker 6 (Engine 63)
Second District VFD & Rescue Squad

At 04:06, Engine 63 (Pumper-Tanker) was dispatched to 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive as the first due tanker. Engine 63 responded with a crew of five (5) personnel.

Engine 63's driver hooked up to the supply line laid by Engine 11 and began pushing water to Engine 11. The remaining crew from Tanker 63 proceeded to Side Alpha, where they were directed by Chief 1 to stretch a hoseline to Side Charlie to extinguish the fire in the rear.

The crew stretched a 400' 1.75" hoseline by way of Side Delta and took a final position on the Charlie/Delta corner. Once the line was charged, the crew from Engine 63 operated the hoseline extinguishing fire on the Charlie/Delta side of the structure and continued to do so during the initial stages of the RIT operations until being relieved and sent to Rehab.

Engine 6 (Engine 61)
Second District VFD & Rescue Squad

At 04:06, Engine 61 was dispatched to 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive as the second due Engine. Engine 61 responded with a crew of three (3). While responding to the scene, Engine 61 officer attempted to get an assignment from Chief 1 but was unable to get through due to excessive radio traffic.

While enroute, Chief 1 adjusted the assignment and directed Engine 132, the third-due engine (fill-site company), to take the second-due responsibilities (water supply company) originally assigned to Engine 61. This information was never communicated to Engine 61, which continued their response assuming that they would be responsible for the dump site operations. When they arrived, they were surprised to see that Engine 132 had assumed the second-due responsibilities but did not attempt to contact Chief 1 for clarification.

Engine 61's driver positioned the engine out of the way since they had not yet received an assignment from Command. Absent any direction from Chief 1, Engine 61's officer, and Engine 61's Firefighter 1 located the crew from Tanker 63 operating a backup line on Side Charlie, and remained with that crew until Chief 1 called them and directed them to assume RIT.

Engine 61's officer acknowledged the message from Chief 1 to assume RIT, and the officer and crew began walking back towards Side Alpha to gather RIT equipment. This is when they heard the MAYDAY call.

As the crew from Engine 61 reached the front of the house, they observed a large number of firefighters crowding around the front porch. Assessing that they would not be able to get through the crowd on the porch, they grabbed a hoseline and made access to the garage area. The crew from Engine 61 continued to operate the hoseline in the garage as other crews attempted to gain access to Engine 132's Acting Captain through the garage wall, which separated the garage from the interior 1st floor foyer area. After several minutes of working in the garage, units were withdrawn from the garage and redirected to assist in other areas of RIT Operations.

The crew from Engine 61 began gathering various tools and other logistics until they were relieved and sent to the Rehab area for the remainder of the incident.

Tanker 3 (Engine 34)
Bay District VFD

At 04:06, Tanker 3 was dispatched to 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive as the second due Tanker. At 04:12, Engine 34 responded with a crew of two (2).

Engine 34 arrived and originally took a position behind Rescue Squad 3 which was directly behind Engine 132 (dump site drafting engine). Engine 34's officer joined the crew from Rescue Squad 3 and remained as part of that crew for the duration of the incident. Tanker 34's driver continued to work on water supply operations throughout the duration of the incident.

Squad 3
Bay District VFD

At 04:10, Rescue Squad 3 was dispatched to 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive. Rescue Squad 3 responded with a crew of five (5).

Rescue Squad 3 arrived on the scene and reported to the front of the structure. Chief 1 assigned Rescue Squad 3 to the primary search, working with Engine and Truck 1 on Division 1 under the direction of Chief 3B, who was assigned Division 1 Supervisor.

While the Rescue Squad Officer spoke with Chief 1, the remaining crew from Rescue Squad 3 completed an additional 360 of the structure. During the 360, they observed heavy fire involvement on all floors as well as structural degradation on Side Charlie and Delta.

When the crew rejoined the officer on Side Alpha, they heard a loud cracking sound and witnessed a collapse inside the structure. They heard Chief 3B screaming for help as he exited the first floor. The crew assisted Chief 3B out of the structure, off the front porch, and removed his PPE.

The crew was then assigned a number of other tasks by Chief 7A, including laddering the basement, collecting RIT equipment, removing debris from the front porch, and preparing to assist in the removal of the missing firefighter. Rescue Squad 3 was also deployed by Chief 7A to operate in the garage, assisting with finding another way into the basement

Rescue Squad 3 was then redirected to Side Charlie, working with several other crews, creating a path to the downed firefighter through the basement.

Engine 13 (Engine 132)
Naval District Washington FD

At 04:10, Engine 132 was dispatched to 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive as the third due Engine. Engine 132 responded with a crew of four (4).

As the third due engine on a non-hydrant structure fire, Engine 132 would usually be responsible for fill site operations. Enroute, Engine 132's officer realized that they were going to be the second arriving engine and notified Chief 1 that they would likely be the second arriving engine. Chief 1 acknowledged Engine 132 and directed them to assume the second due position, making them responsible for dump site operations. Engine 132's driver positioned the engine just short of the driveway on Deer Wood Park Drive and began setting up the dump site in the front yard of the structure, utilizing the dump tank from Engine 63.

The remaining three members from Engine 132 (Engine 132's Acting Captain, Firefighter 1, and Firefighter 2) walked down the driveway towards the structure to get an assignment from Chief 1. The Acting Captain from Engine 132 directed his crew to advance a second hoseline from Engine 11, up to the front porch, where the crew from Engine 11 was already operating a hoseline in an attempt to extinguish the fire on the front porch.

Engine 132's driver assisted the driver of Engine 63 and Tanker 1 with hooking up their discharge lines into the Humat valve, attached to Engine 11's supply line. This allowed both tankers to send water from their tanks to supply Engine 11. Tanker 63 initially attempted to attach directly to Engine 11's supply line, without using the Humat valve. Tanker 1's officer (Water Supply Officer) directed them to reattach the Humat valve, and pumping operations resumed. While Engine 63 and Tanker 1 were pushing their water up to Engine 11, Engine 132's driver began setting up to draft from the dump tank that he had set up. Once Tanker 3 arrived on location, Tanker 3 offloaded its water into the dump tank. A draft was obtained by Engine 132's driver. From this point forward, the dump tanks were used to supply the fireground.

While Firefighter 1 and Firefighter 2 advanced their line up through the front yard, Engine 132's Acting Captain stopped at the command vehicle and quickly spoke with Chief 1 to confirm their assignment.

Engine 132, Firefighter 1, and Firefighter 2 made it up to the front porch, where Engine 11 had been working to knock down the bulk of the fire on the front porch. While Engine 11 operated its hoseline at the threshold of the front door, E132's Acting Captain directed his crew to get their hoseline onto the front porch, through the porch window, and inside the first floor. Engine 132's Acting Captain then attached himself to the hoseline being operated by Engine 11.

Once on the front porch, Engine 132 Firefighter 1 entered the structure and made it about 3-4 feet inside as Firefighter 2 continued feeding him hose.

After operating for 2-3 minutes, Engine 132 Firefighter 2 exited the window back onto the front porch to retrieve more hoseline.

Without warning, Engine 132 Firefighter 1 felt what he described as the floor beneath him beginning to "settle." Engine 132 Firefighter 1 jumped towards the window that he entered through as the structure above and below began to collapse. Engine 132 Firefighter 2 grabbed Firefighter 1, and pulled him backward out of the window, causing both firefighters to fall off the front porch.

Engine 132, Firefighter 1 and Firefighter 2 heard shouting from the front porch, followed by the MAYDAY call going out over the radio. Unaware that it was Engine 132's Acting Captain who had fallen into the basement, both firefighters regained possession of their hoseline and began flowing water into the collapsed section of the 1st floor where Engine 132's Acting Captain had fallen.

For the next several minutes, Engine 132 Firefighter 1 and Firefighter 2 assisted in debris removal from the front porch until they were officially relieved by Command. When directed by Command, the remaining crew from Engine 132 assisted in transferring Engine 132's Acting Captain from the exterior basement to the waiting transport unit, staged out front of the structure.

Truck 13
Naval District Washington FD

At 04:10 Truck 13 was dispatched to 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive as the second due Truck. Truck 13 responded with a crew of four (4).

Truck 13 was turning onto Deer Wood Park Drive when they heard Chief 7A transmit the MAYDAY. Truck 13's officer reported that he was unaware of his dispatched assignment order, but verbally told his crew to be prepared for firefighting or RIT operations. As Truck 13 arrived on scene, the crew assembled hand tools and waited for the driver to get dressed before reporting to the command post. Chief 1 directed Truck 13 to meet up with Chief 7A on Side Alpha and assist with the firefighter rescue operations.

After checking in with Chief 7A, Truck 13's officer said he was directed to work on making access to the basement through the masonry wall on Side Bravo of the structure. As Truck 13's crew moved to Side Bravo the officer realized that the missing member was Engine 132's Acting Captain, so he took a portable radio from another member and attempted to call back to his dispatch center at the Naval Air Station and make them aware of the situation. Making no progress on the Side Bravo wall, Chief 7A directed Truck 13 back to Side Alpha.

After returning to Side Alpha, Truck 13's officer located the remaining members of Engine 132 and accounted for all Naval Air Station members. Under the direction of Chief 7A, the crew from Truck 13 began removing the sheathing from the front of the house in an attempt to access and remove the missing officer once he was located.

Truck 13's crew continued to utilize their saws to cut down the sheathing of the front porch wall and assist in the removal of debris from the front porch. The crew from Engine 132 and Truck 13 were eventually relieved from the rescue operation and sent to a rehab area in the front yard. Once the crews operating in the basement were able to remove Engine 132's Acting Captain from the basement, the members of Truck 13 and Engine 132 assisted in carrying Engine 132's Acting Captain to the waiting transport unit.

Tanker 7
Hollywood VFD

At 04:06:26 Tanker 7 was dispatched on the Box Alarm to 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive as the third due tanker. Tanker 7 responded with a total of five (5) personnel.

Tanker 7 arrived on location and took a position on Deer Wood Park Drive with the other apparatus involved in water supply operations. As Tanker 7's driver assisted with shuttling water, the remaining crew of four made their way to the fireground with the intent of stretching a third hoseline off of Engine 11. When the crew reached Engine 11, they saw that three hoselines had already been stretched, so absent direction from Command, moved towards the front of the house to assist the crews from Engine 11 and/or Engine 132.

When they reached the front of the house and began masking up, the collapse occurred. They immediately encountered Chief 3B exiting the structure in obvious distress, and the crew from Engine 11 and Engine 132 exiting the front porch.

After a brief discussion with Chief 7A, Tanker 7's officer performed an additional 360 of the structure to try and find an alternate way into the basement. Once completed, Tanker 7's officer returned to Side Alpha and after a discussion with Chief 7A, relocated to Side Bravo of the structure. The officer from Tanker 7 directed the crew from Engine 63 operating on Side Charlie to reposition their line to the basement window on Side Bravo.

Tanker 7, Firefighter 3, and Tanker 7's officer entered through the basement window with a hoseline in an attempt to reach Engine 132's Acting Captain. Once they entered the basement, they encountered a mass of floor structure that had fallen into the basement and a significant pile of debris. The officer from Tanker 7 could hear Engine 132's Acting Captain's PASS alarm sounding, but due to the amount of floor structure and debris in the way, was unable to safely proceed any further into the basement. The decision was made to back the crew from Tanker 7 out of the basement.

After exiting the basement, the crew from Tanker 7 relocated to the front of the structure and was directed by Chief 7A to operate the two hoselines in place into the collapsed portion of the 1st floor while crews attempted to reach Engine 132's Acting Captain from the ladder placed by the front door.

The crew from Tanker 7 was then redirected to Side Charlie where they would assist in debris removal operations to reach Engine 132's Acting Captain.

Engine 73
Hollywood VFD

Engine 73 was dispatched on the Box Alarm to 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive after engines dispatched on the original call failed to respond at the 5-minute mark. As Engine 73 responded, several of those engines did eventually mark-up responding, making Engine 73 an extra engine. Engine 73 responded with a crew of four (4).

As Engine 73 was driving down Deer Wood Park Drive, the MAYDAY was being declared. Engine 73 positioned their apparatus out of the way on Deer Wood Park Drive and the crew made their way to the front of the structure. The officer made his way to the Command Post to let Command know that he was an extra engine on the Box. The officer was diligent about not self-deploying, so told Command that Engine 73 would remain at the Command Post until given an assignment.

Chief 7A who was overseeing RIT operations grabbed Engine 73 and linked that crew with the crew from Tanker 7 on Side Bravo, where the officer from Engine 73 was directed to attempt reaching Engine 132's Acting Captain from that vantage point.

After two members from Tanker 7 entered the basement and attempted to move towards Side Alpha of the structure where Engine 132's Acting Captain was suspected to be, Engine 73's officer pulled Tanker 7's crew out of the basement, due to the extremely unsafe conditions.

Engine 73's officer realized that they needed to find another way to reach Engine 132's Acting Captain, so he directed the crew from Engine 73 and Tanker 7 to relocate to side Alpha.

From this point on, the crew from Engine 73, Tanker 7, Truck 7, Car 7, and the officer from Engine 52 worked with Chief 7A to reach and remove Engine 132's Acting Captain. Those actions are recorded in the RIT section of the report.

Squad 7
Hollywood VFD

At 04:39, Squad 7 self-dispatched, and added to the RIT Task Force at 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive. Squad 7 responded with a crew of five (5).

On their arrival, Command directed Squad 7 to team up with the officer of Engine 73 in the garage to assist them in gaining access to the trapped firefighter. In a coordinated attempt to reach Engine 132's Acting Captain, Squad 7's officer and, Tanker 7, Firefighter 2 attempted to descend the ladder into the basement from the garage while Squad 7, Firefighter 1, and Engine 5's officer descended the ladder located on Side Alpha.

At 04:48, Squad 7, Firefighter 1, and Engine 5's officer located Engine 132's Acting Captain trapped under the collapsed debris. Engine 132's Acting Captain's PASS device was sounding and he was heavily entrapped by debris, unable to be moved. Squad 7, Firefighter 1 informed Engine 5's officer that he had access to Engine 132's Acting Captain's buddy breather connection, and asked for a RIT PAK to be sent down the ladder. After a quick adjustment to an unfamiliar RIT PAK, Squad 7, Firefighter 1 made the buddy breather connection at approximately 0510 hrs. After making the connection, he noted no air movement from Engine 132's Acting Captain's SCBA after the connection was made.

Considering the lack of air movement, the level of entrapment, and the elapsed time since the initial collapse, the operation changed from rescue to recovery, and both individuals who had descended into the basement were removed.

As operations shifted to recovery, Engine 5's officer was reassigned to assume RIT operations. The decision was made to slowly attempt to access Engine 132's Acting Captain from Side Charlie with the assistance of the excavator that was on-scene and small unit recon teams.

At approximately 05:35, firefighters reached Engine 132's Acting Captain buried under the debris pile," face down, in a kneeling position. Engine 5's officer determined that the excavator was no longer needed and that saws and small tools would be required to free Engine 132's Acting Captain.

At approximately 06:10, after more than thirty (30) minutes of debris removal operations, those assigned to the RIT Recon Group with the assistance of several other members were able to free Engine 132's Acting Captain from the debris pile and remove him from the basement.

Truck 7
Hollywood VFD

Truck 7 self-dispatched and added to the RIT Task force at 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive. Truck 7 responded with a crew of four (4). In addition, Car 7 also added to the call and responded with a crew of four (4).

Truck 7 arrived on location and took a position on Deer Wood Park Drive. As they gathered saws and other critical RIT equipment, they stopped a fire department utility truck and loaded up all of their equipment to be transported to the scene.

The officer from Truck 7 checked in at the Command Post to let Command know they had self-dispatched and had arrived. Command then directed the crew from Truck 7 to report to Side Charlie and assist with the ongoing debris removal operations.

From this point on, the crew from Engine 73, Tanker 7, Truck 7, Car 7, and the officer from Engine 52 worked with Chief 7A to reach and remove Engine 132's Acting Captain. Those actions are recorded in the RIT section of the report.

SECTION 10: WATER SUPPLY OPERATIONS

This section of the report highlights the information extracted from the investigation relevant to the water supply operations at 20521 Deer Wood Park Drive. As has been previously covered, there is no singularly adopted SOG for non-hydrant water supply operations; rather, several preferred company/multi-company specific policies or established practices throughout the county. There was a fairly wide understanding of how most companies operate a non-hydrant box, but other companies commented on how they have their own method and preferences.

While enroute, Chief 1 identified a hydrant at the intersection of Heritage Drive and Route 5 (Point Lookout Rd) as the water supply fill-site location for the third due engine. The hydrant was approximately 2.8 miles from the scene. This information was relayed to Engine 132, dispatched as the third due engine, and responsible for establishing a tanker fill site per the local SOG.



Diagram courtesy of NIOSH

At 04:18, Command directed Engine 11 to lay out from the driveway and leave room for the ladder truck. Engine 11 with a 750-gallon tank arrived on location at 04:18 and laid 100 feet of four-inch supply line from the top of the driveway to the yard on Side Alpha of the structure where they positioned their apparatus. A Humat valve with adaptor was connected to the end of the four-inch supply line at the end of the driveway to function as an appliance with a clappered valve.

Engine 132 advised Command that he believed he would be the second arriving engine. Command directed Engine 132 to assume the second due engine responsibilities (dump-site). Chief 1 attempted to contact Engine 61 (originally dispatched as the second-due engine), to presumably change their

assignment from the second due engine to the third due engine but did not follow through on his initial attempt.

St. Mary's dispatch then directed Engine 93 to report to the water supply location on Heritage Drive. Chief 1 confirmed with Engine 9 that they were good on the water supply location.

To add to the confusion, E61 advised Command that they were pulling onto Deer Wood Park Drive. Hearing this transmission, Engine 93 who was already on-scene ahead of Engine 61 called Command and advised him that Engine 61 would actually be closer to the water supply location. Hearing no response from Command, Engine 93 left the scene and went to the water supply location as directed.

Tanker 6 (2250-gallon tank size) was the first tanker to arrive on location, with Tanker 1 (2000-gallon tank size) arriving a minute or two behind them. Although Tanker 1 was not dispatched on the original box alarm, they were able to respond in their first due area once staffing arrived at the station. Tanker 1 officer notified Command that he would assume the role of Water Supply Officer (WSO). At this point, Command advised St. Mary's to switch water supply operations to Alpha 5.

These pictures above are a re-creation of the operation

There was some confusion as Tankers 6 and Tanker 1 began to connect their discharge lines to supply Engine 11. Initially, the driver from Tanker 6 attempted to disconnect the Humat valve and connect directly to Engine 11's supply line. The Water Supply Officer (WSO) immediately corrected the situation. He directed personnel to leave the Humat valve in place to function as an appliance (allowing the ability for two tankers to connect to the supply line simultaneously). The intent of the Humat valve (with adapter) is to provide an uninterrupted supply of water in the same way that a clappered Siamese operates. Tanker 1 and Tanker 6 both connected to the

Humat valve and began supplying Engine 11. Engine 11 reported a brief loss of water (less than thirty seconds) between the time that Engine 11's tank ran out of water and the time he received water from the tankers. It's important to stress that there were no reported impacts due to a lack of water for the entire duration of this incident.

A 2500-gallon folding tank from Tanker 63 was set up in front of Engine 132. Engine 132 functioned as the dump site engine. While the first two tankers supplied Engine 11 with their water, Tanker 3 followed by Tanker 7 dumped their water into the folding tank. Engine 132 established a draft from the folding tank and attempted to supply water from the folding tanks to E1-1, however, the Humat valve once again caused some confusion. At one point, supply lines were connected to all four sides of the valve. When Engine 132 was unable to supply water through the Humat valve, the Humat valve was removed and Engine 132 connected directly to Engine 11's four-inch supply line. This eliminated redundancy and the ability to supply the fireground through multiple supply lines. While making that change effectively addressed the immediate issue, it did put Engine 132 in a position of being a critical failure point in the water supply operation.

Approximately ½ hour to 1 hour into the incident, Engine 132 lost the draft and was unable to immediately reestablish it. Engine 132's supply line was disconnected from Engine 11's supply line and the Humat valve was reinserted. Tankers then rotated through connecting to the valve and supplying Engine 11 directly. Engine 132's apparatus water tank was empty because the tank water had been sent to the fireground after losing draft. This may have contributed to Engine 132's inability to reestablish the draft. The situation was ultimately corrected by connecting to one of the tankers and refilling Engine 132s apparatus tank. This allowed them to regain draft from the folding tank and operations resumed with tankers dumping into the folding tanks. Engine 132 then supplied Engine 11 through the Humat valve that remained in place for the remainder of the incident. Water Supply was able to supply an estimated fire flow of between 500 – 1000 gallons per minute for the entirety of the incident. From the time that water was initially delivered to Engine 11, there was never an interruption of water to the fireground. Crews were able to work through challenges and provide an uninterrupted supply of water.

Tankers 1, 6, 3, 7, and 4 shuttled water for the duration of the incident. At 04:31, the WSO directed Water Supply 5 to relieve Engine 9 from their responsibilities at the fill site at Heritage Drive and Route 5 (Point Lookout Rd). At 04:42 the WSO identified a secondary fill site at a hydrant in the Food Lion parking lot at 20995 Point Lookout Rd (approx. 5 miles from the scene). This was in response to some of the returning tanker drivers reporting that the water supply site on Heritage Drive was taking too long to fill the tankers. There was however no fill site engine assigned to the secondary location on Point Lookout Rd. A section of three-inch hose was left connected to the hydrant for the drivers to connect and fill off hydrant pressure themselves.

For the majority of the incident, Tanker 14's officer (Water Supply Officer) was able to keep one lane of traffic open on Deer Wood Park Drive and allow tankers unimpeded access to and from the dump site. However, after the MAYDAY was declared, a medical transport unit was positioned near the top of the driveway blocking water supply operations. Several discussions occurred between the transport unit's crew, the Water Supply Officer, the Medical Duty Officer, and the IC before the unit was eventually relocated and remained out of the way. There was no apparent impact to fireground operations although Water Supply was forced to alter their operations several times to work around the unit and maintain continuous water supply.

SECTION 11: RIT OPERATIONS

When the collapse occurred, it was witnessed by numerous members operating in the front of the building. Members on the front porch and around the main entrance were able to immediately help multiple other members escape the building. Members then began to direct fire streams into the basement, through the hole in the floor, to protect the member who had fallen through. Chief 9B, who was the designated safety officer, called Command to state that "…we just lost the second floor on Side Charlie." The IC then contacted ECC to have them transmit a long tone for evacuation of the structure.

Chief 7A was at the command post checking in with the IC when the collapse occurred. The IC immediately sent him to the front porch to "find out what's going on." On arrival at the front porch, Chief 7A interviewed members in the area to find out the nature of the emergency and who was affected. He then gave the first MAYDAY, stating that it was believed that a firefighter from Engine 1 was missing on the first floor. After giving the initial MAYDAY message, Chief 7A began a face-to-face accounting of all the members who were operating in the building when the collapse occurred. Chief 7A then gave a second message to Command, announcing the name and presumed location of the missing member.

Command acknowledged the MAYDAY messages and ordered Chief 7A to "…get them guys off the front porch…all of them. We are in defensive operations." Command then ordered Engine 61 (the designated RIT company) to deploy to the front door. At this point, Command continued to call individual units in an attempt to fully account for all personnel, including the officer of Engine 132 (the missing member.) Radio transmissions to the missing member, including the use of his name, continued throughout the incident. No radio transmissions from the missing member were received after the collapse occurred.

Shortly after the MAYDAY was received, Chief 1 transferred command to Chief 6 and ordered all units not involved in the RIT deployment to switch their radio traffic to Alpha 4. Chief 1 remained on Alpha 3 and assumed supervision of the RIT operation. Chief 7A continued to size-up the situation involving the missing member and to redeploy companies to attempt alternate means of accessing and removing him. He informed Command and units on the front porch that fire streams needed to continue to operate through the hole near the front door, in order to protect the missing member. Approximately 4 minutes after the initial MAYDAY message, Chief 7A informed Command that he believed the missing member was located in the A/B quadrant of the building, close to Side Alpha.

Chief 7A then sent multiple units from Company 7 to Side Bravo of the building to look for access points to reach the missing member, and to operate attack lines to protect him from fire. Units also operated an attack line from Side Charlie, to protect the missing member. Members entered the basement from Side Bravo and quickly encountered collapse and fire conditions that prevented further movement toward Side Alpha. Chief 7A then requested concrete saws and sledgehammers, so the foundation walls could be breached. He

also requested heavy equipment to the scene, capable of clearing debris from the collapse. Because access from Bravo and Charlie was not possible without heavy debris removal, Chief 7A then informed Command that access would be made via a portable ladder from Side A. Attack lines continued to operate into the basement from Side Charlie and the garage on Side Delta as the rescue operation moved to Side Alpha.

As members prepared to access the basement from the collapsed area near Side Alpha, additional members worked to "open up" the walls on Side A to provide access to the basement. Another group of members entered the attached garage on Side Delta to see if basement access was possible from that location. Chief 7A advised that Delta was the location where breaching tools would be used to attack the walls leading to the basement. It is not clear that this operation was ever attempted, though members did work to attack the fire and enter the basement from the garage, including some breaching of wood-frame walls. Members operating in the garage were the first to report hearing the missing member's PASS alarm operating in the basement.

At the same time, Chief 7A began to send pairs of rescuers down a portable ladder from Side A to locate and access the missing member. Chief 7A also assigned additional members to "open up" the front of the structure to provide as much access for rescuers and fire streams as possible. The officer from Engine 73 led the operation from the portable ladder, which involved multiple members from different companies. Debris from the collapse made movement in the area difficult, which required a series of members to rotate down the ladder before the member was located "…just inside the front door." Simultaneously, members continued to work to create access and attack the fire from the garage area on Side Delta.

