PATUXENT RIVER, Md. — Naval Air Systems Command released findings from a comprehensive review of the V-22 Osprey aircraft on December 12, 2025, affirming the platform’s airworthiness under existing controls and outlining 32 recommendations to address safety and readiness concerns across variants operated by the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.
The review, initiated in September 2023 by NAVAIR Commander Vice Adm. John E. Dougherty, evaluated performance data primarily from the prior three to four years, with extensions for lifecycle trends. It focused on airworthiness processes managed by Program Manager Air 275 and supporting elements. The Department of the Navy and services began implementing the recommendations, with progress tracked through regular cross-service coordination.
“In coordination with V-22 service leaders, NAVAIR has developed action plans to mitigate safety deficiencies,” Dougherty said. “We are continuously evaluating procedural compliance to prevent mishaps as well as strengthening airworthiness controls to establish clear risk thresholds.”
The assessment identified accumulating safety risks from delayed material and non-material fixes, procedural non-compliance, lack of standards for cumulative risks and retirement rates, and joint program challenges due to differing service priorities and risk tolerances. Readiness issues included inconsistent best practices sharing, suboptimized supply systems, persistent reliability problems, and inventory challenges like delayed deliveries and manpower imbalances.
The 32 recommendations were grouped into safety and readiness themes. For safety, five addressed cumulative risk posture, including accelerating proprotor gearbox fixes with triple melt gears and vibration monitoring, targeting completion by 2033, with retrofits starting in June 2025; redesigning input quill assemblies by 2034, with fielding in 2027; developing mitigation plans for open system safety risk assessments by August 2025; implementing a mid-life upgrade; and conducting annual cross-service safety risk reviews starting May 2025.
Another five safety recommendations targeted procedural non-compliance, such as establishing service-specific currency and proficiency requirements by May 2025; setting mishap reduction targets by June 2025; defining variant-specific reduction plans by September 2025; implementing automated component tracking software by November 2025; and establishing controls and audits by June 2025.
Six recommendations focused on ineffective risk management, including annual risk reviews and re-validations starting January 2025; briefing open risks to users annually; defining mishap recommendation closeout processes; updating NAVAIR instructions for broader risks by February 2025; and revising naval aviation safety manuals for timelines.
Three addressed joint program implementation challenges, such as establishing a readiness and safety steering board; and defining access guidelines for safety data, with a joint memo already signed.
For readiness, recommendations emphasized non-uniform best practices, suboptimized supply and maintenance, reliability and procedural issues, and inventory management. These included setting service mission capable rates by May 2025; establishing cost targets; implementing a sustainment system; conducting cross-service reviews; standing up a V-22 supply cell; performing supply diagnostics by July 2025; reassessing manpower by specified dates; re-establishing reliability control boards by March 2025; optimizing maintenance by July 2026; reevaluating depot turnaround times by August 2025; evaluating closed-loop detailing by December 2025; and implementing a common configuration plan.
The review referenced 12 Class A mishaps from 2020 to 2024, resulting in four aircraft destroyed and 20 service member fatalities. Key incidents included a CV-22 in Norway on March 18, 2022, killing four; an MV-22 in Glamis, California, on June 8, 2022, killing five; an MV-22 in Australia on August 27, 2023, killing three; and a CV-22 off Japan on November 29, 2023, killing eight. Causes involved hard clutch engagements observed since 2010 and proprotor gearbox failures linked to material inclusions since 2006, leading to groundings in December 2022 to March 2023 for hard clutch issues and December 2023 to March 2024 following the Japan mishap.
Mishap rates showed human error or procedural non-compliance as causal or contributing in 33 percent of Class A incidents, material failure in seven, with five risks realized catastrophically. Readiness averaged 50 percent mission capable for Navy and Air Force variants, 60 percent for Marine Corps, with maintenance man hours per flight hour at 22, nearly double the naval aviation enterprise average of 12.
A concurrent Government Accountability Office report released the same day highlighted four fatal accidents since 2022, attributing unresolved risks to insufficient maintenance personnel, unclear responsibility for known safety issues, and lack of routines for sharing safety information. The GAO recommended actions to clarify oversight and improve information exchange.
NAVAIR plans to share findings across military aviation to promote best practices. Ongoing analysis includes annual risk reviews and briefings to users.
The V-22, a tiltrotor aircraft combining helicopter vertical lift with fixed-wing speed, entered service in 2007 after development beginning in the 1980s. Total acquisition costs reached $55.7 billion as of December 2019 estimates. The platform supports multi-mission operations globally, including combat and humanitarian efforts.
At Naval Air Station Patuxent River in St. Mary’s County, NAVAIR headquarters oversees V-22 testing and airworthiness. The base contributes significantly to the local economy, with fiscal year 2021 impacts including thousands of jobs and billions in output. A 2002 analysis estimated $1 billion direct impact on Southern Maryland from base activities, growing to $6.6 billion statewide by fiscal year 2008, ranking second among Maryland military installations.
Patuxent River has hosted V-22 milestones, including a 1998 test flight by the Chief of Naval Operations and incidents like a 1992 prototype crash in the Potomac River near Quantico, Virginia, killing seven crew members due to a fluid leak. A September 2023 emergency landing followed a hydraulic failure and windscreen cracks from foreign object debris.
The review follows prior assessments in 2001, 2009 and 2017, which had limited follow-through. Current efforts emphasize closed-loop safety processes to identify, assess and mitigate risks promptly.
NAVAIR’s commitment extends to all platforms, monitoring data to ensure reliability. The V-22 remains integral to national security, with sustained improvements aimed at reducing preventable mishaps.