As the rescue operation from Side A continued, an excavator from a local contractor arrived on the scene. Chief 7A had the operator move into position in the front of the building to assist with the removal of shrubbery and building materials to potentially open more access to the basement from Side A. Ultimately the excavator was moved around Side Bravo to Side Charlie and began to remove debris to open up access to the basement from the rear of the building. In order to direct the excavator in debris removal, Chief 7A turned the RIT operation over to Chief 5 and repositioned to Side Charlie.

After several members rotated into the basement, attempting to access the missing member, a member from Squad 7 and the captain of Engine 52 ultimately made contact, applied the RIT

pack via the buddy breather, and attempted to move him. It was reported that the missing member was unresponsive at this point. Despite efforts with hand tools and saws, the volume and configuration of the debris in the basement and the limited space available to work made removal from Side A impractical. These factors, along with the fatigue and stress on the operating members led Chief 7A to call all members out of the building to regroup and develop the next steps in the operation. Command then asked for a long tone and had all members on the fireground report to the front yard for an accountability check. Chief 7A, Chief 1, Chief 5, the captain from Engine 73, and the captain from Engine 52 met to discuss a change in strategy and reassign positions related to the rescue operation.

The decision was made to redirect the rescue operation to Side Charlie, where the excavator had done some general debris removal to improve access to the missing member. Chief 7A then relieved Chief 1 at the command post and became the incident commander. Chief 5 continued to supervise the RIT operation, while the captain from Engine 52 assumed leadership of the rescue group. Two attack lines were in place and operated from Side A, while two more lines were positioned to operate from Side C. A recon team of two members entered from Side C to access the missing member and evaluate what debris removal was needed to remove him.

The recon team was able to quickly make contact with the missing member and advised that hand tools and saws would be sufficient to disentangle him. After the majority of the collapsed building materials and contents that entrapped the missing member were removed, members also dug smaller materials by hand to completely free the missing member. The missing member was then placed into a Stokes basket and passed out of the basement to the members of Engine and Truck 13, who carried him to the transport unit in the front of the building.

SECTION 12: PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)

During the incident, the deceased acting officer was wearing his department issued turn out coat and pants, gloves, hood, helmet, and boots that met the current requirements of NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting (NFPA 1971, 2018).

The SCBA with integrated personal alert safety system (PASS) device was certified to the 2013 edition of NFPA 1981, Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency Services (NFPA 1981, 2013).

The deceased was wearing nighttime sleepwear consisting of a fire department t-shirt and fire department athletic shorts underneath his gear. He also carried a portable radio and flashlight.

The independent investigation team examined and photographed the nighttime sleepwear and personal protective clothing at the local office of the Maryland State Fire Marshal. Upon visual inspection of the personal protective equipment (PPE) extensive thermal degradation was noted to the turnout pants and coat both on the outer shell and moisture barriers. The protective hood, SCBA facepiece, and boots suffered extensive thermal degradation as well.

The PPE and SCBA suffered extensive thermal degradation from being exposed to fire conditions during the prolonged rescue/recovery operation and exceeding the garment capabilities the PPE and the SCBA are not considered to be contributing factors in this incident.

Findings and Recommendations

Administrative

Governance

As described in a previous section, the St. Mary's County Fire System consists of seven (7) independent volunteer fire corporations. In addition, there are EMS services provided through a combination system that consists of eight (8) independent companies as well as the Department of Emergency Services, which oversees the career EMS members.

Like many other communities, independent volunteer fire 501c3 corporations have historically been granted great autonomy, often being viewed and managed as subcontractors or vendors that provide fire/EMS services within the jurisdiction. This form of relations still exists in many small communities across the country however as communities have grown, and emergency services needs increased, there tends to be a correlating need for a greater governance structure to coordinate efforts and efficiencies in service delivery to ensure that everyone in the community regardless where they live, receives the same level of quality service. Unfortunately, creating a needed and effective form of governance is often seen by individual volunteer corporations as an overreach by local municipalities to interfere with their private corporations. This tends to create a political quagmire that many elected leaders shy away from.

St Mary's County is a County Commissioner form of government. County Commissioners are elected by the residents. The County Administrator is appointed by the Commissioners to oversee the day-to-day operations of county government. In St. Mary's County, volunteer services are divided into two sections, governed by the Fireboard Association (Fire) and the Rescue Association (EMS). Each Fire Company has a Fire Chief and an Assistant Chief. Each EMS company has a County Rescue Chief and an Assistant Chief. All entities work together with the Emergency Service Board, which reports to the County Commissioners.

To simplify, the current relational structure is the appointed members of the Emergency Service Board who report directly to the county commissioners. The Emergency Service Board by charter serves in an "advisory" capacity and not as a governance body. To this point, there does not appear to be any centralized governance structure in place, leaving the corporate Fire & EMS companies to act independently, largely without county oversight.

The committee wants to be very clear in its position. The residents of St. Mary's County have much to be proud of and grateful for as it relates to their dedicated volunteer Fire/EMS companies. In fact, despite limited oversight, the companies largely appear to function extremely well as individual components. The critical exception to this generalization is in the area of having standardized and agreed-upon policies and procedures that apply universally throughout the Fire/EMS system. The committee wants to acknowledge the efforts of several

of the more progressive fire companies who have tried to no avail to manage this issue within and between themselves. Unfortunately, there remain others who selfishly refuse to participate at any level, often refusing to even engage in the discussion. Fire Departments are no longer in a position to operate as individuals, nor is this what's best for the residents of St. Mary's County.

Observation #1: On any given day, emergency responses in St Mary's County require resources from multiple individual fire companies, most of which operate under their individual policies, procedures, and operational guidelines. This is not only antiquated, but it's also incredibly dangerous for the firefighters who provide the service and the residents who require their services. Our safety review revealed deep frustrations by those who recognize this and understand the need to have these unified policies, but have no process in place to get them there. There remain fire companies in the county who selfishly refuse to participate in the process of formulating such documents. The Committee has deduced this to be the biggest liability to the firefighters, the county, and its residents if left unaddressed.

The majority of recommendations in any LODD report can be linked back to acts, omissions, and violations of standing policy/procedure. The same could be said for this report; however, alarmingly, there are very few, if any, policies and procedures to point to.

Recommendation #1: St. Mary's County should immediately address the autonomous operational authorities that exist within the fire system in favor of some form of governance system that has full authority to propagate, codify, and enforce policies and procedures that impact Fire/EMS operations.

Volunteer corporations should be able to maintain their independence when it relates to corporate matters; however, when it impacts emergency operations, there must be movement towards a one-standard, one-system, one-team approach. This is the only way to ensure that the residents of the county receive the same level of response regardless of where they live.

Observation # 2: Written policies and procedures are essential for any organization. This is especially true in the public safety sector, where the risk of not having sound policies and practices can be catastrophic for everyone involved. Endless fire department Line-of-death investigations year after year point to either a department having a lack of written policies and procedures or a failure to follow said policies as a major contributing factor in that tragedy.

While individual behaviors, human error, and personal acts and omissions were the key contributing factors in this incident, it must be noted that there were few to no formalized written policies and procedures in place to guide the operational actions and decision-making of those on-scene.

The Committee does not want to get into a proverbial "chicken/egg" argument. Strategic and tactical mistakes were made, and there is no way to assume whether or not those mistakes

would or wouldn't have occurred despite having written procedures in place. With that said, written procedures provide regulated rules and doctrines that are crucial in high-risk operations. It is the only way to achieve sound, uniform, and dependable operations. When these written policies are appropriately written and enforced, intentional and unintentional errors are greatly reduced.

Policies and procedures that are aligned with laws, standards, regulations, and best practices drive strategic and tactical operations and decision-making on the fireground. Coupled with the unique makeup of the jurisdiction, its local risks and hazards, and the design of if emergency services system, written policies and procedures allow first responders to perform their job correctly, consistently, and safely.

The lack of written policies and procedures in the St. Mary's County fire system creates an operational environment where preventable mistakes, preventable loss of life (civilian and firefighter), and preventable loss of property are sure to happen again if left unaddressed.

One of the more objective observations the Committee considered was that in the absence of written procedures, informal kitchen table talk and tall tales will become what young members base their culture on. This is something that every fire department should assess and consider.

Observation #3: Due to the near impossibility of developing unified policies within the St. Mary's County fire system, individual companies are left to write their own. A review of some of those individual policies revealed that the policies themselves were not always in compliance with national consensus standards, laws, and best practices. If challenged, most would not pass any level of sufficiency. What the Committee also observed is that many of the independent operational type policies adopted were policies taken almost verbatim from departments that are in no way similar to those of St. Mary's County. There is nothing wrong whatsoever with using other jurisdictional policies and procedures as long as you are comparing apples to apples. We found that many volunteer firefighters in St. Mary's County also work for larger career fire departments in the DMV. It appears that many of the station specific policies that do exist were largely drafted by the departments in which they work. Since most large departments in the DMV are different in so many ways compared to the St. Mary's County system, this leaves the policies extremely vulnerable to failure. What works operationally in the New York City Fire Department will not work in the Washington DC Fire Department any more than the operations of the Montgomery County Fire Department working in St. Mary's County.

Recommendation #1: With there being a significant absence of any written policies and procedures currently in place, the Committee recommends that the Standard Operating Guidelines/Procedures be the priority focus of the new governance system. For this to work, the policies must not be optional and must be universally adopted and, more importantly, adhered to by all. The Committee recommends that, at a minimum, and as a starting point, the Standard Operating Guidelines/Procedures include the following components:

- Incident Accountability

- Structured Radio Reports
- ICS
- RIT/MAYDAY
- Tactical Withdrawal/Emergency Evacuation
- Structure Fires in Hydrant areas
- Structure Fires in Non-Hydrant areas
- Basement Fires
- Other occupancy specific procedures common in St. Mary's County
- Gas Leaks

Recommendation #2: The creation of universal written policies and procedures will be a monumental task and one that must be done correctly the first time. Developing these policies and procedures will require all types of expertise. With that said, those who lack firefighting expertise must stay out of the business of getting involved in the technical parts of the policy. Instead, they must play the role of validating that the written policies and procedures meet the needs of the community, comply with all laws, regulations, standards, and best practices, and are legally sufficient.

The Committee recommends that the governance structure selected appoint a committee to begin drafting critical policies and procedures. The committee recommends that the committee be comprised of the following:

- Firefighting subject matter experts (the Committee feels some already exist in the system)
- Representatives from the Emergency Services Department
- Policy writing experts
- Local government representatives
- Risk managers, and
- Legal counsel

Recommendation #3: The business and legal aspects of drafting, updating, and cataloging written policies and procedures are time-consuming and require technical expertise. The Committee cannot say enough about the dedication and selflessness of the many volunteers within the system. They give generously of their discretionary time, which, like most people, they don't have themselves. The committee feels that the urgency of getting critical policies and procedures drafted will necessitate professional support and facilitation.

To be very clear, until written operational procedures are in place; every day that goes by, where firefighters are actively engaged in high-risk activity in the absence of written policies and procedures, poses immediate and unmitigated personal and governmental risk to St. Mary's County.

The Committee feels so strongly about this that we are urging that St. Mary's County utilize the services of **Lexipol** or a similar type of service. The Committee does not want to steer anyone

one way or the other. No member of the Committee is connected in any way to Lexipol or other similar type of provider. Out of expediency and urgency to get these policies done, Lexipol is known throughout the public safety industry as a professional public safety policy service that has a proven track record of facilitating the development and cataloging of all types of public safety written policies and procedures that align with industry laws, regulations, standards, and best practices.

Officer Qualifications

Throughout the interview process, the topic of officer qualification and standards inequities throughout St. Mary's County was pervasive. The absence of any guiding policy, establishing qualifications and standards for fire officers throughout the county, allows for the antiquated practice of allowing each fire company to establish its own. Based on information obtained during the interviews, while some fire companies are using some form of the National Consensus Fire Officer Standards, it was concerning to see that many others were not following any.

For appropriate reasons, the fire service places onerous demands on its fire officers. This is a critical principle that must be understood. In the fire service, an individual's sense of personal safety and wellness is directly proportional to the knowledge, skills, capabilities, and requirements placed upon the officers they work for. While subordinates will likely follow their fire service leaders during routine activities, they are far less likely to fully engage in tactical operations if they believe their leader could get them hurt or killed due to the leader's lack of technical expertise. Elected leaders and chief officers should never allow this type of environment to exist.

Many who responded and operated on the Deer Wood Park Drive incident spoke of concerns with the disparity in qualifications and technical dependability of fire officers at all levels throughout St. Mary's County. During interviews, those holding a titled officer position did in fact have glaring inconsistencies in qualifications and professional standards across the board.

There is an important difference between qualifications and standards. The Committee feels that both need to be addressed. In its simplest form, qualifications are types of requirements or related benchmarks that must be met to give the prospective fire officer the best chance at being successful in a specific rank before specific standards are addressed. This could be a minimum age, a certain number of years of experience, a certification or license, a previous level of time served in a rank, etc. Standards come from published documents that either require or recommend a specific training or certification that provides for a greater level of safety, a higher level of performance, and relative knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Professionalism has nothing to do with a firefighter's membership status, i.e., career or volunteer. Professionalism is a level of quality of service that residents do and should demand of their local fire service, regardless of whether it's comprised of volunteers or career

firefighters. Thankfully, fire service training standards and qualifications have continued to evolve following many years of tragic events such as the one that occurred on Deer Wood Park Drive. The Committee wants to be very clear about this point. The evolution of rising standards and qualifications is not just for career firefighters but for all firefighters. Professional standards and qualifications are the foundation for any professional fire department, whether all-volunteer, all-career, or both.

There is great discrepancy in the current level of experience, qualifications, knowledge, skill, and ability amongst chief officers in the St. Mary's County system. This is a significant risk that must be dealt with immediately. The Committee understands that the overall issue of dealing with unequal qualifications and standards will take time to address; something must be done in the short term to address the safety of the firefighters that these chief officers are responsible for. One would hope that people in these positions would have enough self-awareness and consciousness to recognize they don't have the competency to be in these positions, but unfortunately, that is not always the case.

Recommendation #1: The Committee recommends that all chief officers in St. Mary's County be required to complete the online 40-hour portion of the Blue Card Command program. On the one hand, it's inexcusable even to suggest that completion of the Blue Card Command (or any singular training program) comes close to being an adequate benchmark for allowing someone to function as an Incident Commander. On the other hand, it is one of the only programs out there that speaks to the 8 critical functions of the incident commander and how all of those functions come together when managing a fireground. The intent is to have a single standard program that every chief officer can attend (it's virtual training), and once completed, provides every officer with the critical concepts of incident management, strategy and tactics, and firefighter safety. This in no way assures that every chief officer would be competent in the role. It would make them aware of what the role entails.

Recommendation #2: St. Mary's County should adopt NFPA 1021, Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications, as a requirement for all volunteer officers. NFPA 1021, Standards for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications, establishes a baseline national consensus standard for fire officers. While adopting the standard will not be a silver bullet for the issues identified in this report, it will unquestionably begin aligning standards and professional qualifications with job responsibilities.

Recommendation #3: NFPA 1021 is not going to address all of the complexities of the fire officer roles and responsibilities in St. Mary's County. The Committee recommends that all current and prospective officers in St. Mary's County be required to complete an internally designed, 40-hour, St. Mary's County Volunteer Officer Development School where they are educated on the technical aspects of fire behavior, building construction, strategies, tactics, safety Incident Command System, and all local policies, procedures.

Recommendation #4: Once the county has established county-wide qualification standards, the Committee recommends a requirement for annual training for all who are qualified to operate as Incident Commanders, on all aspects of command operations. NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety, provides a framework for St. Mary's County to follow. The training should require:

1. All who are involved in emergency operations must be trained in the incident management and personnel accountability system to the anticipated level of their involvement.
2. Provide refresher training at least annually.
3. Those expected to perform as incident commanders or assigned to supervisory levels within the command structure must be trained in and familiar with the incident management system at the levels that they are expected to serve.

Recommendation #5: St Mary's County should comply with the Maryland Fire Service Health & Safety Consensus Standard by mandating annual command competency evaluations for all command officers.

Findings and Recommendations

Accountability

Accountability / Crew Integrity

Accountability procedures enhance firefighter safety while operating on emergency incidents by providing the Incident Commander (IC) with systems to track the number of personnel operating inside the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) and their area of operation. While it is critical to account for every member on the incident scene, the Incident Accountability System's primary purpose is to account for all firefighters operating within an incident's hazard zone. This system provides enhanced personal safety for the individual firefighter by providing the IC with an improved means for tracking and accounting for the location of all personnel working in the hazard zone. The personnel accountability system should consistently be implemented in all emergency incidents when personnel operate in an IDLH environment or at the IC's discretion.

A fundamental tenet of any fire department Personnel Accountability System is the concept of maintaining crew integrity, otherwise known as personal accountability. Small unit cohesion is critical for personal safety when working in an IDLH environment. A fire department's Personnel Accountability System relies on the fact that each individual operating at the incident scene has a personal obligation to the overall accountability system. These personal obligations are as follows:

- As an individual, I have a personal responsibility to always stay with my crew.
- As an officer, I have a personal responsibility to ensure my crew always sticks together when operating in an IDLH.
- As an IC, I am responsible for knowing the exact location of all my unit officers, always operating in an IDLH.

To be very clear, there is no single unified policy within the St. Mary's County system that addresses incident accountability. That in no way should be considered an excuse. This concept is taught in the most rudimentary fire service training programs, and the Committee is confident that every member operating on the scene that morning knew better. While the below observations may not have violated any local policy, they spit in the face of one of the most common and fundamental firefighting principles.

Observation #1: Throughout the Deer Wood Park Drive incident, there were numerous occasions where crew integrity was violated. Fire officers who are charged with ensuring crew integrity either initiated these violations or observed them and did nothing about them.

For unknown reasons, Engine 132's Acting Captain made a purposeful decision to assign the two firefighters whom he was personally responsible for to advance Engine 132's hoseline through a front porch window, onto the first floor, while he decided to attach himself to Engine

11's crew. To be clear, the Committee was unable to determine if there was any overwhelming reason for him to make that decision. There was certainly nothing obvious that came up during interviews or in the review of the fireground video. Absent something unknown to the Committee, this was a poor decision at best. The fire officer has no greater obligation than the safety and welfare of those assigned under their leadership.

Throughout fire suppression efforts and the RIT operations, there were numerous instances of firefighters operating independently without their officers, as well as officers abandoning their crew, leaving subordinates who they were responsible for operating alone inside and outside of the IDLH. Firefighters operate in the most complex, dangerous, and time-deficient environments; our response system is the most effective when supported by strong policies, operational organization, communications, and teamwork. In the absence of consistent implementation of one or more of these tenets, individuals will begin to take matters into their own hands.

Recommendation #1: St. Mary's County must immediately propagate, approve, and implement a county-wide mandated incident accountability policy. The policy must include the following principles:

- Operating in an IDLH environment requires a minimum of two people, with one radio.
- When a member has been assigned a portable radio by virtue of their "riding position," that member is required to wear the radio (which must always be turned on) whenever entering an IDLH environment.
- In instances where more personnel are riding on the apparatus than assigned portable radios, the minimum crew operating in a hazard zone must be two firefighters with a minimum of one portable radio.
- Other than highly unusual situations, crews will always enter and exit a structure together.
- Personnel must not separate from their crew for independent action or attach to another crew without their company officer's permission.
- Once assigned to operate in a specific geographical area or a Division/Group/Branch, and outside of an unforeseen emergency, crews are prohibited from moving from that location without the Supervisor's or IC's knowledge.
- All personnel must maintain contact with their company officer by at least one of the following methods: (1) voice, (2) touch, (3) sight, or (4) portable radio.
- Any member(s) whose normal job is to operate outside of the IDLH is not permitted to enter the hazard area without the member's company officer's express permission. The members' company officer must give specific instructions as to the crew's location within the hazard zone. The member(s) must proceed directly to the location identified by their company officer. The member(s) must perform no task within the hazard zone before joining up with their crew.
- Crews may not leave their assigned working location without the approval of the Incident Commander and/or Division/Group Supervisor.

Observation #2: Following the declaration of a MAYDAY, several resources from Station 7 were self-deployed to the Deer Wood Park Drive incident. Without question, members from Company 7 had the greatest impact on the rescue/recovery efforts that day. Their efforts and ingenuity are to be applauded. The Committee would also be negligent if we didn't address behaviors that are known contributors to LODDs.

Units self-dispatching in emergencies have been identified as a key contributing factor in other LODD reports. The Committee is aware of at least one individual who responded in his personal vehicle. This is even more alarming because in those instances, there is a greater chance that the IC and dispatch center have no idea the individual is even on the fireground.

Self-dispatching leads to the potential for unaccounted personnel freelancing on the incident scene, which has deadly consequences. The National Volunteer Fire Council has weighed in on this issue, stating, "The NVFC opposes freelancing or self-dispatching, as it can lead to miscommunication, causing safety and health issues for firefighters, first responders, and citizens." The International Association of Fire Chiefs has also opined, saying, "Uncontrolled and uncoordinated arrival of resources at emergencies causes significant accountability issues as a result of personnel freelancing and creating additional risk to firefighters, civilians, and others who are operating within the parameters of the incident action plan."

Recommendation #1: St Mary's County strictly prohibits the practice of allowing individuals to respond to the incident scene in personal vehicles.

Recommendation #2: St Mary's County prohibits the practice of allowing units to self-dispatch to an incident. They should consider drafting a policy that establishes a process where a fully staffed resource can request permission from the Incident Commander to respond to the scene. While this type of policy can still pose several problems, it does ensure that both the Incident Commander and the dispatch center are aware that the resource is responding to the scene.

Findings and Recommendations

Incident Management System

Incident Management

One of the Committee's primary goals was to establish a clear understanding of the observations, assessments, and decision-making of the officers on-scene. Information gathered through observation and assessment (scene size-up) becomes the foundation for determining the risk, mode of operation, establishment of incident priorities, and determining resource strategical and tactical deployment. The operational framework (Incident Management System) guides the resulting actions and how they all come together in practical application.

Systematically going through this decision-making process is critical for the first arriving officer, the Initial Incident Commander (IC), and the Chief Officer (strategic IC) before assuming Command. Fire Officers must have the knowledge to recognize and make sense of what they are seeing and have the technical ability to communicate their observations and the incident critical factors in a concise and structured way so they can keep all personnel up to date on relevant information.

The development, communication, and implementation of sound strategies and tactics on the fireground begin with recognizing and understanding the risk firefighters will be exposed to on-scene. Once that risk is determined, having a clearly communicated strategy underpinned by well-executed tactics, both of which are enveloped by a well-defined operational system, is essential for personnel to succeed. These aspects of incident management are learned in training and affirmed in operational guidelines, manuals, and policies.

This process is far more complex than it sounds, even for the most experienced fire officer. The process is further complicated because the Fire Officer must apply it with limited information and usually less than sixty seconds of available time. Every element of this process, risk assessment and scene size-up, strategy and tactics, operation doctrine, and standard operating procedures, are detailed below.

Risk Assessment & Scene Size-up: This step is perhaps the most important part of the process, which is why it is troubling that it is also the most difficult piece of the process to understand. However, the Fire Officer must know the process order and associated factors to understand the level of risk on-scene. Factors that contribute to the Fire Officer's risk assessment include, but are not limited to the following:

1. The type of building involved, including size, construction type, occupancy, and layout.
2. The smoke and fire conditions present on-scene, including the locations where conditions are present and the direction the conditions are traveling.

3. The rescue profile (not to be confused with rescue profiling) and requirements to protect the search with the understanding that life safety is always the priority.
4. The resources available on-scene, including but not limited to staffing levels, the number and types of apparatuses, and whether or not there is an established water supply.

The IC must know and understand each of these factors and, more importantly, understand the relationship between them. This requires a high level of comprehension by the Fire Officer. The human brain under stress is subject to failure despite training, knowledge, and experience. This industry is in its infancy in understanding the effects of stress on human performance. For far too long, the cause and effect of improper risk assessment in the fire service have been viewed mostly from culture, behavior, and training. The ESRP believes the industry has become complacent in accepting those explanations, failing to see other possible root causes. Once a risk assessment is completed and understood, the Fire Officer determines the most appropriate strategy.

Strategy: There are two key elements to consider when defining strategy, "what" and "where." The "what" refers to the initial and strategic high-level goals the IC wants to accomplish. For example, the fire service has developed a standard set of overall objectives (the "what") such as Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, and Property Conservation.

The "where" refers to the IC's determination of the starting point to achieve these goals. Once the "where" is established, the IC can then determine the best course of tactical actions to accomplish those goals. In many firefighting situations, the "where" is defined through the mode of operation, including investigation, offensive, defensive, or transitioning between the two modes. Regardless of the objectives, the IC must communicate the starting place to all personnel.

Once the IC defines the strategy and communicates it to personnel, they can determine the most appropriate tactics to implement. Implementing tactics without a strategy is both dangerous and ineffective. The ESRP believes personnel should never be put in harm's way without a clear purpose.

Tactics: Tactics are the specific tasks or actions, working collectively to support the IC’s goals. Tactics include forcing entry, completing a primary search, or stretching a hoseline to suppress the fire at the point of origin. Tactics are further guided by the following two factors, operation doctrine, and standard operating procedures.

Standard Operating Procedure: SOPs assist the Fire Officer in the tactical decision-making process and provide a more consistent tactical response. Written SOPs provide the Fire Officer with a set of predetermined, defined expectations and tactical actions to take when they arrive on-scene of an incident, in the absence of direction from the Initial or Strategic IC. In fast-moving incidents, officers are not required to wait until the Strategic IC arrives to begin acting, allowing the rapid

deployment of resources for the most efficient protection of the residents, property, and the safety of firefighters.

During scene size-up, strategies and tactics, including SOPs, are measured against risk assessment. The IC then determines the best way to manage the risk while simultaneously achieving the incident goals of Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, and Property Conservation. All these elements are incorporated into the organization's operational doctrine.

In conclusion, each of these five factors, and the failures associated with each one, were major contributing factors in the events, actions, and outcomes of the Deer Wood Park Road incident. The specifics are discussed in the relevant sections as follows.

The fireground is a chaotic and hectic environment that demands coordination and cooperation between all involved in the incident to successfully mitigate the emergency. The fireground is complex, fast-moving, dynamic, and marked with uncertainty and ambiguity. Operating safely and effectively in that type of environment requires a comprehensive Incident Management System (IMS).

Coordinating resources, strategies, and tactics is paramount in all environments, from the largest urban department to the smallest rural department. The March 2004 Presidential Mandate, titled the National Incident Management System (NIMS), demonstrates the importance of ICS, requiring any agency that receives Federal funds to comply with the NIMS Directive. However, ICS is much more than compliance with a mandate; it is the backbone of successful mitigation of fires and enhances the safety and survival of personnel when operating on-scene in an Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health situation (IDLH). The Incident Command System (ICS) is a big component of a broader IMS.

To be effective, an IMS must also include operational policies and procedures, accountability procedures, a command-and-control element, and communication procedures. IMS is the framework for supporting operational processes such as scene size-up, risk assessment, selection of strategy and tactics, and the development of a single Incident Action Plan (IAP).

The responsibility for the implementation of the IAP begins with the first arriving unit and transfers to the Strategic IC once they arrive on-scene. As incident complexity increases, the need to support the IC must also be supported. Task saturation of the Incident Commander is a major contributing factor in many line-of-duty deaths (LODDs).

Observation #1: Chief 1 was the first arriving fire department unit. The Initial On-Scene Report (IOSR) was transmitted and covered a number of critical factors, components, and observations. While his report covered those critical items, there is no standard format for the IOSR across the county.

The purpose of the Initial On-Scene Report is not to simply check a box. Each component of the IOSR is related to a critical factor. Those critical factors are all part of what the fire officer must know and understand before going through the process of assessing the risk, determining the proper strategy, and implementing a tactical action plan. It is intended to narrow down the key information that the fire officer absorbs. This helps alleviate information overload for the company officer who is already under extreme levels of stress, which impairs cognitive processing.

An incomplete IOSR may be the first indication that the fire officer is already becoming task-saturated, which also impacts the auditory and speech systems. When the report is incomplete, the remaining part of the incident management process is subject to critical failure.

There are several other benefits of communicating a complete and accurate IOSR. The IOSR and the information contained identify the critical factors that a fire officer needs to know for their company assignment. Providing all responding officers with that information in advance of arriving on the scene gives them much needed time to think through things like what tools they need to bring, what length of hoselines they should be prepared to stretch, or where they might begin their search. When it is not provided in the IOSR in advance, the company officer ends up having to get it in a rush, or worse yet, not even take the time to observe for themselves.

The IOSR also provides chief officers a snapshot of what the first arriving unit is seeing upon arrival. This snapshot will provide a comparison for the chief officer once they arrive and assess whether current strategies and tactics are effective or not.

Recommendation #1: Create a single standard Initial On-Scene Report for all corporations and the County. This IOSR will need to encompass critical factors based on the geographic area of St. Mary's County. Elements of this policy should also include:

- Verified address
- Number of floors
- Construction type
- Occupancy type
- Conditions evident

Observation #2: Chief 1 as the first arriving fire department unit, arrived and completed a 360 after the IOSR was communicated. Chief 1 walked the entire structure clockwise, starting from the alpha side. Chief 1's 360 report included the following information "360's complete got three in the rear Side Charlie access ahh correction basement access to the walk out heavy fire in the rear.

The Committee has been unable to obtain a cause and determination report, nor have we been able to obtain any information on where the fire originated. Examination of available video and photography, aligned with the level of experience and subject matter expertise of the Committee, has led the Committee to the conclusion that there was a well-advanced fire in the

basement, prior to the catastrophic collapse of the structure. The Committee is in no way saying that the fire originated in the basement, only that at the time of the collapse, and before the crews entered the first floor, there was a well-involved fire in the basement space.

While Chief 1 did not see "obvious" signs of a basement fire from the exterior, he failed to take the time himself or follow up by assigning a specific company to physically assess the basement space, even though there was a working fire in the structure. This was a critical failure. In the interview with Chief 1 noted there was a window on Side Bravo that was intact and was pitch black. The walkout slider on Side Charlie had the same conditions as the Side Bravo window.

Video footage taken very shortly after the arrival of Chief 1 shows a significant amount of fire on the first and second floors, as well as the attic space. When those conditions are observed in a structure with a basement, it must be assumed that fire is absolutely in the basement space until proven otherwise. Of note, during interviews, even some of the newest and least experienced firefighters on-scene, as well as the more experienced officers, articulated that they were concerned that the basement was obviously involved; they all assumed, based on Chief 1's report, that they must be mistaken.

In the past twenty-plus years, there has likely been no topic more widely discussed in the national fire service than the importance of completing a 360 on every single structure fire. While there are many benefits of conducting the 360, the primary focus must be on determining the absence or presence of a basement and confirming if there is smoke or fire present. Operating above an unknown, unrecognized, and/or unchecked (hoseline in place) basement fire is perhaps the highest risk activity that firefighters engage in.

The procedure for conducting the 360 is one of the most important operational procedures there is. Like any other operational procedure, because of its importance, it should not only address when it's required, but it should also address when it is acceptable to deviate, and how that deviation should be communicated.

Lastly, as important as having a policy is, the policy is useless unless the basement space is physically inspected for smoke or fire from inside of that space. There may be times when a physical inspection can occur from the exterior without forcing a door or window. As reported in this incident, the windows were "darked out" either on purpose or as a result of products of combustion, not allowing Chief 1 a good view. In the event that you can't see clearly into a basement window, slider, or door, the basement space must be assessed from inside the structure. Either way, basement status CAN NOT be confirmed without physical assessment.

Recommendation #1: St. Mary's County must have a defined and accepted policy for completing a 360, which includes physically assessing the basement for evidence of smoke/fire. The policy must include the following elements:

- An enforced practice that interior offensive operations should not be conducted before the 360 is completed and communicated.

- The identification of legitimate factors that may either preclude the officer from conducting the 360 or require that it be deferred. This should include obvious rescues, building size, and access issues that are difficult and time-consuming to overcome.
- A requirement that when the first arriving officer cannot complete the 360, they must assign that task to a specific company, before units enter the structure.
- Verbal statement of the number of floors in the rear.
- Verbal statement of exterior entrance locations.
- Verbal confirmation of the absence or presence of a basement.
- Verbal statement of conditions evident in the basement, i.e., fire or smoke.

Observation #3: Although there is no video or photographs that show the Deer Wood Park Drive structure at the exact time that Chief 1 arrived and completed his 360, there were video and photographs that show the structure one to two minutes later. It was obvious to the committee members that this was a well-advanced fire that already involved 80 percent of the structure, with obvious signs that the structural integrity was significantly compromised, before the first application of water. This is not the "opinion" of the committee; it's a fact-based assessment from the committee's more than 165 combined years of firefighting experience.

Video of the operations from the start through the point of collapse shows severe window and door racking, alligatoring of the wood siding, internal wall studs (visible because the drywall had completely deteriorated) that had burned through, and a sagging roof and second floor.

Throughout the interview process, the committee was astonished at the number of firefighters who were on the scene, offering their assessment that this was a "bread and butter fire" or that "this was a two-line fire." More insidious was the fact that many of those same individuals had little to no actual firefighting experience. It is worth stating that there were also several experienced firefighters (career firefighters in larger more busier fire departments) who opined that this was a glaringly obvious defensive fire once they viewed all sides of the structure.

There are numerous explainable reasons for the contradiction in observation, most of which could be categorized as "cognitive bias." Most came from those with little to no real experience who simply regurgitate phrases and slogans they hear from those they look up to in an attempt to sound like a seasoned firefighter. Much of it also came from people who mistakenly think they are more knowledgeable, experienced, and competent than they really are, and worst yet, many of those same people are unable to see just how incompetent they are. This is in no way intended to disparage anyone. These are legitimate cognitive biases that are a liability to fire officers and the safety of the people they lead. This type of company officer exists in every fire department in the country, not just in St. Mary's County.

During the interview with Chief 1, he stated that he assumed that units would operate starting with a Transitional Attack, and then once the fire was darkened down, progress to the interior. Although that may have been Chief 1's intention, he never communicated that as his desired

strategy. At the time of the collapse and subsequent MAYDAY, Chief 1 was unaware that the crews had transitioned into the structure.

Chief 1 described that he observed the entire back of the house as "well involved," and observed fire out of several windows on the first and second floors. He also observed fire that had entered the roof space primarily on Side Charlie. Despite that, he mentioned that there was a single window on the second floor that had smoke issuing but no fire, and that the front side of the attic, as well as the garage, had not yet shown visible evidence of fire. He interpreted this as a potential survival space. To be clear, looking for survivable space is important during the size-up phase. The intention of looking for survivable space at a fire is to identify opportunities for targeted searches. In this case, Chief 1 identified the window on the second floor as a potential targeted search opportunity but never communicated that as a plan of action. This is not to say that a targeted search of that bedroom was warranted. By the time the first line was deployed, the video showed that the bedroom was well involved in fire.

There were several obvious signs visible during the initial size-up that should have indicated that an offensive fire attack was going to be ineffective. The location and volume of the fire are the first. The first and second floors were well involved in fire. Significant involvement of lower floors in a Type V private dwelling, where there is also significant involvement of upper floors and attic spaces, should be an obvious sign that fire has already occupied the void spaces, spread to the open areas of the home and there is great certainty that structural components have already been impacted. This is just one example of obvious signs that were missed or misinterpreted.

Recommendation #1: St. Mary's County should mandate that the first suppression unit arriving on the scene must verbally declare the mode of operation (Offensive, Defensive, Transition) as part of the Incident On Scene Report (ISOR).

Recommendation #2: Chief and company-level officers would greatly benefit from a formalized training program that utilizes high-resolution simulation to teach incident size-up, building construction, fire behavior, and strategic and tactical decision-making. Outside of any formal system that could mandate this type of critical training, it is highly unlikely that those who need the training the most will show any interest in obtaining it.

Recommendation #3: Chief 1 was unaware that any company was operating on the inside of the structure. This is another benefit of the previous recommendation listed under accountability, where any company entering an IDLH environment is required to communicate the following information before entering:

- Unit
- Number of people entering
- Location of where the crew is entering the IDLH
- Company objective
- Anticipated area of operation

Recommendation #4: When possible, the initial arriving officer (in this case it was Chief 1) and the subsequent arriving strategic IC must try and slow down the decision-making process and utilize any available discretionary time to maximize the size-up process, and gain a greater understanding of the extent of the situation.

Chief 1 stated in his interview that his "intention" was to initiate a transitional attack, however, he did not specifically communicate that. To add to the confusion, Chief 1 assigned Engine1-1 and Truck 1 to Division 1, which suggested that he wanted them interior. Chief 1 started applying tactical decision-making without first being clear on what his strategy (mode of operations) would be.

Based on his interview, Chief 1 wanted to start off with a transitional attack so he could reevaluate once the fire was darkened down. This would have been a reasonable approach; however, his intent was never clearly communicated to any officer. With that said, based on the volume of fire, companies were forced to operate from the exterior until they could get close enough to the structure. Chief 1 should have taken the discretionary time provided to him while Engine 11, Engine 132, and Truck 1 were operating from the exterior, resizing up the structure, reassessing current fire conditions, and reassessing structural stability before committing to interior operations. This "resizing-up" of the structure was also the responsibility of every single officer operating on the fireground. Not a single officer provided Chief 1 with any level of feedback, which would have allowed him to reassess and reconsider his original strategy. This was perhaps one of the greatest overall fireground failures.

Recommendation #5: The committee recommends that St. Mary's County require the following training for all members:

1. UL-FSRI Fire Dynamics Boot Camp coursework.
2. UL FSRI and ISFI "Understanding and Fighting Basement Fires."
3. Building construction training for all members commensurate with their position. Training should include basic building construction principles for firefighters and more advanced knowledge for chief officers.

Observation #4: As incident complexity increases, the resources required to support the strategic level Incident Commander and the tactical level supervisors (Group, Division, Branch (G/D/B) must also be supported. Task saturation of the Incident Commander is a major contributing factor in many Line of Duty Deaths (LODD).

During the Deer Wood Park Drive incident, several chief officers responded to the scene and were assigned by Chief 1 to various levels of tactical supervision. One chief who responded recognized that Chief 1 needed support in the command vehicle and assigned himself to a Command Aide position. Unfortunately, some of the chief officers assigned to those functions failed at some level to perform even the most basic tasks of a tactical supervisor and failed to provide Chief 1 with desperately needed feedback that he would have needed to adjust his incident action plan.

Fire Department operations rely on the cyclical process of command and control, where the incident commander drives the incident action plan and makes needed adjustments to the plan as dictated by the information/feedback returning to them from those in the fire fight. Over the years, many fire departments have streamlined that feedback (control) in the form of a CAN (Conditions, Actions, Needs) report or some form of formalized progress report. When the control information coming back to the IC suggests that the incident action plan is effective, the incident commander can continue with the strategy. When the same information returns to the incident commander, indicating the current strategic and tactical plan is not effective, the incident commander can immediately adjust the plan.

Key company and chief officers failed to communicate critical information back to Chief 1 so he could have an opportunity to adjust his IAP. Information of visible damage to structural components, rapidly advancing fire conditions, and the ineffectiveness of the hoseline(s) to control the fire was glaringly obvious to them, yet no one provided Chief 1 with that information.

Early into the incident, Chief 1 assigned Chief 3B to assume the role of Division 1 Supervisor. Chief 3B initially maintained a position on the front porch while Engine 132 and Engine 11's crew were operating on the interior. Chief 3B did not provide this information to Chief 1. Chief 3B then entered the structure and moved towards the Bravo side of the house, standing between the crew from Engine 132 and the hoseline being managed by Engine 132 A/Captain. Video shows extreme fire conditions, significant degradation of structural components, and both 1.75" hoselines flowing wide open and having zero positive impact on the fire. In fact, fire conditions were worsening. None of this critical information was communicated to Chief 1 by Chief 3B. The exception to these comments would be Chief 7A, who managed RIT operations. Chief 7A did as good a job as possible under the circumstances, by providing Chief 1 with all critical tactical information, including tactical plans, resource assignments, and regular progress reports on RIT operations.

The purpose of a chief officer in a tactical command position is to provide a level of command or supervision that:

- Provides closer supervision and direction by an experienced command-level officer in dangerous or complex operational areas.
- Has the advantage of being close to the operation for enhanced command and control.
- Provides for a direct ongoing tactical size-up for a specified operational area or task.
- Provides a level of supervision with the sole perspective of coordinating multiple companies without the addition of unit-level responsibility, reducing the IC's span of control.
- Enhances the level of safety in the operation by providing oversight by a single individual, responsible for maintaining a broader ongoing evaluation of the situation.

The tactical supervisor must continuously evaluate the fire conditions, structural stability, progress, and effectiveness of the operations. They are in the best position to maintain a constant evaluation of the situation in the area of responsibility and must focus attention on their

particular area of operation. It is the continual evaluation that guides them in making changes or adjusting tactical assignments as well as requesting additional resources as necessary.

Lastly, the tactical supervisor must keep the IC informed first-hand of conditions in their area of responsibility. They must give an initial report upon arrival at the assigned area of responsibility. Additional reports should be given when significant changes occur, major problems are encountered, or benchmarks are met.

Recommendation #1: St. Mary's County should develop a policy outlining the roles and responsibilities of a chief officer placed in a Division/Group supervisory position, and provide training for those who could serve in those positions.

Recommendation #2: St. Mary's County should develop a standard, and structured radio report as a mechanism for officers and other tactical-level supervisors to provide the IC with critical pieces of information, completing the control element of the command-and-control process. The Committee further recommends that St. Mary's County use the current best practice Conditions, Actions, Needs (CAN) report format.

The CAN report fulfills the control element of command and control by establishing a uniform feedback mechanism in a radio report. This allows the IC to maintain constant situational awareness of the current environment, tasks, and resource needs of units operating in an IDLH. In addition, companies transmit a clear, concise, and informative radio transmission to the IC, minimizing non-critical information transmission.

A company or other operating group at an incident must keep the incident IC apprised of critical pieces of information. There is a delicate balance in maintaining radio discipline. Priority must be given to limiting radio transmissions to the critical information needed to maintain the command-and-control decision-making process.

- Conditions – Which should also include your location, and describe what your current operating environment is as it relates to any of the following (as applicable):
    - Smoke conditions
    - Heat conditions
    - Fire conditions
    - What's burning
    - Fire load hazards (hoarding)
- Actions – Actions describe the tactical/task-level actions being taken by your company. Examples include, but are not limited to:
    - Searching for fire/fire located/water on fire
    - Status of primary/secondary search
    - Vent operations
- Needs – Needs describe any resources and requirements needed to support your assignment. Examples include, but are not limited to:
    - Additional lines

  - Crews with hooks
  - Opening the roof

While there is not a specific time increment or set of circumstances for companies to give and/or an IC to ask for a CAN report, the following are a few examples:

- When Command is transferred to or assumed by someone, the IC should consider getting a CAN report from all units operating in the IDLH.
- A company needs additional resources.
- A company completes and/or is unable to complete a tactical benchmark.
- Changing conditions, such as anytime smoke, fire, or other hazardous conditions improve or worsen.

Observation #5: Command Teams play a vital role in the success of any incident, and the earlier a team is staffed and operating, the greater the chance of success. Strategic command support is achieved by using a company officer or a subsequent arriving chief officer as a command aide to assist the IC at the command post (CP). This is primarily accomplished via the command aide assisting with managing command functions.

One of the most important functions of the command aide is to act as a second set of eyes and ears for the IC. This includes:

- Focusing on any changes in:
  - Smoke conditions
  - Fire behavior
  - Structural integrity
- Monitoring the tactical channel for any missed transmissions
- Developing emergency contingency plans

Another key function of the command aide is managing the tactical worksheet/command board. Proper tracking and accountability of personnel is a major responsibility of the command aide. This includes tracking crews operating in the IDLH and those staged. This includes accounting for units:

- Assigned individually as a single resource.
- Assigned to B/D/G.
- Assigned to support functions such as staging, rehab, etc.
- Still enroute to the scene.
- Anticipating the need for additional resources based on tactical assignments.
- Anticipating and recommending logistical needs to support the operation.

Finally, the command aide can assist the IC with managing command post communications, allowing the IC to focus on the building itself, tactical operations, and communications between the IC and tactical supervisors. The command aide should focus communications responsibilities on:

- Managing communications between Fire Dispatch and Command.

- Monitoring the command channel and providing the incident progress report(s).
- Managing all face-to-face communications at the CP.
- Managing the communications and deployment of resources from staging
- Monitoring secondary tactical/water supply channels if utilized in the operation.

The role of the IC is complex, dynamic, fast-moving, and mentally demanding from the time the call is dispatched until the incident is under control. Chief 1 arrived on location before any fire apparatus, which allowed him to get a bit of a head start with the planning processes. He also had all of the additional complexities that come along with the system in which the IC operates, some unique to St. Mary's County, and some common in every jurisdiction. With the exception of resources coming from the Naval Base, this is an all-volunteer system where the reliability of response is unknown early on in the incident. It was a fire in a non-hydrant area, units began switching positions, additional units were adding on to the call, and Chief 1's mobile CAD computer was not performing properly. These are all major stressors for any IC. There is no question that Chief 1 became quickly task-saturated, even if he did not recognize it himself.

As companies arrived, Chief 1 started to manage his span of control by assigning Chief 3B to a tactical supervision role, however, he was still alone at the command post up until the point when the collapse happened. As a lone Incident Commander, the chances of task saturation regardless of training and experience are real and prevalent during a working incident.

The Committee is aware that the following recommendations will be difficult to accomplish in St. Mary's County based on the unpredictability of the all-volunteer system, especially during weekday, daytime hours. With that said, it is not unusual at all for there to be multiple volunteer chief officers responding to a reported structure fire in St. Mary's County. While it may be difficult and inconsistent, the Committee believes that if the corporations in the system are willing to focus on what's best for their residents as opposed to what's best for themselves, they can make it work.

Recommendation #1: The primary purpose of this recommendation is to support the next one. The Committee recommends that St. Mary's County consider implementing a Duty Chief program, both at the individual corporation level and at a county-wide level. At the corporation level, qualified chief-level officers, with a command response vehicle, could schedule themselves to be the primary dedicated chief officers for emergency responses for a given period of time. The other chief officers in the corporation would be free to respond if available, but it would be the primary responsibility of the on-duty chief officer to respond.

Similarly, the Committee recommends that the same program be established at the countywide system level. In this manner, any qualified chief officer in the county could schedule themselves as a County Duty Chief. The role of the County Duty Chief would be to respond to any incident in the county where no other volunteer chief officer is responding. This would increase the chances of ensuring that at least one chief officer is responding to all critical calls in the county.

Since it appears that individual fire companies in St. Mary's County do a good job of having at least one chief-level officer on their first due calls, the County Duty Chief would greatly enhance the chance of being able to have a second command officer available to respond on high priority calls such as structure fires, which is the point of Recommendation #2.

Recommendation #2: The Committee recommends that St. Mary's County work as hard as possible to ensure they have at least two qualified chief officers responding to all reported structure fires. If the county was successful at fully implementing Recommendation #1, this could be managed by CAD dispatch.

Recommendation #3: St. Mary's County should have a policy that addresses the use of a Command Team on all structure fires. Providing the IC with a command aide will drastically enhance firefighter safety by reducing the risk of task saturation by the IC. The command aide does not need to be a chief-level officer but should be an experienced firefighter.

Recommendation #4: The Committee recommends the development and mandated use of a single (St. Mary's County) command sheet to be used by all command officers at structure fires. The recommendation above will require the participation of chief officers in St. Mary's County from all the different fire companies, most of whom operate using their own company tactical command sheets. This would certainly cause confusion when chief officers from different companies are working to support one another.

Recommendation #5: St Mary's County should issue chief officers a standard mobile data computer that is readily available on-scene to retrieve critical data and information related to an incident from the CAD system. This will require the CAD vendor to develop a mobile client product if one is not already available.

Findings and Recommendations
MAYDAY/RIT

MAYDAY

The radio transmission "MAYDAY" is used to signify a member in imminent danger. Situations requiring a MAYDAY message can include a member who is lost in the fire building, a member experiencing an SCBA emergency, or one or more members trapped by a structural collapse. The transmission of the MAYDAY message indicates that one or more tactical units will need to provide direct assistance to the member with the MAYDAY. It also indicates a need for the incident commander to expand the command function sufficiently to manage this MAYDAY assistance while maintaining effective management of the ongoing firefighting operation.

Written standard operating guidelines (SOGs) are an effective way to prepare for MAYDAY incidents through a clear explanation of roles and responsibilities for all operating personnel. Effective SOGs cover proper communication procedures, command considerations, and operating practices for members in various roles. Without strict adherence to SOGs, critical tasks may be missed by members who are unsure of their responsibilities or are freelancing into roles that have been assigned to others.

In February 2024, following the LODD, the St. Mary's County Fire Rescue System adopted "Standard Operating Guidelines for a MAYDAY Event" as a county-wide policy. This was before the release of this report. Having had the opportunity to review the current policy with these findings in mind, the Committee is recommending the following:

Observation #1: Key portions of "Standard Operating Guidelines for a MAYDAY Event" were implemented immediately following the MAYDAY, but the management process broke down as the incident progressed.

Standard Operating Procedure for a MAYDAY Event outlines important communications and accountability procedures to be followed. Although the rescue plan and actions of the individual rescuers may be the most important parts of a MAYDAY response, it is important to recognize how poor communication and accountability practices can complicate rescue operations. In the chaotic moments following the collapse, some critical tasks were performed in a very effective way by the IC and ECC. However, as the incident progressed, there were major parts of the SOP that were not carried out effectively.

- The Incident Commander (Chief 1) was first made aware of a potential problem when the Safety Officer (Chief 9B) transmitted a priority message, stating that a collapse had occurred in the rear of the structure. Upon receipt of this message, the IC requested that the ECC transmit the evacuation tone. At the same time, the Safety Officer was

making his transmission, the IC sent Chief 7A to the front porch to investigate changing conditions and a buzz of activity involving the crews in that area.

- Before the evacuation tone could be sounded, Chief 7A transmitted a proper MAYDAY message based on his observations of the situation at the front door of the house. He stated that a member was missing on the first floor and that he believed it to be a member of Engine 1. Chief 7A then continued to conduct a direct accountability of the members operating in the area, including face-to-face interviews and a transmission to Command asking that Division 1 Supervisor (Chief 3B) be asked for an accountability of members of his division. As he learned more about the situation through speaking to members in the area, Chief 7A updated his initial MAYDAY message to include the name of the missing member, his presumed location, and some initial actions needed to begin the rescue attempt. This type of "up close" assessment of the situation happened immediately and was critical to accurately understanding the rescue problem.
- Upon receipt of the MAYDAY message, the IC (Chief 1) notified ECC of the MAYDAY, asked again for the evacuation tone, and asked that operations be moved to Alpha 4. IC then directed the RIT (Engine 61) to deploy to the front door. ECC transmitted the evacuation tone on Alpha 3 and the Dispatch Channel. ECC then announced the MAYDAY on the Dispatch Channel and Alpha 3, along with the direction that all units that did not transmit the MAYDAY to switch to Alpha 4. The IC also directed Chief 7A to "get those guys off the porch, we are in defense operations." Chief 1 then asked Chief 6 (who had joined him in the command vehicle) to manage operations on Alpha 4 while Chief 1 remained on Alpha 3 to manage the MAYDAY. These were important early steps needed to divide responsibility and to set the stage for the rescue operation to follow. These steps were entirely in-line with the applicable SOP.
- After completing the notifications for the MAYDAY, the ECC automatically dispatched units for the RIT Task Force and directed those units to respond on Alpha 4. ECC also checked on the availability of helicopters and put them on standby with the proper address and an estimation of the medical needs at the scene. These steps demonstrated a good understanding of the procedures for a MAYDAY and good coordination between the dispatchers and the on-scene commander. Dispatchers who understand the situation and can make key moves without direction are invaluable in the chaotic confusion that sometimes follows a MAYDAY transmission.
- The missing member never made a radio transmission after the collapse occurred. Chief 7A identified the missing member and relayed his name and presumed location to Command. Throughout the incident, Chief 1 continued to attempt radio contact with the missing member to evaluate his location and condition, but was never able to establish contact. It is important to recognize the need for this type of persistent, ongoing attention to the missing member. There are several reasons why a missing member may not be able to give an initial transmission, including the nature of his injuries, the condition of his entrapment, or the increased radio traffic that can be expected immediately after the MAYDAY.
- Upon receipt of the MAYDAY, Chief 7A began to direct companies in the area of the collapse in an attempt to rescue the missing member. Chief 1 remained on Alpha 3 to

direct the MAYDAY, and Chief 6 took over Alpha 4 to direct the ongoing operation. No formal designation of these positions was ever made. There was no formal transition of command between Chief 1 and Chief 6, which resulted in ECC and members on the scene calling each member on different channels in attempts to reach Command. Additionally, both Chief 1 and Chief 6 called ECC directly at various points, which resulted in ECC attempting to contact each chief in an attempt to contact Command. As it played out in this incident, Chief 1 should have become the RIT Group Supervisor, reporting to the incident commander (Chief 6.) Though this may seem like a formality or "word game," this lack of clear authority lines could have seriously hampered the operation, particularly if the incident had continued to escalate or if another emergency had occurred during the rescue attempts.

- In the early stages of the MAYDAY response, Chief 1 did little actual direction of the ongoing rescue effort but rather fielded requests and updates from Chief 7A as an incident commander would. Chief 6 did very little directing of ongoing firefighting operations because most of that direction came from Chief 7A or Chief 1, or through company officers doing what they felt was right at a given point in the operation. No formal assignment of units to the RIT Group occurred, but rather Chief 7A "grabbed" individual members or companies as they were needed. The result of this was a confusing mass of people "standing around" without clear direction, clear understanding of their role in the operation, or to which supervisor they were to report. More clear assignment of members and companies to groups or divisions, with clear lines of authority, would not only improve the efficiency of the operation but would also allow for more frequent, coordinated rotation of personnel into and out of positions and functions.

Recommendation #1: St. Mary's County should revise the *Standard Operating Guideline for a MAYDAY Event* policy to address the following:

- Add the option for the incident commander to keep all operating units on the tactical channel after the MAYDAY is called. Because of the nature of the MAYDAY, the size of the building, and the scope of the firefighting operation Chief 1 should have had the option to manage the entire operation on one channel, with RIT Group simply becoming another functional area for him to manage. This may have eliminated some of the issues with units not switching channels when ordered to and could have streamlined overall communication and coordination. This will also be a valuable option for instances when there is not a second officer on the scene capable of directing operations on the alternate tactical channel.
- Add a step in the process for switching radio channels that directs companies to verbalize their switch to the alternate channel, i.e.: "Engine 1 is on Alpha 4." After ECC ordered units to switch to Alpha 4, it was some time before Chief 6 realized that none of the firefighting units had switched over.
- Add a section that describes options for the establishment of groups and divisions in the event of a MAYDAY. Just as it is true for routine firefighting operations, the nature of every MAYDAY event may indicate a need for a different command structure. In

addition to the establishment of the RIT group, additional groups such as Logistics, Patient Care or Transportation should be considered.

Recommendation #2: St. Mary's County should establish a recurring training program for command officers that exercises the MAYDAY SOG. This training must include interaction between command officers from various departments, so that relationships are established, and officers can become comfortable operating together in potentially chaotic and confusing circumstances. This program should be done at least annually and should be mandatory for any officer with the authority to command fire operations. This training should also include participation from the ECC so that good coordination with that staff is ensured and individual ECC staff gain experience in simulated MAYDAY scenarios.

Recommendation #3: St. Mary's County should adopt a uniform tactical worksheet or command board for use in MAYDAY scenarios. The purpose of these devices is to serve as a checklist for command officers during high-stress events, during which they are bombarded with radio traffic and converging personnel. The incident commander can follow the steps on the worksheet, become distracted by events, and then return to the worksheet to pick up where he/she left off. Although incident commanders must have a good "recall knowledge" of operational procedures, it is important to provide memory aids and checklists so that no critical task is missed.

Observation #2: Upon receipt of the MAYDAY, no PAR Check was conducted to verify the safety of operating personnel. Aside from the efforts of Chief 7A in the early moments of the MAYDAY, no accountability check of operating personnel was conducted. The *Standard Operating Guideline for a MAYDAY Event* makes it a priority for the IC to ensure a PAR Check is completed immediately after units are ordered to the alternate radio channel. Thirteen minutes after the MAYDAY, Chief 6 notified ECC that a PAR check was commencing and asked for a long tone. After calling multiple units on Alpha 4 and receiving no PAR responses, Chief 6 informed ECC "…it looks like everyone is on Alpha 3" and that a PAR would happen on Alpha 3 once "things settled down." No PAR Check ever happened on Alpha 3.

Without an accurate accounting of all personnel on the scene, it is not possible to know the full extent of the potential rescue problem. Several incidents involving line-of-duty deaths have included late recognition of a missing member, or members entering the structure to attempt rescue without anyone realizing it. This is especially troublesome in response systems where unit staffing changes throughout the day and some members respond directly to the scene. The nature of this incident (catastrophic collapse, in the early stages of an incident) absolutely demands a full accountability of all members at the scene, as soon as possible. In a volunteer response system, this must include an accounting of members who respond directly to the scene, or who may have "jumped on" a unit as it began its response.

The topic of accountability is also addressed in a separate section. Because of its importance, it is addressed again in this section due to the nexus. The recommendation listed below aligns with the other accountability recommendation.

Recommendation #1: As stated in Observation #1, St. Mary's County should establish a recurring training program for command officers, in which the MAYDAY SOG is exercised. As a part of this program, PAR Checks must be practiced, under varying, simulated circumstances and conditions, so that they become a reflexive part of the initial command functions.

Recommendation #2: St. Mary's County should explore an accountability tracking system that works for the unique nature of the response system. Traditional "accountability tag" systems are sometimes ineffective in systems where members don't always report for duty on a specific unit at a specific time. Switching between units based on the call type or responding from home to join a unit can make compliance with a tag system difficult. When an accountability system is chosen, it must be enforced culturally and through written policies. Collapse incidents such as the one on Deer Wood Park Dr. are prime examples of situations where one or more officers may not be able to provide a PAR and an accountability system may be needed to determine which members are missing.

Observation #3: Upon receipt of the MAYDAY, the ECC did not initiate the 15-minute timer and did not provide the incident commander with time benchmarks throughout the MAYDAY response. In the policy *Standard Operating Guideline for a MAYDAY Event*, the ECC is directed to start a 15-minute timer, which will run until the MAYDAY is declared "clear." The ECC will notify the IC of each 15-minute benchmark that is reached through the duration of the MAYDAY event. According to the SOG, the expectation is that at each 15-minute notification, command should begin to rotate RIT personnel out of the rescue operation. This timer was never utilized during this incident.

While incident commanders may choose to allow RIT personnel to work longer than 15 minutes, it is valuable to track the passage of time since a MAYDAY has occurred. Not only will time factor into the rotation of personnel but tracking time also allows the IC to continually evaluate the effect of the current fire and smoke condition on the missing member as well as the stability of the fire building. During this incident, members involved in accessing and removing the trapped firefighter sometimes worked to the point of exhaustion before being relieved. This can not only endanger them during their operations but could limit their ability to rotate back into the rescue operation after a break. This lack of rotation of personnel at this incident was not entirely due to the absence of the 15-minute timer, but the use of the timer can serve as a memory aid to officers who have lost track of time and may need a prompt to consider other actions.

Recommendation #1: As stated in Observation #1, St. Mary's County should establish a recurring training program for command officers and ECC personnel, in which the MAYDAY SOG is exercised. As a part of this program, ECC staff should not only review and practice the steps

the incident commander will be taking to manage the MAYDAY, but they should also consider the efficiency of ECC operations and consider establishing pre-arranged assignments that each staff member can fill in a MAYDAY scenario.

Recommendation #2: The ECC should adopt a tactical worksheet for staff to use in the event of a MAYDAY. The purpose of this worksheet is to serve as a checklist for ECC staff during high-stress events, during which they are bombarded with phone calls, radio traffic, and resource requests to outside agencies. Not every critical step ECC staff takes will come out of an order or request from the on-scene commander. Therefore, a tactical worksheet will help staff perform their critical tasks, as well as anticipate resources or actions that the on-scene commander may need.

Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)

At the scene of a structural fire, fire departments establish a designated rapid intervention team so that there are designated resources available to provide immediate assistance to firefighters who are in trouble inside the building. Both OSHA and NFPA require members to be standing by outside of the IDLH atmosphere, equipped and prepared to intervene in the event of an emergency. RIT members are trained and directed to perform an effective size-up on arrival, identify the location of operating members, and take note of potential hazards that endanger operating members. The RIT will then assemble equipment appropriate for emergencies in the building, including cutting and prying tools, egress ladders, supplemental air supplies, and a charged attack line. In some of the station specific SOGs reviewed for Structure Fires, those policies have provisions for an RIT to be established in each of the various fireground scenarios the policy covers.

Observation #1: Although the IC designated a rapid intervention team, in accordance with the SOG, a rapid intervention team was never assembled and prepared to deploy. According to most of the station specific Standard Operating Guidelines for Structure Fires, the third due engine is responsible for RIT duties in both hydrant and non-hydrant areas. When Engine 132 requested to take the second due engine position and Chief 1 approved the switch, Engine 61 became the third due engine. The IC attempted to call Engine 61 to confirm this switch but never completed his transmission. Engine 61 was not aware that Chief 1 had changed the position of Engine 132 to second due.

Engine 61 marked on the scene on Alpha 3 at 0424 hrs. The officer reported that he had been unable to contact the IC for an assignment due to excessive radio traffic. Engine 61 proceeded to the C/D corner to assist Tanker 6 with their attack line advancement. At 0426 IC called Engine 61 and directed him to establish RIT. This transmission occurred at roughly the same time as the collapse occurred, so Engine 61 did not acknowledge the transmission and was not in a position to carry out the order before the MAYDAY was given.

Changes in arrival order and pre-assigned duties can confuse command officers and responding companies, and lead to poor apparatus positioning and missed assignments. This is especially true in a response system where delayed turnout times and response failures have the potential to drastically change a dispatch complement. The IC attempted to contact Engine 61 to inform them that they would be the third due engine but was unable to. Engine 61 ultimately was the fourth engine to arrive.

The collapse and subsequent MAYDAY during this incident happened approximately 13 minutes after the arrival of the first unit and approximately 10 minutes after the initiation of firefighting operations. The company assigned by Command to carry out RIT duties arrived on the scene approximately 4 minutes before the MAYDAY was given. MAYDAY incidents often occur in the earliest stages of an incident, before an initial RIT can be in place, with a size-up completed and equipped and prepared to respond. These situations require the IC to redeploy operating units to address the MAYDAY, which is what occurred at this incident.

At the time of the MAYDAY, the only member who remained in the structure was the member for whom the MAYDAY was transmitted. Because the progress of many of the initial firefighting tasks was held up by the lack of movement of the first attack line, multiple companies were in the area of the collapse, equipped and ready to respond to the MAYDAY. Chief 7a was able to immediately deploy these members to continue fire attack in the area of the collapse and to attempt to access the area where the trapped member was believed to be.

Recommendation #1: St. Mary's County should examine current dispatch procedures and consider announcing the pre-designated run order when each company marks responding on the dispatch channel. Consideration should also be given to how run orders are affected by, and adjusted to, delays in response or failed responses. E.g.: "Engine 11 responding with Lieutenant and 4" "Copy Engine 11 you are the first due engine." This announcement can reenforce the pre-designated assignments on the fireground and can prompt the IC to make changes to those assignments as needed.

Observation #2: Although some portions of the Standard Operating Procedure for a MAYDAY Event were followed, the overall firefighting and RIT operation were not well coordinated and the division of tasks amongst the units and personnel was not clear in the early stages of the incident.

Analysis: Upon receipt of the MAYDAY from Chief 7A, the IC directed the RIT (Engine 61) to deploy to the front door. Because Engine 61 was operating on Side Delta prior to being assigned RIT, the crew from Engine 61 had to both gather RIT equipment and relocate to Side Alpha. Since Engine 61 was delayed getting to Side Alpha, Chief 7A began to direct units in the area of the front porch in an attempt to protect and access the trapped member. Chief 7A then continued to select members as he saw them and led them in additional attempts to access and remove the trapped member as the incident progressed. Although Chief 7A informally filled the role of the RIT Group Supervisor, this was never formally communicated so that everyone

operating on the scene was aware. Formal assignment of units to the RIT Group was sporadic, with little or no tracking of these units as they rotated in and out of RIT operations.

As was discussed in the MAYDAY section, the IC moved all units and radio traffic to Alpha 4 upon receipt of the MAYDAY. This action draws an immediate distinction between the RIT operation and the continuing firefighting operation. At that point, a formal designation of the Incident Commander and the RIT Group Supervisor should have been made. Earlier in the incident the IC had properly designated Chief 3B as the Division 1 Supervisor and listed the units that he would supervise. A similar designation of authority should have taken place after the MAYDAY occurred, with the RIT Group and the IC having a clear understanding of who and what they were supervising.

Later in the RIT operation, after a tactical pause was called to regroup, an effective command structure was established to govern the rescue operation that was about to begin from Side C of the building. This included the formal designation of an officer in charge of assembling tools and equipment needed to support the operation. If this level of delegation had taken place immediately after the MAYDAY, the efficiency of the overall operation and the safety of the operating members may have been enhanced.

Recommendation #1: As was mentioned in Observation #1 of the MAYDAY section, St. Mary's County should consider expanding *Standard Operating Guideline for a MAYDAY Event* to include guidance for the designation of authority after a MAYDAY is given. Command officers should be given examples of groups and divisions that may be effective in a particular MAYDAY scenario and strategies for modifying an existing command structure after a MAYDAY occurs. This SOP should be reinforced with regular, scenario-based training during which command officers are challenged to navigate various MAYDAY-related scenarios and challenges.

Observation #3: Throughout the RIT operation, there were members who did an extraordinary amount of arduous, heroic work to access and free the trapped member. This group of rescuers, however, was a small percentage of the overall number of available personnel at the scene.

The MAYDAY operation at this incident was physically taxing because of the instability of the collapsed area and the volume of fire still present in the structure. The operation was mentally taxing because of the high level of emotional involvement and the frustration that comes with having to change tactics repeatedly when rescue attempts are unsuccessful. These factors become more of a challenge as rescuers become fatigued. Not only does work output diminish, but thinking and decision-making processes are also adversely affected. When members work until a point where they self-describe as "exhausted" or "done", the ability of those members to take a brief rest period and then return to work is significantly diminished. It is more effective to work for shorter periods with a break in between so that the member can continue to work over a longer period.

Multiple members stated that there were "a lot of people standing around" and "not enough people who were ready to work" during the RIT operation. This observation and perception are certainly based on multiple factors, most of which could be addressed through a stricter command structure. Members who are unsure of what needs to be done or who is in charge of them will often default to not doing anything until given an order. This is especially true in departments with a lot of inexperienced members. By contrast, more confident members with a higher level of experience and training may quickly adapt to a situation and jump into action without direction. This can lead to the impression that a handful of members are "doing all the work." Because there is no SOP that clearly assigns tasks to units during a RIT operation, it is necessary to clearly designate group or division supervisors, assign units to those supervisors, and allow those supervisors to drive the operation.

It appears that there may be existing, cultural barriers to effective operations in the St. Mary's response system. These barriers appear to stem from a lack of trust on the part of members of different departments. This lack of trust may arise out of members not knowing each other or not working together very often, or they may come from previous negative interactions that leave individuals with bad impressions of each other. There may be a perception of different performance standards in place at different departments or an unwillingness on the part of some members to "do the job." When things go wrong at an incident and stakes are high, it is natural for an officer to lean on the people he/she knows and trusts. However, when that group of trusted people isn't big enough to handle the task at hand, officers must be able to trust unfamiliar people from other departments to get the job done.

Recommendation #1: St. Mary's County should establish a recurring, multi-company training plan through which members of the different departments can build skills in a collaborative setting. MAYDAY and RIT are examples of tactical scenarios that can be set up to require cooperation and shared effort to navigate. Not only will a training program like this be effective for practicing seldom-used skills, but it will also build trust between members who see each other work hard and succeed in tough situations. The hidden benefit is the "downtime" that happens during these events, during which informal relationships can be developed between individuals who didn't previously know each other.

Recommendation #2: St. Mary's County should consider establishing a group of senior officers and firefighters, from various departments and levels of the system, who meet periodically to discuss operational issues. This group can conduct after-action sessions for significant incidents, address operational issues between companies or departments, and prepare reports that are shared throughout the system for learning and awareness. This group can also be used to mediate disputes between members of the various companies and can make recommendations to improve future responses. This group may also develop multi-company training programs that address recurring operational issues in the county. While it will be important to select capable and skilled people to serve with this group, it is equally important to find individuals from every department in the county, so that collaborative relationships are built and the group has the buy-in of every department.

Findings and Recommendations
Water Supply

Water Supply

A reliable and sustained water supply is essential for firefighting where adequate municipal water supply systems do not exist. More commonly and as building construction continues to evolve, large estate dwellings exceeding 5,000 square feet with open floor plans allow for large, rapidly developing fires. These fires require fire departments to quickly apply a high volume of water to control the fire. Water supply operations in areas without a municipal water supply system are complex. This management is often given a lower priority than operations occurring in or around the structure fire. The need for well-established procedures, skilled apparatus operators, a water supply group supervisor, and training is essential for successful water supply operations.

Observation #1: The water supply operation on the Deer Wood Park Drive incident provided sufficient water flow to the fireground for the entirety of the incident. At no point were fireground operations adversely affected due to a lack of water and it is the opinion of this committee that water supply was NOT a contributing factor in the resulting LODD. However, crews overcame several issues that could have easily been detrimental to incident operations.

The personnel performing water supply operations for the Deer Wood Park Drive incident encountered several problems that could have interrupted the water supply to the fireground. Crews overcame these challenges and delivered an uninterrupted fire flow of between 500 - 1000 gallons per minute throughout the incident. Although ultimately these issues had no impact on fireground operations, their potential impact cannot be ignored. By identifying and analyzing these issues, steps can be taken to prevent recurrence and reduce the risk of water supply complications in the future.

- Although St Mary's County does not have a formally accepted SOP for structure fires in non-hydrant areas, most crews attempted to operate within an existing SOP that has been loosely agreed upon by several of the companies within the County. This assisted with the structure of the water supply operation and the identification of a Water Supply Officer, dump site engine, and fill site apparatus.

- Engine 11 arrived on location and laid 100 feet of four-inch supply line from the end of the driveway to Side Alpha of the dwelling. A humat valve was connected to the end of the supply line. The purpose of the humat valve was to function as a clappered appliance with the use of a 4 ½' male thread to 4" Stortz adapter. In the non-hydrant environment, this allows the humat to function in the same manner as a clappered Siamese. Two supply lines can be connected to the humat at the same time and the line with the most pressure will open the clapper valve and supply the fireground. This facilitates an uninterrupted flow of water by allowing a smooth transition between

multiple supply lines. The presence of an appliance with multiple inputs is a critical component that also provides a "fail safe" by reducing the potential for a single point of failure in the water supply operation.

- Unfortunately, not everyone involved in the water operation appeared to have understood the purpose and/or function of the humat valve that had been placed on the supply line. Tankers 1 and 6 were the first two tankers to arrive on location and immediately began taking steps to supply Engine 11 with their tank water. However, the driver from Tanker 6 initially attempted to disconnect the humat valve and connect directly to Engine 11's four-inch supply line. The Water Supply Officer intervened and ensured that the humat valve stayed in place, allowing both Tanker 1 and Tanker 6 to connect simultaneously.

- Engine 132 was positioned at the top of the driveway and served as the "dump site" engine. After the folding tank was filled and Engine 132 obtained a draft, the driver of Engine 132 attempted to supply Engine 11 with a supply line from Engine 132. However, the line was connected to the 4 ½" threaded male connection on the humat which was on the opposite side of the butterfly valve which was already being supplied by one of the tankers (supply lines were connected to all four sides of the valve). When this was unsuccessful, the humat valve was removed and Engine 132 connected directly to Engine 11's supply line. This eliminated redundancy and made Engine 132 a critical fail point in the operation.

- Approximately 1.5 hours into the incident, Engine 132 lost draft from the folding tank and sent his tank water to Engine 11. Engine 132 was then unable to reestablish a draft. Personnel worked quickly to reinsert the humat valve and tankers once again began supplying the fireground directly. The water supply crews' quick actions prevented any water loss to the fireground during this period. Engine 11 never ran out of water. After Engine 132's apparatus water tank was refilled, he was able to reestablish a draft and continued to supply the fireground through the humat valve for the remainder of the incident.

Recommendation #1: Saint Mary's County should develop a County-wide non-hydrant structure fire SOP that should be formally adopted by each company within the County and/or mandated by a governing body. Components of the SOP should include the following:

- The SOP should assign responsibility for the roles of Water Supply Officer (WSO), dump site apparatus, and fill site apparatus. Each role should be clearly defined to include expectations for drivers, officers, and crew. The use and positioning of the apparatus should also be detailed.

- The SOP should emphasize the need to deliver all available water to the fire scene during the initial stages of fire suppression operations. This should occur before, or

while simultaneously preparing to establish a reliable and expandable water supply operation. Typically, this would mean the first arriving tanker reporting directly to the scene and/or the initial arriving tankers supplying the attack engine through an LDH appliance at the end of the attack engine's hose lay. The initial water supply can then be expanded to provide a sustainable water supply through the use of folding tanks and tanker shuttles. The sustainable water supply to the fireground is delivered through the LDH appliance.

- The SOP should mandate the use of an LDH appliance such as an LDH siamese or a hydrant valve with the appropriate adapters to function in the same capacity. Incorporating an LDH appliance in the water supply operation is a critical step in the establishment of an uninterrupted water supply. It enables a smooth transition between apparatus supplying the fireground in addition to providing a "fail safe" in the event of a failure of one component of the operation.

Recommendation #2: All Saint Mary's Fire Companies should participate in regular multi-company training specific to rural water supply operations and the adopted SOP.

- Emphasis should be placed on familiarization with each role outlined in the SOP and demonstrating proficiency in performing the associated duties.

- It is very common for fire companies and/or apparatus to have unique or specialized tools and equipment that differ from surrounding companies. While standardization typically simplifies interoperability and improves efficiency, this is not always possible. Training priorities should include personnel becoming familiar with the tools, equipment, appliances, fittings, and adapters carried by other companies within the County.

- Large-scale multi-company drills should be conducted on specific components of non-hydrant water supply operations as well as incorporating all components into full-scale exercises. Training should include establishing initial attack engine and tanker operations and transitioning into expanded water supply operations to include folding tanks (dump site) and tanker shuttles. Fill-site operations from various types of sites should also be included (ponds, drafting tanks, hydrants, etc). Fill-site training should provide direction on the most appropriate pump pressures, hose sizes, appliances, layout, and procedures to fill apparatus tanks quickly and efficiently.

ANNEX #1 RADIO TRANSMISSION LOG

June 27, 2023 - LODD - 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr. - St. Mary's County, MD
Initial Call to FF Brice Trossbach Exiting the Residence

Transmission Time	Transmission Duration	Channel Transmission	Radio Identifier Transmitting	Message Transmitted
4:04:11	2:18	PHONE - 8016	N/A	First Call - Alarm Company
4:05:20	:41	PHONE - 911	N/A	Second call -Neighbor calls advising her neighbor's house is on fire and everyone is out of the residence
4:06:25	1:21	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Call Dispatched Area Box 119 20521 Deerwood Park Dr for the house on fire - E1, TK1, T6, E6,T3,S3, NAS E13, TK13, E9, T7, WS5, A19, and A6
4:08:53	:02	FE_DISP	COM_3B	En-route to station
4:09:19	0.26	PHONE - 911	N/A	Third Call - Caller advised they already called but the house is on fire and they are going to need to be "several". Caller also advised that she believes everyone is out of the house.
4:09:39	0.3	FE_DISP	COM1_M	Chief 1 en-route
4:09:44	0.2	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Chief 1 Alpha 3
4:09:49	0.1	FE_DISP	A_69M	Medic 69 En-route
4:09:51	0.2	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Paramedic Ambulance 69 Alpha 3
4:09:55	0.2	FE_DISP	NASE132M	132 with 4
4:09:58	0.1	FE_DISP	ECC_07	132 Alpha 3
4:10:06	0.2	ALPHA_3	A_69M	Medic 69 Alpha 3
4:10:09	0.2	FE_DISP	ENG_93	93 Sergent with 4
4:10:09	0.8	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	20521 Deerwood Park Dr cross st of Ridge Ct and Deer run ct for the structure fire
4:10:13	0.1	FE_DISP	ECC_07	93 Alpha 3
4:10:22	0.2	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	St. Mary's to Chief 1
4:10:30	0.1	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Go ahead
4:10:33	0.3	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Yeah we've taken several calls this is going to be working
4:10:39	0.12	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy so the water supply point for the 3rd due engine company is going to be Heritage Dr and route 5 there is going to be a hydrant
4:10:41	0.2	FE_DISP	FC7A	Chief 7A Responding
4:10:44	0.1	FE_DISP	ECC_07	okay Alpha 3
4:10:47	0.3	FE_DISP	COM_9M	9B St. Mary's is 9 out yet
4:10:52	0.1	FE_DISP	ECC_07	93 is on the road
4:10:52	:02	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	St.Marys and route 5 we copy
4:10:55	:02	FE_DISP	COM_9M	okay switch to Alpha 3
4:10:58	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	9B
4:11:26	:03	FE_DISP	NAS_TRK_	Truck 13 4 with the captain switching to alpha 3
4:11:29	:02	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	St. Mary's to engine 93

June 27, 2023 - LODD - 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr. - St. Mary's County, MD
Initial Call to FF Brice Trossbach Exiting the Residence

4:11:30	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Truck 13
4:11:35	:02	ALPHA_3	ENG_93	Go ahead
4:11:39	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	{NO MESSAGE RELAYED}
4:11:39	:04	FE_DISP	ENG_11	Engine 11 Lieutenant with 5 good on it switch to 3
4:11:40	:04	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	93 disregard St. Mary's to Engine 132
4:11:47	:11	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Engine 11 any response from TK1, T6, E6 T3, S3, T7, WS5, or company 19
4:11:51	:02	ALPHA_3	NASE132M	132 go ahead
4:11:53	:07	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Engine 132 your water supply point is going to be point lookout rd at Heritage dr there is going to be a hydrant there to pick up per Chief 1
4:12:00	:03	FE_DISP	TRK_74	Tanker 74 Captain with 6
4:12:02	:01	ALPHA_3	NASE132M	I'm direct
4:12:05	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Tanker 74 Alpah 3
4:12:15	:02	FE_DISP	SQUAD_3	Squad 3 Lieutenant with 5
4:12:19	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	{NO MESSAGE RELAYED}
4:12:19	:02	FE_DISP	ENG_34	Tanker 3 with 2
4:12:31	:03	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Squad 3 Tanker 34 Alpha 3
4:12:36	:03	FE_DISP	TRK_1	Truck 1 5 with the Lieutenant
4:12:36	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Truck 1 is the engine going to make it
4:12:42	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	St Mary's {rest not readable}
4:12:49	:02	FE_DISP	ENG_63	Tanker 6 with 4
4:12:49	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	{NO MESSAGE RELAYED}
4:12:49	:01	FE_DISP	COM_3B_	Chief 3B
4:12:50	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	alright we got it sir
4:12:31	:04	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Tanker 63 Chief 3B Alpha 3
4:12:56	:02	ALPHA_3	TRK_1	Truck 1 is on Alpha 3
4:13:00	:09	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	twenty thousand five two one 20521 Deerwood Park Rd cross st of Ride ct and Deer run ct for the house on fire
4:13:17	:02	ALPHA_3	CPT5	{NO MESSAGE RELAYED}
4:13:20	:06	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Additional on area box 1-19 20521 Deerwood Park Dr for the house on fire Engine 7 an ambulance from station 39 is due
4:13:49	:02	FE_DISP	WS_5	water supply 5 sergeant and 4
4:13:53	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Water Supply Alpah 3
4:15:00	:03	FE_DISP	ENG_14	Tanker 14 Asst. Chief with 2
4:15:03	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Tanker 14 Alpha 3
4:15:10	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Engine 73 -- Chief 1 St. Mary's
4:15:10	:04	FE_DISP	ENG_73	Engine 73 safety officer total of 4

June 27, 2023 - LODD - 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr. - St. Mary's County, MD
Initial Call to FF Brice Trossbach Exiting the Residence

4:15:15	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Engine 73 Alpha 3
4:15:16	:02	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Chief 1 go
4:15:20	:12	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Alpha side two story single family type 5 construction fire showing on the division 2 and division 1 I'll establish the command you can stand by for the 360
4:15:27	:03	FE_DISP	ENG_61	Engine 61 Lieutenant with 3
4:15:31	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	61 Alpha 3
4:15:32	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	1 second tone sounded
4:15:35	:09	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Units responding Deerwood Park Dr chief 1 is on the scene 2 story type 5 construction fire showing first and second floor
4:15:55	:02	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Chief 1 has the command
4:15:55	:02	ALPHA_3	ENG_61	Engine 61 on 3
4:16:11	:02	FE_DISP	A398_M	398 Charlie
4:16:13	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	398 Charlie Alpha 3
4:16:17	:02	FE_DISP	COMMAND 6	Chief 6 hold me responding
4:16:21	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Chief 6 alpha 3
4:16:28	:03	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Command St. Mary's
4:16:31	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Command
4:16:34	:12	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	360's complete got three in the rear side Charlie access ah correction basement access to the walk out heavy fire in the rear.
4:16:48	:11	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Units responding Deerwood Park Dr 360 complete command reports three in the rear walkout access heavy fire
4:17:05	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	St. Mary's to command
4:17:09	:02	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Go ahead
4:17:11	:04	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	you got 52 personnel extra engine extra tanker on the box
4:17:19	:05	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	I copy
4:17:49	:02	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Command to Engine 11
4:17:58	:01	ALPHA_3	ENG_93	Go ahead
4:18:03	:10	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	11 just lay it out from the driveway I want you to duck into the little cut in the front yard behind my buggy I want to leave the driveway open for the latter truck
4:18:15	:01	ALPHA_3	ENG_11	I copy Chief
4:18:16	:10	FE_DISP	ECC_07	dispatched call - Transfer engine station 5 station 1
4:18:37	:05	ALPHA_3	A_69M	Medic 69 command we are approaching the area where would you like us to stage
4:18:46	:02	ALPHA_3	ENG_11	Engine 11 St. Mary's dropping it in front of the driveway
4:18:53	:06	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Ambulance find a driveway on Deerwood Park

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4:19:00	:01	ALPHA_3	A_69M	Medic 69 Direct
4:19:01	:06	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Transfer tanker 4 station 6
4:19:04	:05	ALPHA_3	NASE132M	132 to command I believe we are going to be second arriving do you want us to continue in
4:19:17	:10	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy command to St. Mary's is the engine from 9 up
4:19:28	:04	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	That's right 93 is up they were running 4th due
4:19:34	:10	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Copy 132 you can take second due and operate as the second due engine company is the command to engine 61
4:19:47	:06	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Engine 93 engine 93 pick up the water supply point lookout and Heritage Dr
4:19:57	:02	ALPHA_3	TRK_1	Truck one is on the scene alpha side
4:20:00	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Truck 1
4:20:09	:03	ALPHA_3	ENG_63	Tanker 63 command we are pulling in now
4:20:18	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to tanker 63
4:20:23	:01	ALPHA_3	ENG_63	Go ahead
4:20:26	:06	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I want you to pull you back up line and I want you to go to the rear
4:20:35	:01	ALPHA_3	ENG_63	4-Oct
4:20:37	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to engine 93 Engine 93 come in
4:20:42	:02	ALPHA_3	ENG_93	go ahead sir
4:20:45	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Are you direct on the water supply point
4:20:51	:04	ALPHA_3	ENG_93	It's going to be Heritage dr heritage dr is that correct
4:20:56	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	That's correct
4:21:03	:02	ALPHA_3	COM_3BU	Chief 3B is on location
4:21:08	:08	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	command to chief 3B go ahead and get dressed and you are going to be division one supervisor at this point you are going to have engine 11 and truck 1
4:12:18	:01	ALPHA_3	COM_3BU	I'm direct
4:21:21	:04	ALPHA_3	ENG_61	engine 61 to command we are about to pull into Deerwood park
4:21:36	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief 7A on scene
4:21:39	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_2	{No transmission received}
4:21:45	:05	ALPHA_3	ENG_93	93 to command 61 is going to be closer to the water supply
4:21:48	:03	FE_DISP	ENG_52	Engine 52 I'm okay on the transfer
4:21:54	:01	ALPHA_3	COM_9M	9B on the scene
4:21:58	:02	FE_DISP	ENG_52	4 with the captain
4:22:01	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Engine 52 you can remain on this channel
4:22:22	:06	ALPHA_3	ENG_14	Tanker 14 on location Chief 1A to command I can {rest of transmission is unreadable}
4:22:29	:02	ALPHA_3	SQUAD_3	Squad 3 is on location

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4:22:33	:02	ALPHA_3	ENG_34	Tanker 3 same traffic
4:22:36	:08	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy chief 1 B and command to st Mary's go ahead and switch water supply over to Alpha 5
4:22:46	:04	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Copy you want water supply 5 going to the supply point also
4:22:55	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to engine 132's officer
4:23:16	:09	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	St Mary's units responding Deerwood park dr all units all tankers correction all tankers on the water supply switch over to alpha 5 alpha 5
4:23:32	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to engine 132's officer
4:23:47	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to engine 132's officer
4:23:53	:01	ALPHA_3	E11_DR	go ahead
4:23:59	:014	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Back up line behind engine 11 and command to squad 3 you can work with the uh division one supervisor start conduct searches
4:24:15	:05	ALPHA_3	E11_DR	We are giving it {unledgable} good head way {Unlegable}
4:24:24	:02	ALPHA_3	TRK_74	Tanker 74 is on the scene
4:24:28	:02	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Nothing transmitted
4:24:30	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Any response from Tanker 4
4:24:32	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	7B when you get dressed just come to the buggy quick
4:24:37	:01	ALPHA_3	COMMAND6	Chief 6 on the scene
4:24:39	:00	ALPHA_3	E132_FF1	Mic Click nothing transmitted
4:24:43	:13	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Transfer tanker from station 2 station 6
4:24:44	:02	ALPHA_3	E61_2	Engine 61 is on scene
4:24:50	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	Engine 11 command I'm out of water
4:24:54	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy Command to division one come in
4:24:59	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Waters out 11
4:25:07	:02	ALPHA_3	FC3B	Division one supervisor to command
4:25:09	:02	FE_DISP	TANNKER_4	Tanker 4 responding with 2
4:25:12	:03	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Tanker 4 you are going to station 6 you can stay on this channel
4:25:14	:03	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	Command I got water we are good
4:25:19	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy
4:25:21	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Call for tanker 2 is canceled 425
4:25:54	:02	ALPHA_3	ENG_93	Engine 93 to command
4:25:59	:01	AlPHA_3	COM1_M	go ahead
4:26:03	:06	ALPHA_3	ENG_93	It's going to be heritage Dr and what's the cross street
4:26:10	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Point lookout rd.
4:26:14	:01	ALPHA_3	ENG_93	Copy

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4:26:23	:09	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	St. Mary's to all Units and takers and water supply switch over to tac 5 water supply is going to be on tac 5
4:26:35	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to engine 61's officer come in
4:26:41	:02	ALPHA_3	E61_2	go ahead
4:26:45	:08	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	61 61's officer can you go ahead and establish a RIT company and you will be the {unlegable} Engine group also
4:26:53	:04	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Safety to command with a priority message we just lost the second floor on side Charlie
4:26:56	:01	FE_DISP	PAXFD6P	Mic Click unlegable background noise
4:26:58	:10	ALPHA_3	FC3B	{unlegable yelling in the background}
4:27:00	:02	FE_DISP	PAXFD6P	{unlegable yelling in the background}
4:27:10	:07	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to all units operating command to St. Mary's can you give me a long tone EVAC EVAC
4:27:18	:03	AlPHA_3	ECC_09	You want the EVAC tone sounded
4:27:18	:10	AlPHA_3	E11_DR	{unlegable yelling in the background}
4:27:28	:00	ALPHA_3	E11_DR	Mic Click nothing transmitted
4:27:30	:16	AlPHA_3	FC7A	MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY we have a missing firefighter missing in the first floor I am being advised it's a fire from engine 1 this is chief 7A we need to flow a bunch of water thru this front door right now
4:27:38	:00	FE_DISP	PAXFD6P	Mic Click nothing transmitted
4:27:49	:09	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command copy Command to St. Mary's we have EVAC and go ahead and move the operations over to Alpha 4
4:28:02	:05	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	****EVAC Tone Sounded****
4:28:05	:04	FE_DISP	ECC_07	****EVAC Tone Sounded****
4:28:10	:08	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Attention units operation on the 1-18 box Mayday has been declared on Alpha 3
4:28:10	:10	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Units on Deerwood Park Dr Mayday being sound Mayday is being sounded if you aren't on the Mayday switch to alpha 4 alpha 4
4:28:19	:03	ALPHA_5	WS_5	Water supply 5 to water supply 5 officer
4:28:22	:09	AlPHA_3	FC7A	7A to command Brice Trossbach is missing on the first floor I'm trying to confirm accountability
4:28:31	:03	ALPHA_4	NAS_TRK_	Truck 13 is on location on Alpha 4
4:28:34	:15	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy 7B get them guys off that front porch all of them. We are defense operations and engine 61 go and deploy RIT company RIT team to the front door.
4:28:43	:04	AlPHA_5	ENG_93	Engine 93 water supply 5
4:28:53	:00	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	mic Click nothing transmitted

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4:28:59	:06	ALPHA_3	FC7A	I need you to get ahold of Chief 3B and get a PAR check of whoever he had with him right now
4:29:05	:03	FE_DISP	ECC_07	St. Mary's Engine 52 Engine 524
4:29:07	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	that's correct we are working on it command to chief 3B division 1
4:29:11	:01	FE_DISP	ENG_52	Engine 52
4:29:13	:05	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Taking the box alarm for the RIT task force go to alpha 4 hold your transmissions
4:29:13	:03	ALPHA_3	FC3B	I am outside on side alpha the guys {unlegable} pulled me out
4:29:20	:02	FE_DISP	ENG_52	I copy I'm switching
4:29:20	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy we need accountability of engine 11
4:29:24	:33	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Addition on area box 1-19 20521 Deerwood Park Dr for the house fire S5,E5,ST38, Medic unit is due as a part of the RIT task force at 430
4:29:51	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to chief 3B
4:30:01	:02	FE_DISP	MEDIC_2	Medic 2
4:30:02	2:25	Position 4 SA		ECC contacts Syscom inquiring if they are flying. Syscom advises they are call by call due to weather. ECC advises they have two firefighters burned from a house fire and we need them on standby. Syscom is given the scene address. ECC advises there is at least two and she believes they still have one missing. Syscom requests information on the extent of the burns. ECC advises no due to them just getting them out of the house and wanted to put them on standby.
4:30:04	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Medic 2 go to Alpha 4 hold your radio transmissions
4:30:07	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to engine 11's officer
4:30:11	:01	ALPHA_3	E11_DR	Go
4:30:20	:02	ALPHA_4	ENG_52	Engine 52 on alpha 4
4:30:20	:03	ALPHA_3	E11_DR	{Unreadable} Front door
4:30:25	:07	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to engine 132's officer PAR of your accountability of your people
4:30:27	:13	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water Supply to all units tanker 14 is backing out 34 proceed down to 63 74 pump in the holding tank we need to make this quick
4:30:29	:10	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Transfer an engine from station 2 to station 1 4:31
4:20:51	:07	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to chief 7B I got no accountability from Engine 132's officer his crew
4:30:54	:04	ALPHA_5	WS_5	Water Supply 5 to water supply 5 water supply officer
4:30:59	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Go Ahead
4:30:59	:11	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Alright I'm working on it I need you to get me engine 7 tanker 7 and whoever is flowing the line to the rear we are going to the basement I believe that is where the firefighter is
4:31:01	:09	ALPHA_5	WS_5	Are we going to heritage dr for the water supply or do you want us to pick up a second

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4:31:11	:31	Position 2 SA		Additional ECC staff is called in
4:31:11	:08	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Actually if that's a good engine at heritage and they got a full crew I rather have them here and you take care of that
4:31:12	:07	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy Command to the ambulance are you on this channel
4:31:20	:17	Position 7 SA		398C advising they are on location
4:31:21	:02	ALPHA_5	E74_2	Go up a little bit more 34
4:31:23	:02	ALPHA_3	A_398M	You have 398C
4:31:26	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I need you up the scene to the front yard
4:31:29	:18	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief I need you to have two lines flowing thru that front door I got 6 in the rear flowing lines back here I need one more charged handline in the rear we are going to try to make it into this basement I believe the missing firefighter is going to be on side Alpha in the alpha bravo quadrant
4:31:30	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 on alpha 2 chief 6 on alpha 4
4:31:34	:02	ALPHA_4	MEDIC_2	Medic 2 is on scene
4:31:45	:05	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's if you are on this channel I will be coordinating on alpha 4
4:31:45	:01	ALPHA_5	E14_1	mic Click nothing transmitted
4:31:49	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy Command to Firefighter Trossbach Engine 132's officer
4:31:54	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Chief 6 I copy
4:31:57	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to medic 69
4:31:58	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_2	mic Click nothing transmitted
4:32:04	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to Engine 132's Officer Firefighter Trossbach
4:32:04	:02	FE_DISP	A_388M	388
4:32:07	:04	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Ambulance 388 go ahead to Alpha 4 hold your radio traffic
4:32:17	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to Firefighter Trossbach
4:32:28	1:12	Position 4 SA		Syscom is contacted again they are starting 2 stand by cards right now ECC advised them when they key up to key up on the main channel
4:32:29	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's
4:32:32	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Chief 6
4:32:35	:05	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	That's right per command go ahead and start me an additional ALS and 2 additional BLS units
4:32:36	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	mic Click nothing transmitted
4:32:41	:10	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	I copy just be advised you have Medic 69 Ambulance 398C Ambulance 388 is en route also have medic 2 on the scene I'll go ahead and hit you for two more ambulances and another medic
4:32:51	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command Chief 7B

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4:32:53	:04	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	I'm direct if you can get ahold of Medic 69 and have them come up to the scene with their stuff
4:32:58	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Medic 69 you copy
4:32:58	:15	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief I got Doug Insley and Tyler Brady are taking a crew into the basement right now it appears quite a bit has dropped down already from the first floor to the basement they are flowing water we're trying to locate him now
4:33:14	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy you have truck 13 back there with you now too
4:33:20	:09	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Alright whoever is on the front porch flow that water do not stop flowing those handlines if you need to reposition do so do not stop flowing water
4:33:22	:36	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Additional Area box 1-19 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr for a house fire resounding ST38, CO79, Calvert EMS 3 and the medic 4:34
4:33:32	:03	ALPHA_3	FC7A	I recommend getting a helicopter on standby chief
4:33:38	:01	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Copy
4:33:39	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's
4:33:44	:02	ALPHA_3	E74_1	mic Click nothing transmitted
4:33:45	1:16	Position 4 SA		ECC advising Syscom to go ahead and launch if they can. Syscom asks about how many patients. ECC advises Alpha 7 is going to be their channel. ECC requests two Helicopters and advises she is unsure where they are going to land. ECC then advises Leonardtown Middle is going to be the landing zone.
4:33:54	:14	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief I need a company with a concrete cutting saw to the bravo side we are making another entrance into the basement I need a couple dudes with sledgehammers that wanna work and a concrete cutting saw ASAP
4:34:02	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water Supply to St. Mary's what tankers do I have on the scene
4:34:09	:02	FE_DISP	MEDIC_5P	Medic 5 Charlie
4:34:10	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's
4:34:12	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Medic 5Charlie alpha 4
4:34:14	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Go ahead Chief
4:34:16	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Copy
4:34:17	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	That's right I know you have a lot going on there can you go ahead and see the availability of a helicopter
4:34:21	:04	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Thats right we are sending two now we will get you a ETA in a second
4:34:36	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Awesome Thank you sir
4:34:29	:02	ALPHA_4	MEDIC_5P	Medic 5 Charlie
4:34:34	:02	FE_DISP	SQUAD_5	Squad 5 chief with 3
4:34:37	:04	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Squad 5 Alpha 4 hold your transmissions
4:34:43	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_2	mic Click nothing transmitted

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4:34:36	:05	ALPHA_3	E73_1	73 to 7A
4:34:52	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Go head go head
4:34:57	:02	ALPHA_3	E74_DR	mic Click nothing transmitted
4:35:03	:27	Position 4 SA		Syscom inquires if we know any extent on burns yet
4:35:07	:16	Position 7 SA		398C Advises ECC they're now paramedic equipped
4:35:08	:02	FE_DISP	A797_M	797 Charlie
4:35:08	:10	Position 2 SA		ECC attempts call hangs up
4:35:08	:08	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water Supply to any other tanker on the scene other than 34 63
4:35:13	:16	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief Update we cannot make entry due to collapse in the delta side we have to go thru the front door we are getting accountability of all the crews I need anybody that's in the front yard to keep flowing water we're repositioning handlines now to make entry into the basement
4:35:19	1:17	Position 2 SA		Deputy Director of Emergency Services Kiersten Shea is notified
4:35:23	:03	FE_DISP	ENG_23	Engine 23 with 4
4:35:27	:03	FE_DISP	ECC_07	23 can you take in the landing zone at Leonardtown Middle School
4:35:31	1:13	Position 4 SA		Trooper 2 and Trooper 7 Syscom advises that if we are talking airway compromise or severe burns then we will probably need a 3rd aircraft. ETA Tropper 7 in 11 Trooper 2 in 25
4:35:31	:07	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy We will keep running these handines in the front door
4:35:34	:02	FE_DISP	ENG_23	Thats Correct
4:35:36	:04	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Alright just go ahead and start that way we are trying to get an ETA on the troopers now you can just stay on this channel
4:35:43	:03	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	St. Mary's to command we also have two helicopter's en-route
4:35:48	:06	ALPHA_3	FC7A	The only crews that are going in right now is truck 13 73 and 74 Doug Insley and myself
4:35:56	:02	AlPHA_4	TK13_FF2	Nothing Transmitted
4:35:57	:10	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Transfer engine from station 4 to station 1
4:36:01	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_2	Nothing Transmitted
4:36:06	:01	ALPHA_3	E11_2	Nothing Transmitted
4:36:19	:02	FE_DISP	A_389M	389 Charlie
4:36:20	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's
4:36:22	:02	FE_DISP	A_797M	797 Charlie
4:36:25	:01	ALPHA_3	E93_OIC	Nothing Transmitted
4:36:25	:03	FE_DISP	ECC_07	389 Charlie 797 Charlie Alpha 4 hold your radio traffic
4:36:28	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Go head
4:36:29	:02	ALPHA_5	ENG_93	Engine 93 to St. Mary's

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4:36:32	:05	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Alright in a minute after I coordinate some stuff with the crews on scene we are going to do a PAR check
4:36:36	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_09	Nothing Transmitted
4:36:37	:02	ALPHA_5	WS_5	Nothing Transmitted
4:36:38	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Ok I copy
4:36:49	:01	ALPHA_5	ECC_09	Engine 93
4:36:58	:03	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief we need an attic ladder ASAP we're going in the front door
4:36:59	:25	Position 2 SA		Additional ECC Staff alerted to come in
4:37:08	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	They coming Chief
4:37:23	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	23
4:37:18	:01	FE_DISP	ENG_23	23
4:37:20	:08	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Alright you are going to have trooper 7 in about 11 minutes and trooper 2 in about 20 you can switch to Alpha 7
4:37:28	:17	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Update no access to side delta Bravo or Charlie I need you to assign a company to find another way into that basement we are going to have to breech a wall. we are sending the crews from 7 Doug Insley myself to side alpha we have two hose lines operating
4:37:29	:06	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water Supply to 14 expedite your return {rest is unreadable}
4:37:30	:01	FE_DISP	ENG_23	Direct
4:37:41	:04	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 on 7
4:37:49	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy we are going to get you another crew {Rest is unreadable}
4:38:00	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's can you go ahead and start SMECO and fire Marshall
4:38:04	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	11 to command to Truck 3
4:38:07	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	That's right
4:38:11	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ3_1	Squad 3
4:38:14	:43	Position 4 SA		{10-21 to unknown operations request for service to address}
4:38:17	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Nothing Transmitted
4:38:18	:02	ALPHA_3	E63_DR	Nothing Transmitted
4:38:22	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to Lieutenant 6A
4:38:22	:05	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief I recommend you start a {Unknown} ASAP
4:38:29	:02	FE_DISP	SQUAD_7	Squad 7 to St. Mary's
4:38:31	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	You advise a (unknown)
4:38:33	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Squad 7 Go head
4:38:34	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	No readable
4:38:36	:03	FE_DISP	SQUAD_7	I'm responding on the RIT task force with five. I'm switching over
4:38:37	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to St. Mary's can you make that happen for me

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4:38:40	1:17	STMARY08		ECC contacts Maryland Department of Emergency Managment to respond ASAP
4:28:41	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Ok squad 7
4:38:41	:02	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	you want a Gradall or bull dozer sir
4:38:45	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	The biggest thing you got
4:38:47	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Copy
4:38:49	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Nothing Transmitted
4:38:50	:03	FE_DISP	MED_18P	Medic 18
4:38:52	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	command to St. Mary's whatever you can get us to breech a wall in the basement
4:38:58	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Medic 18 Alpha 4
4:39:03	:11	ALPHA_3	FC7A	I need two RIT packs a stokes basket and a bag of rope to side alpha stand by on the front porch
4:39:22	:04	ALPHA_5	WS_5	water supply 5 to command water supply is established
4:39:25	:06	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	7B you are going to have engine 93 coming to you with a stokes basket and equipment
4:39:30	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	repeat your last
4:39:41	:02	ALPHA_5	E34_1	34 To water supply I'm now disconnected
4:39:43	:03	FE_DISP	ENG_41M	Engine 41 A Chief total of 3
4:39:46	:04	ALPHA_3	FC7A	All the wagon drivers bring your RIT packs up to side alpha right now
4:39:47	:03	FE_DISP	ECC_07	41 transfer to station 1 stay on this channel
4:39:55	:05	ALPHA_3	FC7A	John Trossbach I need a 14 foot roof latter to side A right now
4:39:55	:57	4 SA		DPW contacted for equipment ASAP
4:39:56	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	ok 41
4:40:02	:00	ALPHA_3	PAXFD2P	Nothing Transmitted
4:40:19	:02	ALPHA_3	SAFE3A	Nothing Transmitted
4:40:33	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's
4:40:36	:02	AlPHA_3	A69_P1	Nothing Transmitted
4:40:38	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Go ahead chief
4:40:41	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	That's right go ahead and get me a PAR check for all unit's on the scene
4:40:47	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Alright I copy I'll give you a long tone you want me to conduct it or you wanna conduct it
4:40:47	:02	ALPHA_3	E91_1	Nothing Transmitted
4:40:52	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Go ahead and give me a long tone there is a lot of stuff going on right now
4:40:56	:08	ALPHA_3	FC7A	John Trossbach I need more pressure on 132's line the driver's side line off of tanker 14
4:40:56	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	**** Long Tone ****

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4:41:19	:01	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	Nothing Transmitted
4:41:22	:03	AlPHA_4	CMD6_DR	All units operating on the fire ground standby for a PAR check
4:41:36	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Engine 132
4:41:56	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Engine 11 PAR check
4:42:20	:02	ALPHA_5	WSO_5P	Water supply 5 go ahead
4:42:24	:02	ALPHA_5	WSO_5P	Water Supply Command
4:42:28	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Unit calling water Supply
4:42:29	:02	ALPHA_3	FC5A	Nothing Transmitted
4:42:30	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Tanker 74 PAR check
4:42:38	:07	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Okay secondary is going to be right there in Callaway by the food lion there is a hydrant up there
4:43:11	:04	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Squad 3 PAR check
4:43:12	:26	STMARY04		Calvert Communications calls to advise that CO.3 did not get out and asked if we would like them to be replaced. St. Mary's ECC advised yes
4:43:13	:37	STMARY07		Called advised jay brown excavating can get us a excavator to the scene from chingville rd. ECC starts a deputy to the location for an escort
4:43:18	:02	ALPHA_3	E73_DR	Nothing Transmitted
4:43:32	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Tanker 34 PAR check
4:43:39	:11	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief update we have three people inside so far Doug Insley is leading the guys down into the basement to attempt to locate we have three lines operating on side Alpha
4:43:52	:06	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Command I copy 7B are they able to hear a PASS device or anything going off
4:44:04	:02	ALPHA_4	MEDIC_5M	Medic 5 is approaching
4:44:04	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Standby
4:44:22	:02	ALPHA_4	MEDIC_5M	Medic 5C is on scene
4:44:34	:02	ALPHA_3	E73_DR	Nothing Transmitted
4:44:37	:10	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's seems looks like everyone is on Alpha 3 that's operating on this search and rescue so we will do a PAR check here momentarily on alpha 3 once things settle down
4:44:38	:06	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief I need every wood cutting saw to the front porch gas wood cutting saw right now
4:44:48	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	Chain saw or {unreadable}
4:44:49	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	okay chief
4:44:51	:03	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	Tanker 14 to the water supply I'm full headed back
4:44:55	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Copy that need ya quick
4:45:01	:02	ALPHA_3	E74_DR	Nothing Transmitted

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4:45:33	:02	ALPHA_3	E74_DR	Nothing Transmitted
4:45:43	:02	ALPHA_4	ENG_52	Engine 52 is on the scene
4:45:58	:11	RY07		SYSCOM contacts ECC advising that they started egale 2 as well they are showing a 25 minutes out
4:45:58	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	52 go ahead and bring your man power
4:45:59	:03	ALPHA_3	E836OIC	Nothing Transmitted
4:46:03	:01	ALPHA_4	ENG_52	Copy
4:46:06	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	come up to chief 1 command
4:46:06	:02	ALPHA_3	E73_1	okay
4:46:13	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to 52 go ahead and bring your RIT equipment
4:46:14	:04	ALPHA_3	E73_1	73 7A
4:46:19	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	go ahead
4:46:21	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	okay we want you to establish a RIT company in the front yard
4:46:21	:11	ALPHA_3	E73_1	okay he's on the delta quadrant he is completely berried and he is not moving
4:46:34	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	okay where are you seeing him from
4:46:39	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to 52 acknowledge
4:46:40	:06	ALPHA_3	E73_1	He's to the right of that doorway right across from that window they are opening now
4:46:44	:46	ALPHA_4	E52_1	Nothing Transmitted
4:46:47	:09	ALPHA_3	FC7A	okay we sending guys in now chief get me EMS to side alpha I want as many fresh body's as you can to side alpha in a Stright line do not come on the front porch
4:46:49	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to truck 13 your EI status
4:46:59	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to truck 13 your EI status
4:47:02	:07	ALPHA_3	E73_1	73 73 driver bring spare cylinders to side A ASAP
4:47:06	:29	STMARY07		NDW dispatch contacts ECC to check the status of Truck 13. ECC advises NDW that they're working a mayday involving Engine 132
4:47:11	:03	ALPHA_3	E11_DR	E11's driver charge the 2 inch
4:47:17	:09	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy we are getting you fresh bodies 52 is on the way up and EMS is ready for you
4:47:22	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to truck 13
4:47:34	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to truck 13
4:47:43	:02	ALPHA_3	E73_2	Nothing Transmitted
4:47:59	:02	ALPHA_3	UT5_DR	Nothing Transmitted
4:48:03	:06	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to any unit confirm truck 13 portable driver status
4:48:15	:45	ALPHA_4	TR13_DO	Nothing Transmitted

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4:48:16	:04	ALPHA_3	E73_1	73 73 driver you copy that message for a SCBA
4:48:23	:01	ALPHA_3	E73_2	I'm direct
4:48:29	:03	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	Trooper 7 St. Mary's
4:48:30	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	14 engines officer
4:48:35	:07	ALPHA_5	E14_1	One up One up One up One up get the exuast fans yo stop stop pumping
4:48:40	:03	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	Engine 23 trooper 7 you called
4:48:46	:05	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	I guess dispatcher is busy we're inbound from the airport about 5 mins
4:48:48	:02	ALPHA_5	E74_2	74 is full enroute back to you
4:48:53	:04	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	Copy we're still responding we'll meet you up there
4:48:58	:04	AlPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	Ah we need more {unreadable} were you are setting us up
4:49:07	:07	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	we were informed by fireboard the LZ is going to be at Leonardtown middle school it is going to be a new LZ for yourself and trooper 2
4:49:12	:03	ALPHA_3	SAFE1	Nothing Transmitted
4:49:13	:05	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Okay 389C any unit out with truck 13 driver advise his EI status
4:49:15	:08	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	Ah roger actually now it's actually going to be the eagle as well so enough room to stage 3 please
4:49:20	:02	ALPHA_4	A_388P2	Nothing Transmitted
4:49:25	:02	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	Direct
4:49:25	:02	ALPHA_4	TANKER_4	Tanker 4 to company 6
4:49:27	:04	ALPHA_3	FC7A	{unreadable} Doug Insley come up to the front porch
4:49:29	:05	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Okay All units hold your traffic St. Mary's truck 13's driver 4:49:39
4:49:39	:03	ALPHA_4	TK13_DO	Truck 13 driver to command you trying to reach me?
4:49:43	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Yessir you EI was activated checking your status
4:49:50	:01	ALPHA_4	TK13_DO	I'm ocean king
4:49:52	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Copy 4:50
4:49:52	:06	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP2M	Trooper 2 enbound {unreadable} with a 20 minute ETA 2 0 Minute ETA
4:49:53	:01	OPS	E23_2	Trooper 2
4:50:00	:01	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	Engine 23 direct
4:50:05	:01	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	23
4:50:08	:04	OPS	E23_2	I know you are busy how many troopers or helos do I have inbound
5:50:13	:08	OPS	ECC_07	you are on alpha 2 you have trooper 7 that's on the air trooper 2 and eagle 2 have been dispatched
4:50:22	:02	ALPHA_3	E73_DR	{Background noise}
4:50:23	:06	OPS	E23_2	Copy I'm on Alpha 7 I just wanted to verify that it was now 3 helicopters and not 2
4:50:41	:02	ALPHA_3	PAXFD2P	{Background noise yelling Brice}

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4:50:50	:05	ALPHA_3	SQUAD_7	Squad 7 to command we're pulling on the scene now what equipment do you need up to the scene
4:50:56	:07	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief I got eyes on him he's right side of the front door we're going to open it up now
4:50:58	:02	ALPHA_4	A_797M	797C is on the scene
4:50:59	:00	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Nothing Transmitted
4:51:03	:06	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water Supply once ugh 14 gets out I need the next tanker to come in and dump
4:51:07	:04	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to 797 go ahead and stage find a driveway to stage right now
4:51:11	:08	ALPHA_5	E14_1	So please do not block this road we need to get access to this land {Unreadable} the ambulance you need to move you are blocking my traffic
4:51:14	:53	STMARY08		First news media to contact ECC regarding the incident
4:51:18	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 Squad 7 you on this channel
4:51:27	:02	ALPHA_5	E74_2	74 is pulling up now
4:51:30	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	74 let 14 get out they are coming by the holding tank now
4:51:43	:03	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Brain Williams and Jake Mchaffy are you both accounted for
4:51:45	:04	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's is squad 7 on this channel did they respond yet
4:51:48	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	74 14 should be past you come on down
4:51:52	:05	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	That's right they just arrived on the scene they are on Alpha 3 for the mayday as a RIT task force
4:51:54	:09	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief I need someone to put eyes on Jake Mahaffy, Tyler Brady, and Brian Williams I believe they are all out but I need confirmation
4:51:55	:02	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	Engine 23 to trooper 7
4:52:00	:02	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	Trooper 7
4:52:03	:11	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	LZ will be the parking lot in front of Leonardtown Middle school we're sitting in the center where the flag pole is located you should be clear in front of us and behind us
4:52:05	:05	AlPHA_3	E74_1	74 to 7A my crew is out here swapping bottles {rest unreadable}
4:52:05	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	I'm direct thank you
4:52:11	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Ok
4:52:16	:05	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	unreadable
4:52:17	:02	ALPHA_3	LT1C	Nothing Transmitted
4:52:27	:01	ALPHA_3	SQUAD_7	I copy Chief
4:52:29	:46	STMARY07		DPW contacts ECC to inquire what equipment is needed
4:52:40	:05	ALPHA_4	SQUAD_5	Squad 5 is arriving command is there anything additional you want us to bring
4:52:48	:08	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to squad 5 go ahead and bring your manpower up ugh squad 7 is bringing other RIT equipment now

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4:52:49	:04	ALPHA_5	E14_1	63 is that you or is that 34?
4:52:52	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	132 I'm losing water
4:52:56	:07	ALPHA_5	E14_1	next tanker stage before coming down we're going to dump 74 then I need to switch out
4:52:57	:06	ALPHA_3	FC7A	hey Chief I need two fresh crews to side alpha if you could get them for me
4:52:58	:01	ALPHA_4	SQUAD_5	Copy
4:53:09	:02	FE_DISP	WS5_DR	Water supply 5 to St. Mary's
4:53:12	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Go ahead
4:53:16	:06	FE_DISP	WS5_DR	Can you start me PD to my draft site for traffic control
4:53:17	:16	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Next tanker in line for the holding tank come on down behind 74 and mi going to have you dump from the rear I'm going to have you go to the right in that right hand lane where 132 is and back up and dump and that way we can get 74 out and get the next tanker in
4:53:18	:15	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	23 If you have someone you can send them down to the far entrance is the main entrance to the facility off route 5 {Rest is unreadable}
4:53:22	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	That's right
4:53:25	:01	FE_DISP	WS5_DR	Alright thank you
4:53:39	:02	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Nothing Transmitted
4:53:47	:10	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	We are going to have aircraft front and behind you if you can send someone down to the route 5 entrance to make sure no one pulls in that isn't welcome
4:53:59	:01	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	We're direct
4:54:12	:02	AlPHA_5	UT9_DR	Nothing Transmitted
4:54:14	:06	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Next tanker in line i need you to pull down pull down next tanker for some water come on
4:54:23	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Flow the water to them and get out of the way lets go
4:54:28	:02	OPS	MED_18P	Medic 18 St. Mary's I'm on the scene of the fire
4:54:31	:01	OPS	ECC_07	MEDIC 18
4:54:37	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Next tanker where are you come on I need this holding tank
4:54:54	:02	ALPHA_3	E73_DR	Nothing Transmitted
4:54:57	:10	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 to trooper 7 if you could standby for once second we are closing the gate on the north end to the school and we are moving over to the main entrance
4:54:58	2:53	POSITION 4SA		ECC contacts T barrack for assistance
4:55:14	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water supply to any tanker on the scene that is full of water
4:55:14	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's
4:55:15	:02	ALPHA_3	E74_1	Nothing Transmitted
4:55:18	:04	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	{Unreadable}

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4:55:24	:09	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	23 do you know if any of the patients are ready to go or whether we should be making arrangements to head down there
4:55:31	:02	ALPHA_3	E74_Dr	Nothing Transmitted
4:55:34	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Nothing Transmitted
4:55:35	:04	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	I do not believe any of the patients are ready I will get that information for ya
4:55:37	:05	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Doug Insley reposition to the front porch get those guys out of the garage we have eyes on him right now
4:55:40	:02	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	23 that's a negative
4:55:40	:06	ALPHA_7	SP_TRP7M	I know all of your people are busy let me see if the barrick knows someone
4:55:43	:46	Position 7 SA		ECC conatacts someone on the scene to have someone bring a utility to the middle school to pick up trooper 7
4:55:49	:04	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 Trooper 7 negative on patients being ready
4:55:49	:01	AlPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's
4:55:52	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Chief 6
4:55:54	:04	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	That's right can you go ahead and start me the police for crowd control
4:55:59	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	That's right
4:56:13	:09	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 to trooper 7 also you have overhead wires running from route 5 towards the school directly at the rear of my wagon
4:56:14	:03	ALPHA_5	E74_2	is that secondary water supply set up yet?
4:56:19	:18	ALPHA_5	E14_1	I have ugh 34 or 33 whichever one it was I had them go hook up themselves directly do we have any other engines sitting on the scene that's got water on it I want your water if I don't have a tanker bring me an engine down here whoever is in line send them
4:56:23	:06	ALPHA_3	E73_1	73 to 7A meet me in front of the garage
4:56:33	:02	ALPHA_4	SQUAD_5	Nothing Transmitted
4:56:40	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	I want any water I can get
4:56:44	:08	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief I got {Unreadable names of two Firefighters} going down the latter we have a visual with him right now with a active PASS alarm
4:56:47	:03	ALPHA_5	E74_2	63 is en route to ya
4:56:51	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	okay tell them come on
4:56:53	:07	ALPHA_3	E74_1	Capt.7 to the Charlie side line watch the line I have people operating in the garage
4:56:56	:01	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	go ahead
4:56:58	:07	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	23 utility 1 is going to be en route to pick up the flight medics to bring them to the scene
4:57:05	:02	ALPHA_3	E73_OIC	Hey Mark Bell

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4:57:09	:04	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	I'm direct trooper 7 you copy the message
4:57:14	:03	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief get me a {Unreadable} fire it up
4:57:24	:06	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Rector I can't copy exactly what you are saying
4:57:30	:04	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Hey do we have another tanker out there other than 63
4:57:39	:02	alPHA_5	ENG_34	34 is en route back to you
4:57:39	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	Nothing Transmitted
4:58:22	:02	ALPHA_3	PAXFD2P	{background noise} Nothing transmitted
4:58:27	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_OIC	Nothing Transmitted
4:58:39	:05	ALPHA_5	E74_2	Mark your next closest tanker is going to be 34 they just turned onto Deerwood park now
4:58:40	:02	ALPHA_3	E93_1	Nothing Transmitted {PASS device activated in background}
4:58:45	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	ok that will be good
4:59:18	:15	STMARY07		Company 1 calls in and requests a fill in
4:59:32	:02	ALPHA_3	FC3B	Nothing Transmitted
4:59:36	:07	ALPHA_3	E74_1	Capt. 7 to 7A I need a {unreadable} to the garage {unreadable}
4:59:53	:02	ALPHA_4	SQ4_OIC	Nothing Transmitted
4:59:54	:11	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Stay off the radio, Chief add two more going down there we got tucker and busel down in the hole with Peabody and the other names I already mentioned
5:00:09	:00	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	Nothing transmitted
5:00:11	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	Nothing Transmitted
5:00:15	:03	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 St. Mary's trooper 7 is on the ground
5:00:08	:01	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	23
5:00:22	:02	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 Trooper 7
5:00:25	:02	ALPHA_7	SP_TPR7M	Trooper 7 on Alpha 7
5:00:29	:10	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	Sir did you copy St. Mary's message we're requesting your medic and he's going to be taken to the scene we have a vehicle en route
5:00:34	:03	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	tanker 14 to water supply full headed back
5:00:38	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Copy
5:00:40	:06	ALPHA_3	E74_1	74 to 7A I have squad 7 coming in the garage to relive us
5:00:40	:06	ALPHA_7	SP_TPR7M	Okay I was {unreadable} I'll be standing by
5:00:49	:09	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief I need squad 7 to walk on an alternant path with Doug Insley to the down firemen they need to go through the garage and find an alternate path
5:01:02	:02	ALPHA_5	ENG_34	34's approaching where do you want me
5:01:07	:03	ALPHA_3	FC7A	7A to Doug Insley Doug Insley come in
5:01:12	:04	ALPHA_5	E14_1	who's pulling up come on up

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5:01:13	:10	ALPHA_3	SQ7_3	Squad 7 to command I got the sheriff's office out here with the excavator you requested you want them to get up there as far as they can with the trailer or you want them to unload out here
5:01:24	:04	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Get it to side A Alpha how quickly they can get it up here but get it up here now
5:01:29	:01	ALPHA_3	SQ7_3	copy that
5:01:34	:00	ALPHA_3	E73_DR	Nothing Transmitted
5:01:37	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief 1
5:01:45	:03	AlPHA_3	FC7A	Anyone near Doug Insley
5:01:56	:17	STMARY07		Chief 6A calls in to have CISM team activated
5:02:03	:04	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	St. Mary's to command your excavator should be coming up the street
5:02:10	:12	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Ambulance that is in front of the water supply units can you move your ambulance please you are blocking my traffic lane I need you out of the way please get in that driveway where that car is if anything
5:02:12	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy thank ya
5:02:33	2:14	STMARY07		SYSCOM is contacted for a CISM Team
5:02:35	:02	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 to trooper 2 are you circling
5:02:37	:07	ALPHA_3	E73_1	73 to 7A we have eyes on him we have eyes on him
5:02:39	:03	ALPHA_7	SP_TPR2M	Trooper 2 that's right
5:02:45	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	ok
5:02:48	:12	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	directly to my rear you will have power lines going from route 5 towards the school also to the rear of trooper 7 there is a flag pole in the center of the parking lot
5:02:58	:02	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	14 is approaching
5:02:58	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief 1
5:03:02	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	14 standby
5:03:02	:01	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	go ahead
5:03:05	:04	ALPHA_3	FC7A	I'm taking JA and his guys in the garage with Doug Insley and I
5:03:15	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I didn't catch it you taking guys into the garage?
5:03:30	:07	ALPHA_3	E91_1	Any rig that has saw's and fuel can you bring to side Alpha we need more saw and fuel for saw
5:03:40	:08	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy you have 3 or 4 of them at the front door in the front yard
5:03:50	:02	ALPHA_5	E74_2	74's full headed back to ya
5:03:50	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_DR`	Nothing transmitted
5:03:54	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Copy that we can slow down a little bit {Rest unreadable}
5:04:01	:01	ALPHA_5	E74_2	Copy
5:04:17	:03	FE_DISP	E41_3	Hold engine 41 out at company 1

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5:04:22	:03	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	Nothing transmitted
5:04:51	:02	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	14 Staging
5:05:08	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 St. Mary's
5:05:11	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Chief 6
5:05:14	:06	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	That's right can you go ahead and sound a second alarm for this incident and it's really for manpower we just need all the manpower we can get
5:05:20	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	That's right
5:05:23	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	Nothing transmitted
5:05	:05	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Also Chief 6 command syscom been contacted in regards to CISIM they're going to get back to us
5:05:35	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	Nothing transmitted (PASS device in background)
5:05:42	:02	ALPHA_5	ENG_63	Nothing transmitted
5:05:45	:13	ALPHA_3	FC7A	7A to command I would like for you to get me one person to collect all RIT packs on the fireground and have them sit them on side Alpha nice informally please
5:05:45	:07	ALPHA_5	ENG_63	Tanker to 63 to water supply do you want us to go to Leonardtown or supply
5:05:55	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Engine 41
5:06:02	:01	FE_DISP	ENG_41M	go ahead St. Mary's
5:06:02	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I copy they are coming
5:06:04	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Go ahead and start towards the scene, Standby to copy
5:06:04	:03	ALPHA_2	SQ7_2	Nothing transmitted
5:06:04	1:59	Position 5SA		Deputy Director Shea requests Calvert Tanker 3 Engine 3 Tanker 7 Engine 7 Calvert 2 and EMS 3 advises them to go to Alpha 11
5:06:09	1:38	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Second Alarm sounded Tower 9 engine 4 Calvert Tanker 3 Calvert Engine 3 Squad 2 Charles Tanker 2 Charles Engine 2 Calvert Tanker 7 Calvert Engine 7 Calvert Tower 2 Company 6 station 39 station 38 company 79 Calvert EMS 3 Company 59 and company 49 due
5:06:14	:08	ALPHA_5	ENG_93	engine 93 to water supply officer second fill site set up at the wise grocery store
5:06:19	:02	ALPHA_2	SQ7_2	Firefighter {unreadable}
5:06:22	:02	ALPHA_4	SQ5_3	Nothing transmitted
5:06:23	:01	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Copy that
5:06:28	:05	ALPHA_5	ENG_93	Utility 9 is going to be the officer at the wise grocery store
5:06:43	:05	ALPHA_3	SQ7_DR`	Squad 7 to command I'm confirming that the power has been secured to the house
5:06:55	:01	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	{Unreadable} to command
5:06:59	:02	ALPHA_3	E93_OIC	Nothing transmitted
5:07:05	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Chief 9B come this way

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5:07:17	:03	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 St. Mary's trooper 2 is on the ground
5:07:21	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	Nothing transmitted
5:07:21	:01	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	23
5:07:25	:06	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 St. Mary's is there any update on patient info
5:07:25	:03	ALPHA_5	E74_2	74 is back staging behind 14
5:07:29	:01	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Copy
5:07:32	:04	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	Not at this time sir
5:07:35	:03	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Safety to command the meter is still intact so we still do have power
5:07:35	:21	STMARY05		Deputy Director Shea contacts Charles for Engine 2 and tanker 2
5:07:41	:01	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	Copy
5:07:42	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	Nothing transmitted
5:07:58	:01	FE_DISP	A_599P2	599C
5:08:04	:02	FE_DISP	A_67M	67C
5:08:05	:03	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	St. Mary's
5:08:07	:03	FE_DISP	ECC_07	599C 67C go to Alpha 11
5:08:11	:08	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Command to all units operating the power should be secured at the Pannel so you shouldn't have power at all
5:08:19	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	34 come on down
5:08:26	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_OIC	Nothing transmitted
5:08:27	:03	FE_DISP	MDO_18P	MDO 18 is responding to the fire
5:08:31	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	MDO 18 Alpha 11
5:08:37	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Whatersupply to 74 come on down i need your water
5:08:38	:02	FE_DISP	TANKER_4	Tanker 4 to St. Mary's
5:08:41	:05	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Tanker 4 you can go ahead and take in the second alarm and switch to alpha 7
5:08:44	2:00	POSITION 6SA		NDW calls for an update regarding their units involved in the Mayday
5:08:47	:01	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	Nothing transmitted
5:08:49	:03	ALPHA_3	E73_1	73 to 7A
5:08:49	:02	FE_DISP	TANKER_4	10--4
5:08:58	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	go ahead
5:09:01	:17	ALPHA_3	E73_1	We have hooked up the RIT pack to the victim he is on the buddy breather now. we are going to need fresh crews my crews are exusted he is still coverd under debris but we are working on it
5:09:19	:03	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	unreadable
5:09:23	:09	ALPHA_3	FC7A	JA Nelson I need you to take over the RIT I'm going to be walking with the excavator on side bravo

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5:09:34	:08	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	Chief 7A use caution with that excavator the porch is barely hanging on if we hit that wall we're going to bring it down
5:09:36	:02	ALPHA_7	ENG_41M	41 is on alpha 7
5:09:45	:06	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	I'm going to need a small saw Zaw and a
5:09	:02	ALPHA_4	SQ5_3	Nothing transmitted
5:09:53	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_1	Nothing transmitted
5:10:02	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief 1
5:10:07	:16	ALPHA_7	FC3C	Chief 3 to all income units on the second alarm what you to stage out on route 5 prior to the entrance to the complex and I'll give you directions in a moment
5:10:08	:04	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	it's pretty tight down here I think you really can only fit one rescuer down in the basement with him
5:10:10	:01	FE_DISP	A_197M	197C
5:10:12	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	197C alpha 11
5:10:18	:03	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Pull that {unreadable} to JA Nelson
5:10:25	:02	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	Chief 3 you're on Alpha 7 with the LZ
5:10:29	:03	ALPHA_7	FC3C	Second alarm units on one channel
5:10:30	:04	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Someone near chief 5 have him contact me on the radio
5:10:34	:03	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	11 Alpha 11
5:10:41	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ7_2	unreadable
5:10:47	:18	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 to all second alrarm units i want you to statge out on route 5 prior to the entrance to chestnut hills and i'll give ya further in a moment. First incoming unit you're going to be my statge second alarm staging officer
5:10:52	:09	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 St. Mary's do you have additional info on how many total patients we have besides the trapped fireman with the reference for helicopters
5:10:57	:13	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Transfer from Charles station 3 to station 1
5:11:03	:07	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	23 at this time we believe it's 3 unaccounted for firefighters
5:11:03	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	7A to command
5:11:13	:04	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief 1 or Chief 5 Chief 1 or Chief 5
5:11:15	:01	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	Direct
5:11:19	:02	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Chief 1 go ahead
5:11:22	:14	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Alright this excavator is ready to start working on the basement window on the delta side correction the bravo side am I good to good we don't have any crews operating in the basement on the bravo side correct
5:11:25	:08	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Transfer tanker from Calvert station 6 to our station 6
5:11:25	:04	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	14 to water supply be advise SMECO is coming down the road now

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5:11:37	:07	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	we had a exterior line on that side we'll back them out just double check and get back to you in a second
5:11:43	:13	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Any response from Tower 9 Calvert tanker 3 Calvert engine 3 squad 2 Charles Tanker 2 Charles engine 2 Calvert Tanker 7 Calvert engine 7 Calvert tower 2 station 39
5:11:45	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	I'm with the line right now it's out
5:11:57	:05	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	Chief 9 to 7A I'm on the delta side now trying to see if we can get some access over here
5:12:03	:10	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Alright here's the plan with the excavator excavator is going around to side Charlie we can start working on the deck working his way in from side Charlie I need somebody operating inside to give me the okay to start
5:12:18	:02	ALPHA_11	ENG_41M	Hold engine 41 at the scene
5:12:31	:03	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Doug Insley Disregard
5:13:11	:06	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Anyone in the basement Kaylin Peabody or one of those guys in the basement answer your radio please
5:13:41	:04	ALPHA_11	CA_TA2_M	Calvert county tower 2 on Alpha 1
5:13:45	:04	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Jason Adams can you come around side Charlie and monitor the excavator
5:13:52	:01	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	That's right
5:13:56	:07	ALPHA_11	ECC_06	Copy Calvert Tower 2 20521 20521 Deerwood park drive structure fire
5:13:57	:17	ALPHA_3	E63_1	Nothing transmitted
5:14:19	:07	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	Chief 5 to Chief 7A and Chief 1 I need you to meet me on side Charlie ASAP with the excavator
5:14:28	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	I'm on the way
5:15:00	:07	FE_DISP	ECC_07	St. Mary's to any available manpower any available units who are on the air on Alpha 1 515
5:15:21	:03	ALPHA_3	FC7A	7A to command with a priority message
5:15:35	:04	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Command if you're on the channel 7A has a priority message on alpha 3
5:15:37	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Nothing transmitted
5:15:41	:01	ALPHA_3	FC7A	I'm with him
5:15:47	:03	ALPHA_3	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to 7A go ahead with your priority message
5:15:51	:03	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 St. Mary's you on this channel
5:15:52	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Standby I'm with him right now
5:15:54	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Chief 3 go ahead
5:15:58	:03	ALPHA_11	FC3C	I need a rundown of my second alarm units please
5:16:01	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	okay stand by

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5:16:06	:19	STMARY07		Company 5 calls in with a crew for their tanker. ECC advises to head towards Leonardtown
5:16:07	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	okay Chief 3 are you ready
5:16:10	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	that's right
5:16:11	:02	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 eagle 2
5:16:12	:14	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	okay for the second alarm I'm currently showing engine 41 and I have tanker 4 we also have ambulance 599C ambulance 67C and MDO 18 enroute for the second alarm
5:16	:05	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 Stmarys is the eagle on alpha 7 or they only have access to our alpha 1
5:16:30	:08	ALPHA_11	FC3C	so I just have engine 41 tanker 4 2 ambulances and a MDO
5:16:31	:02	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	I have no herd them yet stand by
5:16:45	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to command
5:16:48	:03	FE_DISP	E1010B	Charles county engine 10
5:16:49	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	okay I'm direct thank you
5:16:51	:03	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	you now have tanker 51 with 2
5:16:52	:04	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Engine 1010 you are responding on the second alarm you can switch to our Alpha 11
5:16:56	:02	ALPHA_11	A_197M	197C staging
5:16:58	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to command
5:16:58	:02	FE_DISP	E1010B	I copy switching over with 4
5:17:02	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	I copy with 4
5:17:03	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Chief 3
5:17:07	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	go ahead
5:17:09	:05	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	you have ambulance 197C there on this channel they're now in staging
5:17:11	:03	ALPHA_3	ECC_06	St. Mary's to command are you monitoring alpha 4 as well
5:17:13	:03	FE_DISP	SQUAD_2	Squad 2 with 4 switching
5:17:16	:02	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Yeah I'm here
5:17:16	:03	ALPHA_11	E1010B	Charles county engine 1010
5:17:16	:07	FE_DISP	ECC_07	SQUAD 2.
5:17:18	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Command on alpha 4
5:17:19	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Squad 2 alpha 11
5:17:21	:02	ALPHA_11	A_67M	67C is staged
5:17:22	:01	FE_DISP	SQUAD_2	copy alpha 11
5:17:22	:02	ALPHA_11	CMD6_DR	you have chief 6 on alpha 4
5:17:23	:10	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief 1 I need yourself Doug Insley Andrew {unreadable} JA to the front porch JA Andrew Doug Insley and yourself

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5:17:23	:16	STMARY08		Rick Tarr calls and advises they are enroute
5:17:25	:13	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	okay sir I know you are extremely busy with multiple channels just so you are aware the second alarm is on alpha 11 chief 3 is also on that channel I believe he is kinda helping you out as far as with command if you wanna make contact with him at his buggy
5:17:25	:04	FE_DISP	EMSCH18M	EMS chief 18 ST. Mary's I'm responding to the fire
5:17:25	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	staging 67C
5:17:30	:07	ALPHA_11	FC3C	okay St. Mary's when they markup forget any additional they need to stage out on route 5 prior to chestnut hills
5:17:30	:05	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Chief if want the first alarm go to alpha 4 just hold your traffic everyone else is on alpha 11
5:17:41	:01	FE_DISP	EMSCH18M	Can you repeat that
5:17:41	:05	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay I copy any second alarm units stage on route 5 prior to chestnut hills
5:17:43	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Standby I'm going to have to give you a public service
5:17:43	:03	FE_DISP	ECC_07	You go ahead and go to alpha 4 just hold your traffic
5:17:48	:01	FE_DISP	EMSCH18M	gotcha thank you
5:17:50	:03	ALPHA_11	ENG_41M	Engine 41 is going to be at staging in about 5 minutes
5:17:54	:02	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Chief 1 to St. Mary's
5:17:55	:03	ALPHA_5	ENG_63	Tanker 63 to water supply were at staging
5:17:57	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	41 what's your manpower
5:17:58	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Chief 1
5:18:03	:03	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	you can Disregard I'll work on alpha 4 with it
5:18:08	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	I'm sorry say again
5:18:11	:02	ALPHA_11	ENG_41M	4 firefighting personnel
5:18:12	:02	ALPHA_4	CAR1_OIC	Chief 1 to St. Mary's
5:18:14	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to chief 1
5:18:16	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Copy thank you
5:18:17	:05	ALPHA_4	CAR1_OIC	How is the second alarm looking as far as ugh being able to fill it on the staff on the units
5:18:19	:04	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	St. Mary's to eagle 2 eagle 2 alpha 7
5:18:24	:11	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	we got tower couple ambulances and a medic unit we just sent the all call we've also contacted Calvert and Charles to get any units we can
5:18:36	:02	ALPHA_11	MED18A_M	MDO 18 is out with staging
5:18:37	:11	ALPHA_4	CAR1_OIC	that's correct just keep on working on filling it for me I need units and I need people that's just the main things make sure you get me some people regardless of how you get it I just need it

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5:18:39	:04	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Crisco Crisco come over to me and john Trossbach right by the garage
5:18:42	:03	ALPHA_11	CA_T2_M	Calvert {unreadable}
5:18:45	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Chief 6 to 7A he's operating on alpha 4 I'll reach him and get him up here
5:18:49	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Understood sir we're trying to get whoever we can too but I understand
5:18:58	:05	ALPHA_7	E23_2	23 St. Mary's do we have verification that there is more than one firefighter trapped
5:19:08	:02	FE_DISP	TANKER_5	Tanker 5 responding with 2
5:19	:02	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	23 Standby hold your message
5:19:13	:03	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Tanker 5 you can go to alpha 7 alpha 7
5:19:19	:01	ALPHA_4	CAR1_OIC	Command St. Mary's
5:19:26	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Command go ahead
5:19:29	:13	ALPHA_4	CAR1_OIC	when you get these units can you just advise on the equipment wise we just we need saws chainsaws k12 everything they got as far as power tool wise that's what we're going to need
5:19:34	:06	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	23 I have no radio contact with eagle 2 SYSCOM is advising they're overseeing your {unrea4dable}
5:19:42	:05	ALPHA_08	USPP_005	Egale 1 st.mary's we're canceled per SYSCOM
5:19:42	:05	ALPHA_4	ECC_07	Okay i copy also your gradal and other dozer are enroute with a police escort
5:19:46	:10	ALPHA_7	E23_2	I with the crew from trooper 2 they have contact with the eagle I'm trying to verify I'm getting word that the eagle was cancelled
5:19:50	:03	ALPHA_4	CAR1_OIC	I copy we have a excavator working on the scene now so
5:19:52	:02	FE_DISP	CA_E31_M	Calvert engine 31 with 3
5:19:56	:03	ALPHA_7	TANKER_4	Tanker 4 on location
5:19:57	:01	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	ok
5:20:00	:04	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	Tanker 4 alpha 11 please 1 1
5:20:01	:05	FE_DISP	E1002B	Tanker 1002 with 2 switching to 11
5:20:08	:06	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Calvert engine 31 you can switch to alpha 11 1002 Aswell
5:20:08	:05	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	23 the eagle has not been canceled has not been canceled
5:20:08	:04	8CALL90	NDW RE28	NDW rescue engine 28 to St. Mary's
5:20:08	:05	ALPHA_08	ECC_05	St. Mary's to eagle 1 we copy you in service at 0520
5:20:08	:05	ALPHA_4	SFTY3_P1	Safety to command SMECO is on scene and power has been secured to the house
5:20:02	:02	ALPHA_3	SAFETY79	Nothing transmitted
5:20:16	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 copies thank you
5:20:16	:03	ALPHA_11	TANKER_4	Tanker 4 on location
5:20:20	:03	FE_DISP	TRK_7	Truck 7 you can hold us on the run with 4 what's the channel

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5:20:21	:14	ALPHA_7	E23_2	23 to St.marys information per trooper 2 from the troopers from 7 on the scene apparently MIEMSS was contacted and eagle 2 was canceled
5:20:21	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay tanker 4 are you in staging
5:20:24	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Alpha 11
5:20:27	:02	ALPHA_11	TANKER_4	that's correct/
5:20:30	:03	FE_DISP	CA_TN7PB	Calvert Tanker 7
5:20:35	:04	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	Okay that was not advised through this location
5:20:39	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Calvert tanker 7 alpha 11
5:20:43	:04	ALPHA_11	E1002B	Tanker 1002 with 2.
5:20:48	:03	ALPHA_7	E23_2	That's what I'm being told by the troopers St. Mary's
5:20:59	:10	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to any unit on alpha 4 with an any type of saw report to side Charlie again any unit on the scene with available saw report to Charlie side
5:20:59	:05	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	I understand sir I apologize for the conflicting information but we weren't advised that
5:21	:02	ALPHA_3	TK13_DO	Nothing transmitted
5:21:10	:05	ALPHA_5	COM_3M	Chief 3 to water supply I have a tanker sitting out in staging from the second alarm you want them
5:21:24	:07	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Tanker 1002 you are going to be staging on route 5 prior to chestnut hill rd in Leonardtown
5:21:26	:15	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water supply to chief actually let me talk to command post I'm not going to need I'm good with the tankers I got on the scene currently let me go talk to command
0.226238426	:01	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Command to St. Mary's
5:21:32	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Command
5:21:35	:12	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	okay give me a long tone I need a long tone on alpha 3 and alpha 4 I want everyone in the front yard so long tone for everyone in the front yard
5:21:35	:02	ALPHA_11	E1002B	I copy.
5:21:41	:05	8CALL90	NDW RE28	NDW rescue engine 28 to st. mary's
5:21:42	:06	ALPHA_5	COM_3M	Okay i just got the second alarm i got put in charge of and i herd you ask for more tankers ill keep them in staging thank you
5:21:49	:07	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	7 Second long tone
5:21:58	:11	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Units on the fire ground units on the fire ground deer wood park drive all units report to the front yard all units report to the front yard
5:22:10	:06	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	6 second long tone

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5:22:17	:14	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's units operating deer wood park drive all units on the scene report to the front yard again St. Mary's all units operating on deer wood park drive report to the front yard
5:22:35	:02	FE_DISP	A_296P2	296C
5:22:38	:04	ALPHA_4	COM_3M	Chief 3 to command you want units out of staging to have down there for manpower
5:22:42	:04	FE_DISP	ECC_07	296C switch to alpha 11 hold your radio traffic
5:22:45	:05	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to chief 3 standby one second I'll confirm once I get everyone in this front yard
5:22:58	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water supply to staging second alarm
5:22:59	1:54	STMARY08		NDW contacts ECC to advise that NDW RE28 is enroute to Leonardtown on 8CALL90. Then advises they're en route to PAX. Then ECC advises them to respond to the scene
5:23:04	:02	ALPHA_11	A_296P2	296C
5:23:06	:01	ALPHA_5	COM_3M	go ahead
5:23:09	:25	ALPHA_5	E14_1	okay converse with command we aren't going to need your units but we do need all your available personnel unless it just has a driver on it then you can put them in service but we need all the man power to walk down to the scene to remove all this debris
5:23:13	:04	ALPHA_11	CA_E31_M	Calvert engine 31 on alpha 11
5:23:18	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	7A to chief 1
5:23:22	:07	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	okay Calvert engine 31 you're going to stage on route 5 in the area of chestnut hill rd.
5:23:25	:01	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	go ahead
5:23:25	:21	STMARY07		Calvert calls and advises that ambulance 239 with a medic on board
5:23:32	:02	FE_DISP	CA_ET33	Calvert tanker 3
5:23:33	:01	ALPHA_11	CA_E31_M	Direct
5:23	:02	ALPHA_5	COM_3M	Yeah I'm direct I've already sent them down there thank you
5:23:44	:02	ALPHA_5	E34_1	34 to water supply in staging
5:23:48	:02	ALPHA_11	A_296P2	296C
5:23:50	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Calvert Tanker 3 alpha 11
5:23:51	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Unit calling water supply
5:23:52	:02	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Chief 3 to {unreadable}
5:23:55	:02	ALPHA_5	E34_1	34 is back in staging
5:23:59	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Copy that we're going to be sitting for a little bit
5:24:04	:02	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Chief 3 to engine 41

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5:24:10	:01	ALPHA_11	ENG_41M	Go ahead chief
5:24				come on down here park out of the way and bring your manpower up if you have any saws on your unit bring them with you need to move this debris by hand chief 3 to tanker 4 you driver only
5:24:16	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's chief 6 or chief 1
5:24:20	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 go ahead
5:24:22	:10	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	okay I knew chief 1 was looking for manpower and apparatus so I'll run the transfer in from 13 we're going to start them to the scene you also have your whole second alarm in staging on alpha 11 if you need manpower
5:24:29	:02	ALPHA_11	TANKER_4	I got one firefighter
5:24:33	:10	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Alright send that firefighter down there as well with engine 41 tanker 51 you guys on scene
5:24:34	:03	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	okay I'm getting ready to coordinate with chief 3 in a minute
5:24:37	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Direct
5:24:47	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to chief 6
5:24:52	:02	ALPHA_11	A_599M	Ambulance 599C in staging
5:24:55	:05	FE_DISP	SQUAD_1	Squad 1 St. Mary's I'm going to deer wood park dr with 4 just need the channel
5:24:56	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	599C
5:25:00	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Alpha 11
5:25:00	:09	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Chief 3 to the ambulances just stage out there on route 5 keep your manpower on your units please
5:25:11	:01	ALPHA_11	A_599M	Yeah we got it
5:25:13	:03	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Tanker 5 you on the scene
5:25:18	:05	8CALL90	ECC_08	St. Mary's fire to rescue engine 28
5:25:21	:03	ALPHA_11	ECC_06	St. Mary's chief 3 chief 6 is trying to reach you on alpha 4
5:25:28	:05	8CALL90	NDW RE28	Rescue engine 28 to St. Mary's how do you copy this radio
5:25:34	:01	ALPHA_4	COM_3M	Chief 6 go ahead
5:25:37	:07	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	That's right command is requesting 2 engines and a special to the scene hopefully that's a total of 12 personal
5:25:37	:03	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_1	Squad 1 is on alpha 11
5:25:42	:04	8CALL90		Rescue engine 28 to St. Mary's.
5:25:42	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's to chief 3
5:25:46	:06	8CALL90	ECC_08	St. Mary's fire rescue rescue engine 28 I copy you sir

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5:25:46	:22	ALPHA_4	COM_3M	okay right now all I have is engine 41 out there with 4 I got them coming in and tanker 4 out there with 2 I got their one personnel coming in as well they're going to get as close as they can and walk up I'll get you more when I get them all I have is ambulances sitting out there I'm waiting for tanker 51 that's still trying to get more units
5:25:57	:03	FE_DISP	CA_ET33	Calvcert tanker 33
5:26:01	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Calvert tanker 3 alpha 11
5:26:07	:08	8CALL90	ECC_08	St. Mary's to engine 28 on 8CALL90 how do you copy
5:26:10	:05	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	I appreciate it sir yeah just send them up for now we'll use them
5:26:16	:10	8CALL90	NDW RE28	I copy you sir were responding to the call in Leonardtown we're on Budds Creek Rd
5:26:16	:01	ALPHA_4	COM_3M	Yeah they on their way
5:26:16	:04	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	Chief 5 to chief 7A or side Charlie
5:26:23	:01	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Go ahead
5:26:25	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's chief 6
5:26:26	:09	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	Side alpha is clear chief 6 has requested 2 engines company and a special from second alarm staging they're en route to us now
5:26:26	:07	8CALL90	ECC_08	I copy sir you okay on the address 20521 Deer Wood Park Dr
5:26:27	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Go ahead
5:26:28	:03	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Command to St. Mary's do I have any others units coming to me other than what you have given me
5:26:29	:06	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	County roads just called in as well they are approaching with the gradual if you can have someone escort them in where you need them
5:26:32	:17	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	That's correct command and I have a run down for you so I have 4 engines 5 tankers two trucks 2 squads and several Ems units in staging and if the Ems units are not going to be required if I can keep them available for county calls as they come up
5:26:35	:04	8CALL90	NDW RE28	That's correct deer wood place I copy
5:26:36	:02	ALPHA_3	CPT5	I copy we're waiting arrival side Charlie 05:26:40
5:26:40	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Stand by
5:26:42	:03	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	All personnel and equipment are cleared side alpha
5:26:51	:10	8CALL90	ECC_08	ECC inqures if NDW RE28 has other 8CALL channels
5:26:51	:07	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	yeah that's correct you can do that did you tell the second alarm units to go to alpha 11
5:26:55	:04	FE_DISP	CA_A37_M	Calvert county paramedic ambulance 37 is enroute
5:27:00	:05	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Calvert paramedic 37 you can switch to alpha 11 and hold your traffic

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5:27:03	:08	8CALL90	NDW RE28	Try that again St. Mary's all I have is 8call channels you said 8CALL92
5:27:06	:01	FE_DISP	CA_A37_M	Direct
5:27:10	:03	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	I am ready
5:27:10	:03	8CALL90	ECC_08	Thats right go to 92 9 2
5:27:13	:26	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay I'm showing engine 41 and tanker 4 already in staging we have squad 2 engine 1010 Calvert county tower 2 tanker 5 tanker 1002 Calvert county engine 31 truck 7 Calvert tanker 7 Calvert tanker 3 Calvert engine 71 squad 1 and several Ems units
5:27:26	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Chief 6 to St. Mary's
5:27:27	:08	ALPHA_3	CPT5	CPT 5 to command can I get two personnel to start operating handline back here we have a couple of hot spots that need to extinguished.
5:27:29	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Chief 6
5:27:32	:13	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	That's right ugh go ahead and keep coming to the scene ugh I'm not sure if we are going to utilize them at this moment but ugh just in case they can come up here and stage out of the way I'm not sure where they are going to find that but 05:27:41
5:27:41	:02	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	okay I'm direct
5:27:44	:04	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chief 7A to Doug Insley Doug Insley come in
5:27	:08	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Direct he just called in he's coming into the area he's going to have chief 3 who's out at staging units directing him where you need him
5:27:46	:08	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Engine 41 pull up to {unreadable} up to the scene and so is the officer of tanker 4
5:27:51	:03	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Command to chief 7A
5:27:55	:05	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	That actully may be a better idea have them stage with the second alarm until we need them
5:27:56	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	I'm coming to the buggy
5:28:01	:06	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Direct if you would chief 3 if you just just advise them of that or would you like to advise them on 11
5:28:06	:03	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	That's correct they should be switching over to 4
5:28:08	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	If you could advise them that's great I'd appreciate it
5:28:10	:04	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay chief and we are also working on fill ins for the county
5:28:10	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Absolutely
5:28:16	:01	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Direct thank you
5:28:18	:08	ALPHA_11	ECC_06	Chief 3 also per command a gradual from county roads should be coming into the area he wants him to stage out there with you if you can make contact when you see him sir

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5:28:28	:04	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Ok I'm direct
5:28:33	:03	ALPHA_11	CTYHW101	Chief 3 I'm on alpha 11
5:28:39	:02	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Last unit on alpha 11
5:28:52	:04	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Transfer Charles truck 11 to station 1
5:28:53	:02	ALPHA_3	FC7A	Chris come to the buggy
5:29:06	:04	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_1	Squad 1 to chief 3 where are the units staging
5:29:11	:03	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	They are staging out on route 5 how many people do you have on your unit?
5:29:19	:12	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Bring your personnel up here get as close as you can but get out of the way so the tankers can get in and out bring your personnel up to the scene and any saws you have as well
5:29:32	:02	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_1	Squad 1 is okay
5:29:39	:04	ALPHA_11	CTYHW101	Chief 3 this is DPW umm i lost you on that last transmission
5:29:46	:02	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	What unit is this
5:29:49	:02	ALPHA_11	CTYHW101	County Highways 101
5:29:52	:05	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	okay let me check to see if they want your unit up there as well you have the Gradall
5:29:59	:07	ALPHA_11	CTYHW101	I got two and then I have another mini excavator and skid steer getting loaded as we speak
5:30:07	:03	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	okay stay on this channel I get right back to you
5:30:12	:01	ALPHA_11	CTYHW101	10-.4
5:30:17	:05	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	Chief 1 to chief correction chief 1 to St. Mary's
5:30:18	:05	FE_DISP	E1005	Engine 10-05 two plus one
5:30:23	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Chief 1
5:30:23	:04	FE_DISP	ECC_07	1005 start towards Leonardtown for now switch to alpha 11
5:30:31	:02	ALPHA_4	FC3C	Chief 3 to command
5:30:39	:02	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Copy
5:30:46	:31	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	All units on the fire ground all units on the fire ground Chief 6 will be the accountability officer Captain Snell from company 5 will be directing all operations from side Charlie all crews are to maintain crew on side alpha standby for accountability check one minute
5:30:49	:03	ALPHA_11	CAR1_OIC	Chief 1 to chief 3
5:30:53	:07	ALPHA_4	FC3C	I got the county showing up with a 2 skid steer and some other equipment do you want that equipment up here
5:31:07	:02	ALPHA_7	CAR1_OIC	Chief 3 you on this channel
5:31:22	:02	ALPHA_5	CAR1_OIC	Chief 3 you on this channel
5:31:28	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_06	He's on alpha 4 sir

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5:31:36	:06	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Yes I was on Alpha 4 just trying to ascertain if they need the heavy equipment up there from the county
5:31:47	:03	ALPHA_11	CAR1_OIC	Chief 1 to chief 3
5:31:57	:02	ALPHA_11	CAR1_OIC	Joe you on this channel
05:32:00	:01	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	That's right chief 1
5:32:03	:02	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Do you need that heavy equipment from the county up there
5:32:05	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Stmary's chief 6
5:32:07	:12	ALPHA_11	CAR1_OIC	I copy hey chief can you ugh get one of those at staging area I need you up here to coordinate stating units and manpower wise with ugh chief 6 and 7A
5:32:08	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's chief 6 ocean king
5:32:15	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Command to Snell Mayday group
5:32:20	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to command 6 your EI status
5:32:20	:02	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Okay I'm direct
5:32:24	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Accidental
5:32:25	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ5_3	{Unreadable} I'll pass it along
5:32:28	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Copy 533
5:32:28	1:57	STMARY07		Anne Arundel county is contacted by ECC for additional Resorces
5:32:29	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	What was your unit identifier
5:32:33	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ5_3	Chief 5A
5:32	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Okay are you with him right now
5:32:37	:02	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Command to St. Mary's
5:32:40	:01	ALPHA_3	SQ5_3	That's correct.
5:32:42	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's go ahead
5:32:43	:02	ALPHA_3	CMD7_DR	Nothing transmitted
5:32:45	:09	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Okay the next fire unit that shows up on the scene they are going to have to take over staging for the second alarms units that are being called up
5:32:48	:10	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Bradley Cooper you and t-shirt get your guys to side Charlie company 4 head to side Charlie. Snell come in
5:32:55	:03	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay squad 1 have you made it to staging yet?
5:32:59	:01	ALPHA_3	CPT5	go ahead
5:33:02	:04	ALPHA_11	COM_3M	Chief 3 St. Mary's squad 1 is bringing their manpower up so it will have to be the next unit
5:33:02	:12	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	You have 4 correction 5 people I believe from company 4 Bradly cooper keester and 2 or 3 other guys headed to you right now do you have two engine company's operating right now
5:33:06	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	okay truck 7

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5:33:16	:07	ALPHA_3	CPT5	I copy I have all my personnel here we're getting ready to send a recon team in thru side Charlie get got a good hole made
5:33:19	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's to truck 7
5:33:24	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Okay I need individual names of the recon team go ahead
5:33:29	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's to squad 2
5:33:29	:01	ALPHA_3	CPT5	I copy
5:33:38	:05	ALPHA_3	CPT5	It'll be Tyler Insley and Pilkerton will be recon team 1
5:33:43	:03	ALPHA_11	E1005	Engine 1005 two plus 1
5:33:45	:06	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Copy recon team one Tyler Insley and Timmy Pilkerton do they have at least two charged handlines
5:33:49	:05	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Engine 1005 you can stage in the area of route 5 and Deer wood park drive
5:33:53	:05	ALPHA_3	CPT5	That's correct we have two charged handlines back here and a good batch of personnel
5:33:58	:03	ALPHA_11	E1005	Engine 1005 okay
5:33:59	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Direct
5:34:02	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's to squad 2
5:34:06	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Please ensure they are on some sort of tag line
5:34:07	:03	ALPHA_4	CA_ET33	Nothing transmitted
5:34:08	:01	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_2	Squad 2
5:34:10	:06	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Squad 2 will you arrive at the staging location can you take over the staging officer responsibility
5:34:19	:01	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_2	Copy
5:34:20	1:15	STMARY06		MIEMSS contacts ECC regarding CISM
5:34:25	:03	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	Tanker 14 to water supply
5:34:27	:02	ALPHA_4	FC3C	Nothing transmitted
5:34:27	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Matt Rogers report to the command post Matt Rogers report to the command post Matt rogers come on
5:34:31	:01	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Go ahead
5:34:33	:05	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	Be advised you have a couple more excavators coming down the road
5:34:39	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	Chief 5 to Chief 7A
5:34:41	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	okay I need to check with command about that
5:34:43	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Last unit go ahead
5:34:46	:06	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	Chief 5 to 7A I do have clear line of site visibility to the crews from side alpha
5:34:47	:03	ALPHA_11	CTYHW101	County highways to chief 3
5:34:49	:03	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	Alright it's going to be two graduals is going to be what they are

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5:34:54	:09	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	You have visual with the crews from the basement from side alpha is that what you are saying chief
5:35:04	:04	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	That's correct I have a line of site to them I will be monitoring them
5:35:09	:06	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Okay I want you to watch that second floor it looks like it's dropping down I don't want it to hit on top of you
5:35:25	:02	FE_DISP	CO_19	Company 19 has a crew
5:35:29	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Okay company 19 go ahead and hold it on quatres for now
5:35:35	:02	FE_DISP	CO_19	I'm direct thank you
5:35:43	:02	ALPHA_3	E73_1	Nothing transmitted
5:36:13	:01	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Go ahead
5:36:15	:05	ALPHA_3	CPT5	I'm going to need all the rotary saws and chainsaws you can muster to side Charlie
5:36:17	:03	ALPHA_11	CA_E31_M	Calvert engine 31 staging
5:36:21	1:04	STMARY07		ECC contacts PG
5:36:21	:11	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Direct Matt Rogers I need you to find someone that's not doing anything right now and get all saws on the fire ground to side Charlie mike Sullivan are you monitoring this radio
5:36:21	:03	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	14 to water supply
5:36:28	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 to truck 7
5:36:37	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 to truck 7
5:36:40	:04	ALPHA_3	CAR1_OIC	7A I'm with him now
5:36:40	:03	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	Tanker 14 to water supply
5:36:45	:12	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	ok Scott Hankinson look at the buggy Scott Hankinson look at the buggy I need you to get Look at me I need you to get all the saws to side Charlie every saw that is on this fire ground to side Charlie
5:36:53	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's to squad 2
5:37:03	:03	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's to squad 2
5:37:08	:05	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	Chief 5 to 7A give me a fresh group from the second alarm to side alpha
5:37:09	:01	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_2	Squad 2
5:37:11	:08	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Squad 2 when you get to staging I need you to get all of your saws all the saws from other units gather it all up and let us know when you have that
5:37:15	:06	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Chief you have truck 7 coming up now and I'm giving you a engine company I believe it is is going to be St. Lenard engine 7 but I'll get back to you in a minute
5:37:22	:01	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_2	I copy
5:37:22	:03	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	Okay a just need them to man the handline here on side alpha
5:37:25	:04	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 to Truck 7 you on this channel

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5:37:38	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	St. Mary's is truck 7 on this channel
5:37:41	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Chief 3 I have been unable to reach them
5:37:48	1:01	STMARY07		Anne Arundel contacts ECC and Advises they're sending their Engine 91 Tanker 9 and truck 42
5:37:50	:08	ALPHA_11	CA_E31_M	Calvert engine 31 to St. Mary's myself and NDW engine 28 are in staging
5:38:02	:07	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay do either of those apparatus have any saws that can be brought to the scene chief 3 are you direct
5:38:10	:02	ALPHA_7	TANKER_5	Tanker 5 is on 2
5:38:11	:11	ALPHA_11	FC3C	That's right I need NDW 28 engine crew to the scene I need truck 7 up to the scene if we can get in contact with them and you just sent umm what unit up to the scene
5:38:16	:46	STMARY06		PG contacts st Mary's advising Paramedic engine tanker 36 and tanker 36 are en route
5:38:20	:04	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	Tanker 5 Alpha 11 1 1
5:38:23	:04	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Calvert 31 if they have any saws they can bring them up to you
5:38:26	:03	ALPHA_4	CA_ET33	Calvert tanker 3 staging
5:38:29	:05	ALPHA_11	CA_E31_M	That's correct engine 28 is working their way back now they have the saws
5:38:35	:03	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Okay I'm direct thank you
5:38:41	:03	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_1	St. Mary's squad 1 is on the scene
5:38:45	:03	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay squad 1 and saws that you have as well
5:38:50	:03	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_1	got it do you want me to remain on alpha 11
5:38:58	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Chief 3
5:39:01	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	go ahead
5:39:03	:08	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	okay squad 1 is on the scene it sounds like they have some saws as well Dahlgren engine has some saws do want these units staying here or switching over
5:39:13	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Switch over and come to the scene
5:39:24	:03	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_2	Squad 2 is on the scene
5:39:25	:04	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Side Charlie to command 2 ppv fans side Charlie
5:39:28	:09	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay squad 2 Calvert 31 and NDW engine the operations are now on alpha 4 alpha 4 for the scene
5:39:41	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Squad 2 you got saws bring them up
5:39	:07	ALPHA_11	SQUAD_2	okay chief we are going to put them in a utility one of the Ems utility and send them down so we aren't blocking up the road way
5:39:47	:53	STMARY08		Anne Arundel calls and advises they're sending Engine 91 tanker 9 truck 42 BC3
5:39:56	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Direct

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5:39:59	:11	ALPHA_11	CA_E31_M	Calvert 31 is switching to alpha 4 be advise engine 28 does not have st marys channels they are operating on 8call
5:40:13	:08	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Okay we're okay with that just have them come on up we just need their saws right now everyone is in a stand holding period right now with the RIT team
5:40:21	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	Command how close is truck 7
5:40:26	:05	ALPHA_11	FC3C	St. Mary's all other units can stay out there and stage we'll call them up as we need'em
5:40:26	:01	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	say again
5:40:29	:06	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	All of truck 1's equipment is dead except for one I need a second PPV to the rear I'm taking one now
5:40:33	:06	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	okay St. Mary's to the incoming units continue to stage in the area of route 5 and chest nut hill
5:40:35	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Scott Hankinson find me a PPV to the rear please
5:40:45	:03	ALPHA_11	CA_T2_M	Calvert county {unreadable} is direct
5:40:56	:03	FE_DISP	CAR_7	Car7 total of 5
5:41:00	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Car 7 alpha 11
5:41:05	:04	ALPHA_7	ENG_23	23 St. Mary's trooper 2 is airborn and returning
5:41:10	:03	ALPHA_7	ECC_08	okay copy trooper 2 is in service and returning
5:41:42	:03	ALPHA_3	SQ5_1	Okay do you have a crew close that you were sending
5:41:59	:03	ALPHA_11	CA_A37_M	Calvert Paramedic ambulance 37 staging
5:42:03	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Calvert Paramedic 37 okay
5:42:35	:01	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Side Charlie to command.
5:42:38	:01	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	go ahead
5:42:40	:03	ALPHA_3	CPT5	I need additional handline side Charlie
5:42:41	:10	ALPHA_5	E74_2	74 to water supply I'm at the try and get out behind these graduals and ugh turn around and ah we'll get 63 turned around and back down to the tank
5:42:55	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Someone get the flight paramedic or the supervisor from the helicopter to the command post
5:43:04	:04	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Staging engine 33 from Calvert
5:43:13	:03	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay Calvert engine 33 I copy you in staging
5:43:21	:02	ALPHA_5	E74_1	74 to 63
5:43:22	:02	ALPHA_11	E1010B	Engine 1010 is in staging
5:43:25	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	1010
5:43:59	:07	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 St. Mary's any EMS medics sitting in staging can go in service we're going to use what we have on the scene

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5:44:07	:08	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay St. Mary's to the EMS units on alpha 11 EMS units om alpha 11 you are in service return back to the main channel
5:44:15	:04	FE_DISP	T1011	Charles county truck 1011 to communications
5:44:20	:08	FE_DISP	ECC_07	St. Mary's fire to Charles truck 11 remain on this channel start towards station one are you familiar with the address
5:44:29	:03	ALPHA_11	CH100_P	Chief 100 to chief 3
5:44:33	:04	FE_DISP	T1011	Charles COunty truck 1011 copy station 1
5:44:39	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Truck 1011 can I get your staffing
5:44:45	:02	FE_DISP	T1011	4
5:44:47	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	I copy
5:44:48	:02	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Station 2 direct
5:44:59	:05	FE_DISP	SQ4_2	Utility 4 responding for manpower total of 6
5:44:59	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	St. Mary's to command
5:45:03	:01	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Go ahead
5:45:05	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Utility 4 go to alpha 11
5:45:05	:21	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	okay if you still looking for manpower or apparatus we have quite a few units heading towards Leonardtown that offered to fill in Prince Georges engine tanker 36 their tanker 36 Charles county truck 11 we also have some units from Anne Arundel headed down might be extended ETA's but if you need them to the scene just let us know
5:45:08	:04	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Station Squad 2 to chief 3
5:45:13	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	go ahead squad 2
5:45:16	:06	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Sending 4 saws down from the rescue squad now do you want their personnel as well
5:45:23	:09	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Yeah you can bring them on up I'm at the command units right in front of the building come and see me
5:45:30	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	I'm direct just have them start filling in
5:45:34	:03	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	That's right they are all reporting to Leonardtown now we'll just
5:45:35	:01	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Copy
5:45:37	:04	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water Supply to 14 come on down to the holding tank
5:45:38	:02	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Respond to different stations when they're in the area
5:45:42	:02	ALPHA_4	CMD6_DR	Sounds like a plan thank you sir
5:45:45	:01	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	I copy
5:46:17	:01	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Side Charlie to command
5:46:19	:03	ALPHA_11	CA_T2_M	Calvert county tower 2 staging
5:46:22	:01	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Go ahead

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5:46:26	:04	ALPHA_3	CPT5	I need spare metal cutting {unreadable} to side Charlie
5:46:29	:03	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's is Calvert tower 2 in staging
5:46:33	:04	ALPHA_3	CPT5	For the rotary saws and any other rotary saws you can get
5:46:39	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 to squad 2
5:46:39	:38	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	okay all personnel on the fireground monitor your radio for a second Chief 9B will now be the logistics Officer Ryan Lockrow turn around and look at me you are assigned to work with him we need to collect Airpacks RIT packs metal cutting blades and metal saws they all need to be taken to side Charlie you are working with the guy behind you in the blue tank top Scott Hankinson you two need to work on getting all that equipment to side Charlie you have all the people on side alpha to your disposal okay
5:46:41	:03	FE_DISP	CA_TN7PB	Calvert Tanker seven on location
5:46:46	:02	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	St. Mary's you calling squad 2
5:46:47	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Calvert tanker seven you can switch to alpha 11
5:46	:07	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 to squad 2 bring your RIT bags up as well if you have any metal cutting blades bring them up as well
5:47:02	:05	ALPHA_11	A_67M	67C to St. Mary's is that correct did you release us
5:47:06	:03	ALPHA_4	CA_TN7PB	Calvert tanker 7 on location
5:47:08	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	67 you're in service
5:47:15	:04	ALPHA_11	CA_E71_M	Calvert engine 72 tanker 7 are in staging
5:47:17	:01	ALPHA_4	ECC_06	Okay calvert tanker 7
5:47:19	:02	FE_DISP	A_67M	67C back on main
5:47:19	:04	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Calvert engine 72 tanker 7 okay
5:47:24	:02	FE_DISP	ECC_07	67C
5:47:25	:05	ALPHA_11	E1014B	Charles Engine 1014 en route two plus one
5:47:31	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	1014 okay
5:47:35	:03	ALPHA_11	E1002B	Tanker 1002 staging
5:47:37	:04	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Logistics to side Charlie getting your metal cutting blades off of squad 3 stand by
5:47:39	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	1002
5:47:55	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Firefighter Driscoll Firefighter Driscoll come over to the buggy
5:48:15	:03	ALPHA_5	E74_2	74 is empty headed to the fill site
5:48:20	:04	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Side Charlie 9B spare fuel for the saws as well
5:48:26	:01	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Copy
5:49:20	:03	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Staging to chief 3
5:49:25	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Go ahead

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5:49:27	:09	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	3 firefighters from squad 2 with a RIT bag saws and spare blades are en route down to you
5:49:35	:07	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Chief Watts Chief Watts come to the command post Chief Watts
5:46:38	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Thank you I appreciate it
5:49:57	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	34 water supply 34 come on down
5:50:03	:01	ALPHA_5	E34_1	Headed your way
5:50:38	:03	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Side Charlie have one can of gas coming around to you and we're getting more
5:51:26	:02	ALPHA_3	F136_FF	Nothing transmitted
5:52:05	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	14 will be going to Calloway to fill up
5:52:16	:02	ALPHA_3	FC5A	Nothing transmitted
5:52:20	:10	ALPHA_3	CMD7_DR	Capt. Insley to mayday group and command We have located Brice we're over top of him now we have a little bit more debris to move and then we're going to try and pull him out okay
5:52:45	:01	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Go ahead
5:52:47	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	I have approximately 8-10 personnel fresh out here do you need any of them out there
5:52:55	:03	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Negative right now we have plenty back here
5:52:59	:10	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Okay Chief Watts is coming to side Charlie now he has the plan of attack moving forward please coordinate with him and follow those instructions he has the plan
5:53:11	:02	ALPHA_3	CPT5	I copy meeting with him now
5:53:14	:02	ALPHA_4	SQ1_DR	Nothing transmitted
5:53:16	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	389's Officer or Driver 389's officer or driver come in
5:53:24	:02	ALPHA_3	E93_OIC	93's officer go ahead
5:53:25	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Command to 63 you'll be next up I'll let ya know
5:53:27	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Ambulance 389's Officer come in
5:53:33	:02	ALPHA_4	MEDIC_5P	389
5:53:39	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Someone near 389 come in
5:53:43	:10	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Staging to all suppression peace's on the scene come down to rescue squad 2 Calvert engine 33 stage there
5:53:45	:02	ALPHA_4	MEDIC_5P	Ambulance 389 go ahead
5:54:03	:04	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Chief 9B to command i have 38's ambulances crew here
5:54:22	:05	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	You can pull your suppression peace's down around the EMS units on the shoulder
5:55:17	:08	ALPHA_3	E93_1	Nothing transmitted
5:55:19	:04	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Command to St. Mary's can you tell me what units I have out in staging

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5:55:30	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Nothing transmitted
5:55:30	:04	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Staging 23 I'm getting that for you right now
5:55:37	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 St. Mary's thank you
5:55:40	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Capt. Snell come in
5:55	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water Supply to tanker 4
5:55:45	:01	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Go ahead
5:55:48	:10	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Chief 5 is coming around we have we we ugh need to handle something really quick Capt. Insley how are looking on the debris removal
5:55:59	:02	ALPHA_3	CMD7_DR	Nothing transmitted
5:56:06	:14	ALPHA_3	CMD7_DR	We've got his Waist to his head clear his legs are pinned we're working on it now we have good access to him and room to work we just have to free this stuff around his legs
5:56:09	:03	ALPHA_5	ENG_93	Water Supply {unreadable}
5:56:22	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Okay do you need any additional equipment that could help you
5:56:27	:14	ALPHA_3	CMD7_DR	Negative We have 4-5 firefighters working on it right now we just need everyone else to stand back for a second once we clear him we're going to need both crews from 13 to come inside and grab him
5:56:43	:06	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	That's already being managed Chief Watts is having that under control Keith are you tracking Tyler's message
5:56:43	:03	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Staging to chief 3
5:56:48	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Go ahead
5:56:51	:10	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Calvert Engine 33 with two Calvert engine 71 with 3 Charles engine 1010 with 4 Calvert tower two with 4
5:56:53	:01	ALPHA_3	PAXFD1P	That's right
5:56:56	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Okay .
5:57:08	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Thank you
5:57:22	:02	ALPHA_3	SQ2_3	Nothing transmitted
5:57:47	:02	FE_DISP	A_67M	67C in quarters
5:57:51	:01	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Ambulance 67C
5:58:08	:02	ALPHA_3	UT5_DR	Nothing transmitted
5:58:10	:02	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Staging to St. Mary's
5:58:15	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Staging go head
5:58:21	:14	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	I know you are a little busy If St. Mary's or MSP has a unit available that could help with traffic or if we could get someone from St. Highway or county roads to bring out a sign board
5:58:39	:04	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	okay St. Mary's to county Highway are you still monitoring this channel.

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5:58:45	:02	ALPHA_11	CTYHW101	10-4 Call my cell
5:58:47	:04	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Okay I'll give you a call staging I'm direct we're working on it
5:58:49	:03	ALPHA_3	TK7_1	Command see if we can get some fire oil to side C
5:58:54	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Repeat Please
5:58:58	:02	ALPHA_3	TK7_1	Fire oil for the saws
5:58:58	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	Absolutely Understood
5:59:03	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Logistics are you tracking that request
5:59:10	:01	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	That's correct
5:59:18	:06	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Staging to Chief 3 if water supply needs it we have two tankers in staging as well
5:59:48	:04	FE_DISP	T836	Engine Tanker 836 St. Mary's
5:59:54	:06	FE_DISP	ECC_07	Engine Tanker 836 If you could start towards station 1 are you okay on the address
6:00:02	:04	FE_DISP	T836	Direct Sir
6:00:06	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	1B to Logistics
6:00:11	:01	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Go ahead Chief
6:00:13	:10	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	If we could get some salvage buckets small shovels to side Charlie no chains just buckets to side Charlie
6:00:25	:01	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Copy
6:00:28	:02	ALPHA_5	E74_2	74 to water supply
6:00:32	:01	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Go ahead
6:00:35	:05	ALPHA_5	E74_2	I'm coming back to the scene can I get around to get to the other side of the scene
6:00:43	:04	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Negative stay up that end
6:00:49	:06	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Side Charlie to command we are pushing the 14 foot roof ladder out of the window if someone can grab it
6:00:50	:01	ALPHA_5	E74_2	Nothing transmitted
5:00:57	:05	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Don't worry about that ladder just get it out of whatever way you need it and leave it in place
6:01:05	:04	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Okay it needs to go okay they're taking it out side Charlie
6:01:13	:02	FE_DISP	E23_DR	Nothing transmitted
6:01:13	:06	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	1B you have a crew getting your floor jacks shovels and salave buckets
6:01	:14	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Alright all personnel Corey Ivaro from La Plata is getting Higher jacks bottle jacks and a floor jack he will be bringing that with his personnel to side Charlie Cpt. Snell you tracking that
6:01:24	:03	ALPHA_11	C1001CP	Truesdale you still on 11

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6:01:28	:01	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	That's correct
6:01:31	:08	ALPHA_11	C1001CP	Yeah I need to get the Squad down here we need a floor jack and a bottle jack ASAP
6:01:37	:07	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Yeah I copy that equipment won't be necessary we just need the bucket and some shovels the smaller the better
6:01:40	:09	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Direct St. Mary's you can reassign staging officer to another crew
6:01:45	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Cory you tracking that
6:01:52	:04	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Chief I got two guys from company 2's crew going to get salvage buckets {rest unreadable}
6:02:16	:03	ALPHA_11	C1001CP	Truesdale you can disregard we found one
6:02:20	:01	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Copy
6:03:12	:01	ALPHA_11	SQ4_2	In staging
6:03:25	:16	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water supply to tanker 63 once 34 passes you umm hold on yeah stand by 63 water supply to tanker 4
6:03:29	:02	ALPHA_11	E41_DR	Nothing transmitted
6:03:40	:12	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Staging to all units in the staging area that arrive on the scene have your officer come to squad 2 for a face to face officer only to squad 2 for a face to face
6:03:59	:03	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Just the units arriving
6:04:00	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Water Supply to 74
6:04:03	:08	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 to squad 2 officer once you get everything straight {unreadable}
6:04:04	:01	ALPHA_5	E74_2	Go ahead
6:04:06	:06	ALPHA_5	E14_1	okay I need you to come on down I'll get this van out of the way I I need water now
6:04:18	:04	ALPHA_5	E74_2	Alright standby I'm walking past tanker 4 do you want them up there now
6:04:22	:03	ALPHA_11	E1005	1005 to staging
6:04:24	:11	ALPHA_5	E14_1	I I need you to come down and back in and and I'll have tanker 4 side dump they can come in right behind you we're out of water
6:04:39	:04	ALPHA_5	E74_2	Okay Tanker 4 is ahead of me so I'm walking back to my unit now
6:04:47	:04	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Copy we are working on it now Logisitics are you tracking that request
6:04:50	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Okay send them down
6:04:52	:02	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Yeah that's correct
6:04:57	:08	ALPHA_3	E14_1	Water Supply to command we're getting ready to momentarily lose all water supply due to road blockage we are trying to correct it
5:05:07	:03	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Okay
06:05:28..	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	I need both of yall to come on down 74 and tanker 4
6:05:32	:02	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's to the staging officer

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6:05:36	:02	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	St. Mary's .
6:05:39	:04	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	County Highway is deploying the signboard should be about 15 to 20 minutes
6:05:44	:01	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Thank you Ma'am
6:06:08	:02	ALPHA_11	E41_DR	Nothing transmitted
6:06:21	:02	ALPHA_5	E14_1	Come on down tanker 4
6:06:26	:04	ALPHA_5	E14_1	I wanna get you to side dump and
6:06:35	:05	ALPHA_5	E14_1	34 you might have to back up so tanker 4 can cgo on down once they unload
6:06:42	:01	ALPHA_5	E34_1	Direct
6:06:46	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	1B to logistics
6:06:51	:01	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Go ahead 1B
6:06:54	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	What's the status on those shovels and buckets
6:06	:04	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Unreadable
6:07:06	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	I didn't copy any of that
6:07:09	:04	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Unreadable
6:07:11	:03	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Chief 3 to squad 2 officer in staging
6:07:20	:07	ALPHA_11	FC3C	Alright sir I need to know exactly what units you have that have personnel on them and the count of your personnel
6:07:28	:02	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Let me know when you are ready
6:07:32	:01	ALPHA_11	FC3C	I'm ready
6:07:35	:45	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	I Have Calvert engine 71 with 3 Engine 1010 from Charles with 4 Calvert tower 2 with 4 Calvert engine 33 which is a tanker with 1 tanker 5 with 2 Calvert tanker 7 with 1 Tanker 1002 with 2 utility 4 with 6 Charles engine 1005 with 2
6:07:52	:08	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	1B you should have 4 shovels that came off of truck 1 I'm still trying to find you some small buckets
6:08:01	:05	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	Okay green shovels are going to be too big we need small hand shovels
6:08:07	:01	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	Copy
6:08:20	:02	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Side Charlie to command
6:08:23	:01	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	Go ahead
6:08:25	:02	ALPHA_11	FC3C	okay thank you
6:08:30	:04	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Standby {rest unreadable}
6:08:35	:02	ALPHA_3	COM1_M	you are unreadable sir try again
6:08:39	:03	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Go ahead and have the IC report to side Charlie
6:09:05	:04	ALPHA_5	E74_2	74 to water supply you want me to back up to the tank once tanker 4 is empty
6:09:17	:08	ALPHA_3	CMD9_DR	1B Scott Hankinson is bringing you two small shovels we're still trying to find you some small buckets how small like chimney buckets would that work or you need something bigger

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6:09:27	:02	ALPHA_3	CPT5	We can cancel that request
6:09:32	:02	ALPHA_3	E11_OIC	9B standby with that
9:09:41	:07	ALPHA_5	E14_1	74 come on down behind tanker 4 get in place to the right of the holding tank and back up to it
6:09:45	:05	ALPHA_3	CPT5	Side Charlie to command both handlines went dead we need those charged
6:10:12	:02	ALPHA_3	CHF6_P2	I need the lines to side Charlie charged
6:10:20	:02	ALPHA_4	TK13_FF1	Nothing transmitted
6:10:34	:03	ALPHA_5	E14_1	34 the road will be clear you can come on out
6:10:39	:02	ALPHA_5	E34_1	You said I am clear
6:10:43	:14	ALPHA_5	E14_1	as soon as tanker 4 goes by you are clear 63 fall in behind them umm stage behind well umm well just hold up I'm going to let this tank get down a little bit I gotcha
6:11:05	:03	ALPHA_5	ENG_14	Tanker 14 to water supply I'm full headed back
6:11:21	:02	ALPHA_5	E34_1	34 is coming out
6:12:00	:02	ALPHA_11	SQ4_2	Nothing transmitted
6:14:20	:03	ALPHA_11	E1014B	Charles engine 1014 Staging
6:14:31	:03	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	1014 what's your personnel
6:14:36	:02	ALPHA_11	E1014B	two plus one
6:14:39	:01	ALPHA_11	STA2_D	Copy
6:14:40	:13	ALPHA_3	E14_1	Water Supply to command we lost draft for lack of words we are now switching back to tankers and we're going to try and establish and get some water in 132 and try and reestablish water supply
6:14:42	:01	ALPHA_11	ECC_05	St. Mary's direct
6:16:06	:01	ALPHA_3	CHF6_P2	Command St. Mary's
6:16:10	:01	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	Command .
6:16:12	:14	ALPHA_3	CHF6_P2	Firefighter has been removed we are taking him back to 389 and and then to trooper 7 the plan has already been coordinated whatever deputies you have available shut down path here to wherever the trooper is I need every intersection shut down
6:16:28	:04	ALPHA_3	ECC_09	That's correct it's Leonardtown middle school sir {unreadable}